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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation argues for a particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarianism, namely that Mill is best read as a sanction utilitarian. In general, scholars 
commonly interpret Mill as some type of act or rule utilitarian. In making their case for 
these interpretations, it is also common for scholars to use large portions of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism as the chief source of insight into his moral theory. By contrast, I argue 
that Utilitarianism is best read as an ecumenical text where Mill explains and defends 
the general tenets of utilitarianism rather than setting out his own preferred theory. The 
exception to this ecumenical approach to the text comes in the fifth chapter on justice 
which, I argue on textual and historical grounds, outlines the central features of Mill’s 
utilitarianism.   
With this understanding of Utilitarianism in place, many of the passages 
commonly cited in favor of the previous interpretations are rendered less plausible, and 
interpretations emphasizing Mill’s other writings are strengthened. Using this 
methodology, I critique four of the most prominent act or rule utilitarian interpretations 
of Mill’s moral theory. I then provide an interpretation of Mill’s theory of moral 
obligation and utilitarianism. On Mill’s account of moral obligation (which purportedly 
holds for moral theories generally, not just utilitarianism) there is a tight relation 
between an action being wrong and it being subject to punishment by an agent’s 
conscience. The utilitarian aspect of Mill’s theory concerns the role of rules in an agent’s 
conscience. According to Mill’s sanction utilitarian view, the actions that are punished 
 iii 
 
are those actions that violate the moral rules which, if widely internalized across society, 
would promote general utility. On this account, an action is wrong when an agent 
violates a justified moral rule and is properly punished, at least by one’s conscience. An 
action is right when conditions are such that if the action were not performed, then the 
action would be properly punished by at least the agent’s conscience. I apply this 
interpretation to other notable components of Mill’s approach such as his account of 
practical action (the Art of Life) and his theory of liberty.  
     
       
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated, without hesitation, to Katie Wright.  
 
 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I have long looked forward to thanking the many individuals who helped me 
complete this dissertation. At each stage—theorizing, planning, researching, composing, 
editing, revising, and defending—there were many who added something and a few who 
helped with everything. 
 First, I want to thank my dissertation committee members. I want to thank R.J.Q. 
Adams for taking me on as a History student. I could not have written this dissertation 
without the central ideas that I developed while under his guidance. I want to thank 
Clare Palmer, especially for her thorough and incisive feedback throughout the many 
stages of this project. In several cases I saw her privilege helping me improve my work 
ahead of other pressing commitments, and for her continual willingness to push me to be 
clear and careful in my work I am sincerely grateful. I want to thank Scott Austin for his 
always sagacious and timely advice, and for his endless string of wry comments that 
brightened my mornings as I returned to the mines of Mill’s Collected Works.     
I want to thank Michael LeBuffe for spurring me to do better work in the history 
of philosophy than I thought I could. Both his confidence in my work and his high 
standards have shaped my aims and hopes for this dissertation.  
 I want to thank the Texas A&M Department of Philosophy staff for their patience 
and for helping me complete this project. Jamie Bosley, Tom Ellis, Osmara Garcia, and 
Katy Massey all came to my aid at key moments. I also want to give special thanks to 
Gary Varner for his role in making it possible for me to spend a semester working on my 
 vi 
 
dissertation with my wife at the University of Delaware. I also want to thank the 
audiences at Texas A&M University and Lehigh University where I presented portions 
of my work.  
I want to thank friends like John Forcey for our many nights of staying up and 
arguing philosophy for far longer than we had planned on and for pushing me to be a 
more creative philosopher. In addition, I want to thank Cody Jackson for helping me 
revise parts of the dissertation and for never turning away an opportunity to discuss 
moral and political philosophy.  
 I want to thank my six-year officemate and friend TJ Kasperbauer. No single 
professor or fellow student has shaped my philosophical thinking as much as he has, and 
his own drive to do philosophy well has certainly inspired whatever scholarly 
zealousness one finds in this dissertation.          
 In addition, I want to thank my parents Gary and Carol Wright. So many days I 
called them feeling tired and discouraged about my progress only to have them raise my 
spirits by reminding me that I was not alone. I also want to thank my brothers, Micah 
and Jon, and Jon’s wife Keely, as well my sister Christine and her husband Adam for 
their support and concern throughout the dissertation. Each of them reached out to me at 
different points and their encouraging words have not been forgotten. I also want to 
thank Hope Olson and Wayne Gerber for their support and counsel throughout the 
process of completing the dissertation.     
I cannot possibly give sufficient thanks to my dissertation director Linda Radzik. 
I am grateful for so many things that she did, but for two things in particular. First, she 
 vii 
 
took time away from her own projects to meet with me almost every single week from 
the time I began working seriously on this dissertation. Second, she did not allow me, for 
one moment, to entertain the idea that I could not or would not do the work that was 
necessary to complete the dissertation. For me, this was crucial beyond measure and for 
all of her work I am incredibly thankful.    
 Finally, I want to thank my wife Katie. She was there for long nights, early 
mornings, and the days with too much or too little coffee and certainly too many pages 
to write. Both for what she does, and who she is—for these and many things besides, I 
owe. Thank you all.  
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
              Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  ii 
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  viii 
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................  1 
 Basic terminology and the varieties of utilitarianism ..........................................  1 
 Interpretive methodology... .................................................................................  12 
 Outline for the dissertation ..................................................................................  14 
  
CHAPTER II RULE UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL .................  19 
 Urmson’s rule utilitarian interpretation ...............................................................  21 
 Fuchs’ rule utilitarian reading .............................................................................  29 
 Mill’s Art of Life .................................................................................................  40 
 Fuchs’ reply to Sumner and West .......................................................................  43 
 Conclusion... ........................................................................................................      56 
  
CHAPTER III ACT UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL ..................  57 
  
 Crisp’s interpretive methodology ........................................................................  59 
 The greatest happiness principle and the levels of morality ...............................  62 
 The demandingness of morality ..........................................................................  75 
 The Art of Life and supererogation .....................................................................  80 
 Sanctions and utility maximization .....................................................................  86 
 Introduction to Berger .........................................................................................  93 
 Berger’s interpretative methodology   .................................................................  94 
 Analysis of the strategy conception of rules .......................................................  97 
 Textual justifications for the strategy conception of rules ..................................  104 
 Objection to Berger .............................................................................................  115 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
CHAPTER IV MILL’S ECUMENICAL UTILITARIANISM AND HIS  
CURIOUS FINAL CHAPTER .................................................................................  121 
  
 Introduction and chapter outline.... .....................................................................  121 
 The Orthodox reading .........................................................................................  123 
 The Ecumenical reading: Mill’s audience and his attitude toward the text ........  126 
 The Ecumenical reading: Mill’s intellectual context ..........................................  134 
 Mill’s final chapter ..............................................................................................  138 
 Implications of the Ecumenical reading and the final chapter ............................  145 
 Conclusion... ........................................................................................................  148 
  
CHAPTER V DEFENSE OF THE SANCTION THEORY OF MORAL WRONG 150 
 Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong .......................................................................  154 
 The first formulation ...........................................................................................  158 
 The second formulation .......................................................................................  164 
 The third formulation ..........................................................................................  180 
 Compulsion, rules, and prospective guidance .....................................................  189 
 Summary of the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong ............................................  201 
  
CHAPTER VI MILL’S SANCTION UTILITARIANISM ......................................  209 
  
 Mill’s commitment to utilitarianism and his approach to punishment ................  211 
 Rule violations .....................................................................................................  213 
 Conscience: moral codes across and within societies .........................................  216 
 Conscience: moral wrong and the counterfactual right .......................................  219 
 The distinctness of sanction utilitarianism ..........................................................  223 
 Art of Life and utility maximization ...................................................................  226 
 Self-regarding action and sanction utilitarianism ................................................  235 
 Objections to sanction utilitarianism ...................................................................  246 
  
CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION ...............................................................................  260 
  
 Overview of the defense of the sanction utilitarian interpretation ......................  260 
 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................  270 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................  271 
 
  
 1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
 This dissertation will argue that John Stuart Mill (hereafter Mill) is best 
interpreted as a sanction utilitarian. To support this claim, I will provide arguments that 
that are both philosophical and historical in nature. The philosophical arguments concern 
the specification of various types of utilitarianism, the ways in which they are 
conceptually distinct, and how Mill’s utilitarianism in his normative ethics is related to 
his philosophical views on other matters such as his metaethics and political theory. The 
historical arguments concern Mill’s biography and his apparent intentions in publishing 
work relevant to his views in moral and political theory.  
 In this introductory chapter, I have three objectives. First, I will introduce some 
of the essential terminology relevant to understanding philosophical disputes about 
Mill’s position. Second, I will explain two contrasting positions concerning Mill’s 
intentions in publishing Utilitarianism. Third, I will outline the dissertation as a whole in 
order to describe how each chapter supports the claim that Mill is best interpreted as a 
sanction utilitarian.       
 
Basic terminology and the varieties of utilitarianism  
 As is common in philosophy, there is little agreement on how to define even the 
most basic philosophical concepts that will be used in this dissertation. This lack of 
agreement extends to the term ‘moral agent’, a term that I refer to throughout this work. 
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Sarah Buss describes agents as those who can act, deliberate about acting, and initiate 
actions in light of their deliberations.
1
 In the sense that I will be using the term, a moral 
agent is someone who can be an agent, in Buss’s sense, with respect to moral concerns 
(e.g. concerns about harming other agents, fair distributions of resources, etc.). In some 
areas of philosophy, such as animal ethics and bioethics, there is a considerable amount 
of debate about precisely what kind of cognitive or affective faculties are necessary and 
sufficient for a being to be a moral agent and whether beings like animals can be moral 
agents.
2
 I do not wish to take a stance on such issues here. When I refer to moral agents 
in this work, I will be referring to human moral agents, though this should not be 
understood as precluding the possibility of non-human moral agents.        
 In the course of the dissertation, I frequently refer to moral agents, but, to be 
clear, this dissertation is not aimed at coming to understand moral agency in a novel or 
unusual way. The same cannot be said of the term ‘utilitarianism’. Indeed, the 
dissertation will be focused around explaining and giving reasons to believe that Mill 
articulated a rather uncommon form of utilitarianism. However, as with the term moral 
agent, there is little agreement on what utilitarianism means precisely. Julia Driver 
writes that “utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morally right action is 
                                                 
 
1
 Sarah Buss, “Personal Autonomy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1997-, article 
published 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/. 
 
2
 For a recent discussion that traces the history of such questions see Mark Rowlands, Can 
Animals Be Moral? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For an argument that both animals and 
humans can be moral but that agency is species relative such that animals have different kinds of agency 
than humans see Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009).   
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the action that produces the most good.”3 While this definition does capture how 
utilitarianism is sometimes defined by philosophers, it presumes that right action 
requires maximization. But some types of utilitarianism identify morally right actions 
with doing some acceptable or satisfactory amount of good (as in satisficing types of 
utilitarianism).
4
 Alternatively, some types strive to create dispositions or motives that 
generally promote, but not necessarily maximize, happiness (as in motive utilitarianism), 
or focus on avoiding actions that cause pain and suffering (as in negative utilitarianism). 
In providing an alternative definition that speaks to these concerns, William Shaw claims 
that, “Two fundamental ideas underlie utilitarianism: first, that results of our actions are 
the key to moral evaluation, and second, that one should assess or compare those results 
in terms of the happiness they cause (or, more broadly, in terms of  their impact on 
people’s well-being).”5   
 Aside from providing a larger conceptual space that can account for non-
maximizing conceptions of utilitarianism, Shaw’s dual emphasis captures the way in 
which many philosophers think about utilitarianism, as a type of consequentialism that is 
                                                 
 
3
  Julia Driver, “The History of Utilitarianism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Stanford University, 1997-, article published Summer 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history/. 
 
4
 Admittedly, it is more common for philosophers to discuss satisficing consequentialism than 
satisficing utilitarianism. However, there is no reason, as such, that someone could not be a satisficing 
utilitarian rather than a consequentialist—it simply depends upon the theory of good in operation in the 
theory.  For a qualified endorsement of a satisficing view see Thomas Hurka, “Two Kinds of Satisficing,” 
Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 107-111. For a criticism of this type of view see Ben Bradley, “Against 
Satisficing Consequentialism,” Utilitas 18 (2006): 97-108.   
 
5
 William Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1999), 2. In using and unpacking Shaw’s definition as a way to explore utilitarianism I am 
following Dale Miller, J.S. Mill: Moral, Social, and Political Thought (Malden, MA: Polity, 2010), 71-73.   
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concerned with assessing consequences in light of a particular conception of the good.
6
 
Put generally, a moral theory is consequentialist if it judges the rightness or wrongness 
of actions solely on their consequences.
7
 As Shaw’s second tenet suggests, 
consequentialist theories can be formulated so as to promote various types of goodness, 
and utilitarianism is simply a type of consequentialism that is tied to happiness, however 
that term is understood.
8
  
 While many philosophers regard it as a truism that utilitarianism is merely one of 
the many possible types of consequentialism, Daniel Jacobson has questioned the 
legitimacy of classifying matters in this way since consequentialism has historically 
recognized certain theoretical commitments that Mill’s view does not share.9 While I am 
sympathetic to Jacobson’s arguments on this point, it is not central to my present 
concerns and thus I will provisionally allow, following general consensus, that all types 
of utilitarianism count as types of consequentialism.
10
   
                                                 
 
6
 Consequentialists might, by various means, identify several kinds of goods to try to bring about. 
 
7
 This way of putting the matter follows Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Consequentialism,” in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997-, article published Fall 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. 
 
8
 As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, consequentialism as stated is sufficiently broad that one could, in 
theory, stipulate the good as something like ‘the number of cows in Texas’ and judge actions based on 
whether their consequences promote that good.  
 
9
 Daniel Jacobson, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill,” 
Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 159-191. 
 
10
 One of Jacobson’s key arguments is that, historically, consequentialism requires deontic 
impartiality. Deontic impartiality adopts an impartial stance concerning the rules that govern all moral 
agents and says that, when considering consequences like happiness, everyone’s happiness counts in the 
same way when evaluating right and wrong action. In other words, consequentialism has a conception of 
agent neutrality built into it such that it is strictly speaking irrelevant, as a point of moral evaluation, who 
undertakes any given action. All that matters is the consequences for moral agents, regardless of who 
caused the consequences or how they are distributed across moral agents. Jacobson argues that Mill is not 
committed to this kind of impartiality in his moral theory. This is because, on Mill’s view, some actions 
are not subject to moral evaluation, regardless of the consequences of the action in question (namely, those 
that Mill classifies independently as self-regarding). Instead of being committed to deontic impartiality, 
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 That said, even if utilitarianism is a kind of consequentialism concerned about a 
particular conception of the good (i.e. utility), there are still several different varieties of 
utilitarianism to be further specified. While philosophers have articulated a wide range 
of types of utilitarianism (e.g. preference utilitarianism, motive utilitarianism, negative 
utilitarianism), interpreters of Mill’s normative ethical theory have focused especially on 
the question of whether his theory is best classified as a type of act or rule utilitarianism. 
Sanction utilitarianism, which was first outlined as an interpretation of Mill’s view by 
David Lyons, has received considerably less scholarly attention until recently.
11
 In this 
study, the focus will be on clarifying the debate among these three types of utilitarian 
interpretations. Since the purpose of this chapter is merely to introduce the basic terms of 
the debate and because there will be considerable attention to the nuances of each view 
in later chapters, I will merely sketch the commitments of each view here and return to 
them later to fill in the important details.  
  One definition of act utilitarianism says that an act is right insofar as its 
consequences for the general happiness are at least as good as any alternative available 
to the agent. In a clarifying remark on this distinction, David Brink writes that, “This 
conception of act utilitarianism is both maximizing, because it identifies the right action 
with the best available action, and scalar, because it recognizes that rightness can come 
                                                                                                                                                
Jacobson claims that Mill is committed to axiological impartiality, which says that everyone’s happiness is 
equally valuable. Therefore, so the argument goes, given that Mill is committed to axiological and not 
deontic impartiality, and given that deontic impartiality is a necessary condition of consequentialism as it 
has been historically defined, it follows that Mill is not a consequentialist. For a discussion of these two 
principles see Jacobson, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism,” 168-169.      
 
11
 See David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). For recent publications supportive, explicitly or implicitly, of the sanction utilitarian view 
see Jacobson, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism,” and Miller, J.S. Mill.   
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in degrees, depending on the action’s proximity to the best.”12 Brink also recognizes that 
this means that doing less than one’s very best is, to some extent, morally wrong.13 This 
last point is brought out by Roger Crisp, who notes that, “If an action produces 
happiness, it is—to that extent—right, and if it produces unhappiness it is to that extent 
wrong.”14 Thus, on this understanding, an act utilitarian is committed to saying that there 
is always some course of action that is the most morally worthy (i.e. the one that will 
best promote utility), and any action that promotes less utility than that one is, to some 
degree, morally wrong.     
 This claim about how act utilitarians identify actions as morally wrong has two 
important implications. First, according to act-utilitarianism, strictly speaking, there is 
no domain of intentional human action that is outside the scope of moral evaluation. 
That is to say, any action where one is, say, choosing between mutually exclusive 
options X and Y, where X and Y have different degrees of utility that are promoted by 
the agent’s choice, then that action falls within the sphere of moral consideration. 
Furthermore, it seems that, ceteris paribus, if X promotes more utility in comparison to 
Y, performing Y rather than X is morally wrong. It might not be as morally wrong as 
other actions, but it is morally wrong nonetheless.  This is true whether X and Y concern 
decisions such as whether one should order light roast or dark roast coffee or whether 
one is deciding whether to leave one’s family to become a painter in Tahiti. Of course, it 
                                                 
 
12
 David Brink, “Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997-. Article published Fall 2008. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mill-moral-political/. 
 
13
 Ibid. 
 
14
 Roger Crisp, ed., J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 115. 
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is important to clarify that, demanding as this theory is, the act utilitarian is sensitive to 
the fact that agents are cognitively limited in their respective abilities to calculate the 
utility of the consequences of actions. To avoid this and other related difficulties, one 
might adopt what has been called a sophisticated or two-level act utilitarian view.
15
 On 
this view, agents accept certain norms or principles as “rules of thumb” to help guide 
behavior in line with act utilitarianism. These rules of thumb would be imperatives like 
“tell the truth” or “don’t steal,” which, if followed in most situations, are likely to 
maximize utility. When acting on one level, agents follow the rules of thumb, and, when 
acting another level, agents would act so as to maximize utility per the demands of act 
utilitarianism. If the rules of thumb come into conflict, if the case is especially unusual, 
or if it is clear that greater utility would result from not following the rules of thumb, 
then one should undertake the action that promotes the greatest utility.  
 In contrast with act utilitarianism, which evaluates actions by direct reference to 
utility, rule utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing utility indirectly through the use 
of rules. On this theory, an action is right or wrong depending on whether or not it is in 
accord with the moral rules that are the best ones from the utilitarian standpoint. Dale 
Miller explains that rule utilitarianism is committed to two tenets: 
 1. Whether an action is right or wrong depends upon whether the ‘authoritative’ 
 set of moral rules would permit or forbid actions of that general kind; and  
                                                 
 
15
 This kind of utilitarianism is perhaps best elaborated in R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its 
Method, Level, and Point (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981). Peter Railton outlines a similar view that 
he calls sophisticated act-consequentialism. See Peter Railton “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the 
Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134–171. 
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 2. The authoritative set of moral rules is the one whose general acceptance value 
 would yield more total net happiness than the acceptance of any other set.
16
  
  This kind of rule utilitarianism is sometimes called ideal code utilitarianism, as 
its rules represent the ideal set of rules for maximizing utility.
17
 Different societies might 
endorse different ideal codes if the demands of utility are such that the alternative codes 
would lead to greater utility if they were accepted by moral agents. That said, while the 
above formulation allows for moral rules to be different across different societies, the 
rules have a notably more robust character on this theory than they do on the two-level 
act utilitarian view, where the rules can and should be overridden in cases where utility 
will clearly be maximized. Miller makes this point clearly when he writes that, 
“Crucially, the rule utilitarian’s authoritative moral rules are ‘true’ moral rules in a sense 
in which the act utilitarian’s [rules of thumb] are not: that an action violates the 
authoritative rules is a necessary and sufficient condition for its being wrong.”18     
 Whereas both act and rule utilitarianism have been discussed at length in the 
larger literature on utilitarianism and consequentialism as tenable moral theories in their 
own right, sanction utilitarianism appears to have been, for the most part, contained to 
the realm of Mill scholarship.
19
 As was noted earlier, the view was first explicated by 
                                                 
 
16
 Miller, J.S. Mill, 76. Nota bene: I will be adopting the practice throughout this dissertation of 
assigning block quotations to passages that are more than fifty words in length or that are especially 
important to the discussion at hand.   
 
17
 There are other kinds of rule utilitarianism like generalizing rule utilitarianism, but since the 
focus here is only on these three main contenders I will limit myself to only one type.   
 
18
 Ibid. 
 
19
 Elements of Mill’s theory of conscience and sanctions, however, have been incorporated into 
other non-utilitarian moral theories. See Stephen Darwall, “Moral Obligation and Accountability,” in The 
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David Lyons who outlined the essentials of the view in 1976.
20
 My aim, both in this 
chapter and in the dissertation as a whole, is not to put forward the view as a compelling 
or ultimately plausible moral theory—though I do take the view that the theory is more 
plausible than other types of utilitarianism. Instead, in this chapter, I will state and 
explain the view’s theoretical commitments and how the theory might work in practice.     
 On the sanction utilitarian view that will be defended in this dissertation, an act is 
morally wrong if and only if it is appropriate for an agent to feel the internal sanction of 
conscience (and possibly be subject to other punishments such as social or legal 
penalties), which is regulated, in part, by a code of rules that promote utility, for 
performance of the act. To see what this definition amounts to, it is helpful to compare it 
to act and rule utilitarianism. Sanction utilitarianism is similar to rule utilitarianism in 
that it resists the idea that the morality of every action should be, in principle, directly 
subject to the demands of utility (as is the case in act utilitarianism). It differs, however, 
from both act and rule utilitarianism in that these theories have no strict limits on which 
types of action might be subject to the demands of morality. Sanction utilitarianism, by 
contrast, limits the domain of morality only to those occasions where it would be 
appropriate to bring certain types of sanction against an agent. Specifically, sanction 
utilitarianism is concerned about specifying the relationship between morality and the 
internal sanction of conscience. On the sanction utilitarian view, if an agent does not 
appropriately feel the internal sanction of conscience for performing an act, then that 
                                                                                                                                                
Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 91-110. 
 
20
 David Lyons, “Mill’s Theory of Morality,” Nous 10 (1976): 101-120. 
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action is not morally wrong.
21
 Lyons, who holds that Mill’s internal sanction of 
conscience can be referred to as guilt, writes that, “To call an act wrong is to imply that 
guilt feelings, and perhaps other sanctions, would be warranted against it.”22 This means, 
however, that agents must internalize the rules that promote utility in order for them to 
function in the agent’s consciences. It would difficult for an agent to be reliably 
sanctioned by her conscience for disobeying utilitarian-based rules that she has never 
heard or thought of. As such, sanction utilitarians, like rule utilitarians, emphasize the 
importance of educating individuals in a way that allows the moral rules to be 
internalized so as to regulate consciences.  
 To give a simple illustration of the theory in action, while one should clearly feel 
the internal sanction of conscience for committing murder, other sanctions like legal 
penalties (which are external sanctions) will be appropriate as well since such 
punishments serve as an example to others and work to prevent future crimes. In the case 
of a teen lying to his reasonably inquiring parents about how late he stayed out on a 
Saturday night, sanction utilitarianism would standardly dictate that the teen should feel 
the internal sanction of conscience and be properly subject to the external sanction of, 
say, verbal punishment from his parents. He is probably safe from the external sanction 
of legal punishment since this type of punishment would probably have, on balance, 
more negative than positive future consequences for the agent.   
                                                 
 
21
 In the later chapter on Mill’s theory of moral obligation I will go into some detail about what it 
means to “appropriately feel” the internal sanction of conscience.  
 
22
 Ibid., 109. While Lyons, and later interpreters following him, refers the internal sanction of 
conscience ‘guilt’, there is scant textual evidence to suggest that Mill used this term to describe the 
sanction of conscience.    
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 What has been said so far, though, only speaks to the nature of the sanctioning 
aspect of the view. One might reasonably wonder what makes the view utilitarian. The 
utilitarian aspect specifies and justifies the rules that are in operation in the consciences 
of sanction utilitarian agents. In other words, it is the demands of utility that properly 
lead agents to internalize what rules they use in their daily lives, and those rules would 
presumably be different with a different set of values in place than those generated by a 
commitment to utilitarianism.  
 In many ways, sanction utilitarianism bears a close relation to rule utilitarianism. 
Sanction utilitarians appeal to many of the same rules as ideal code rule utilitarians when 
identifying the moral norms that agents should internalize. Unlike rule utilitarians, 
however, they do not leave it up to a matter of utility whether an agent should be 
punished for an action that violates a moral rule. Rule utilitarians justify each rule in a 
moral scheme by considering how it will affect utility outcomes—including those rules 
governing punishment. If an action is wrong, it should be punished if only if there is a 
rule which justifies the punishment in light of its effects on utility.  Sanction utilitarians, 
by contrast, recognize a non-contingent relationship between an action’s status as 
morally wrong and its status as an action that should be punished at least by their 
conscience. To put the issue rather starkly, sanction utilitarians do not even consider the 
question, “Does it make sense, from the standpoint of utility, for agents to be punished 
for breaking a moral rule?” Instead, they claim that if an action is morally wrong, the 
agent should be punished, at least by their conscience, regardless of the effects that such 
punishment might have for utility.  
 12 
 
 Now that the view has been contrasted with rule utilitarianism, one might ask 
whether sanction utilitarianism can rightly be called a utilitarian theory at all.
23
 In my 
view, it can still be justifiably be called a version of utilitarianism in the sense that, to 
recall Shaw’s definition at the beginning of the chapter, the results of actions and 
promotion of the happiness of moral agents are the key concerns in the theory. These 
concerns, however, must fit within the theory of moral obligation and Mill’s 
understanding of human moral psychology. On my reading, Mill expressly attempts to 
sketch a theory of moral psychology and moral obligation that is compatible with non-
utilitarian moral theories. Conceptually speaking, once the basics of that theory of moral 
psychology and moral obligation are in place, the principle of utility is installed as a 
guiding value that informs the rules that agents use when operating in the moral domain.    
 
Interpretive methodology  
      While philosophers have generally been in disagreement about whether to 
interpret Mill as an act, rule, or sanction utilitarian, they have been in greater agreement 
on the importance of Utilitarianism for interpreting Mill’s considered view in normative 
theory. Because of this wide agreement among philosophers, I will call this position “the 
Orthodox view.”24 In his scholarly guidebook to Mill’s famous 1861 document, Crisp 
                                                 
 
23
 One might also ask whether this is an especially compelling and plausible theory of 
utilitarianism. While I am inclined to say that Mill’s sanction utilitarianism is more plausible than some of 
the interpretations of his work, I will not be arguing for the ultimate plausibility of Mill’s view in the 
dissertation.    
 
24
 In a review of a guidebook to Utilitarianism that explored many of the relevant questions 
surrounding Mill’s moral theory, all of the book’s contributors ignored a crucial point that looms large 
over much of Mill scholarship, namely “whether Utilitarianism elaborates Mill's own moral theory, or if it 
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writes that, “in so far as Mill was an evangelist, Utilitarianism . . . can be seen as his 
Bible . . . it was clearly intended to be the summation, and defense, of his thoughts on 
the doctrine which provided the foundation for his views.”25 Crisp also argues that the 
document shows an important break with previous utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and 
James Mill. In Crisp’s view, one can read the trajectory of Mill’s philosophical life as a 
leading up to that document: a document that Mill himself supposedly held in high 
regard. This final development is expected, Crisp argues, when one begins to track 
Mill’s move away from Bentham’s views, beginning with Mill’s 1833 and 1838 essays 
criticizing Bentham’s moral philosophy. Utilitarianism is, as one biographer puts it, 
where Mill “put all of his own cards on the table” and finally dissociated himself from 
the previous iterations of utilitarianism.
26
   
 What I call the Ecumenical viewpoint takes a sharply different view of the 
document and its relation to Mill’s intellectual life. This view was first outlined by 
Daniel Jacobson and articulated in an article expressly critical of the Orthodox reading.
27
 
The Ecumenical position argues that, for the most part, Utilitarianism is not Mill giving 
his own view on matters related to utilitarianism. Rather, Utilitarianism is a document 
for popular consumption (and one that Mill did not hold in especially high regard), 
which Mill hoped would cast the utilitarian position in a more favorable popular light. 
                                                                                                                                                
had a different and considerably more modest aim.” Daniel Jacobson, “Review of Henry R. West, ed., The 
Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism,” in Notre Dame Philosophical Review, published July, 2007,  
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25072-the-blackwell-guide-to-mill-s-utilitarianism/.  
25
 Roger Crisp, Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1997), 7-8.   
 
26
 Richard Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand (London: Atlantic, 2007), 324-325. 
 
27
 Daniel Jacobson, “J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism,” Philosophers Imprint 3 
(2003): 1-18. 
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This is why, for instance, so much of the book is focused on responding to standard 
objections to the view and clarifying common confusions about what utilitarians are 
committed to. In his initial article, Jacobson argued that Mill held to a very unorthodox 
version of utilitarianism in his other writings on moral theory and in his correspondence, 
but that this view does not come out distinctly in the pages of Utilitarianism. This is not 
surprising, however, if, as the Ecumenical position supposes, Mill is writing a general 
defense of the utilitarian approach to morality, rather than a partisan defense of his own 
views. The exception to this understanding, though, concerns how one should interpret 
the final chapter on justice (chapter five) where Mill does seem to be marking out 
several distinct points of his own view. If correct, this novel reading of the text is a 
tremendously significant finding. So much of Mill scholarship depends on a thorough 
reading and comparison of passages from Utilitarianism. By revising how one should 
interpret this key document, the Ecumenical reading opens the way for seriously revised 
readings of Mill’s moral and political theory.         
 
 Outline for the dissertation  
 At this point, since the basic terms and points of debate concerning the historical 
and philosophical nature of this study have been established, it is appropriate to outline 
the remaining chapters of the dissertation.  
 In chapter two, I examine interpretations from J.O. Urmson and Alan Fuchs, both 
of whom favor rule utilitarian readings of Mill. Urmson’s interpretation is especially 
noteworthy, as it served as an important correction of earlier uncharitable readings of 
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Mill. His view arguably initiated many of key debates in contemporary Mill scholarship 
even if the specifics of his interpretation are not widely affirmed today. In the second 
part of the chapter, I provide a discussion of key features in debates about the nature of 
utilitarian rules. This provides a richer context for the third section, in which I critically 
examine Fuchs’ recent rule utilitarian interpretation of Mill. Unlike Urmson, Fuchs takes 
a broader reading of Mill’s work, drawing on his writing on Whewell, Comte, and the 
System of Logic. In many respects, Fuchs’ interpretation resembles some of the notable 
features of the sanction utilitarian view, but ultimately, I will argue, he makes key 
interpretive missteps (especially in his views of how Mill handles conflicting moral 
rules), which serve to undermine his interpretation.  
   In chapter three, I examine the act utilitarian interpretations of Roger Crisp and 
Fred Berger. Crisp, who favors a multi-level view interpretation similar to Hare’s, 
provides the interpretation that is perhaps most striking in its differences from the 
sanction utilitarian interpretation defended here—both in its methodology (e.g. his 
prioritization of Utilitarianism as it compares to Mill’s other writings) and its 
conclusions. In particular, I take issue with his reading of chapter five of Utilitarianism, 
and the especially wide scope of actions he sees as punishable under Mill’s theory of 
moral obligation. Berger’s view is arguably the more sophisticated and compelling act 
utilitarian interpretation, with several notable features that, in my view, have been 
insufficiently appreciated in the professional literature on Mill’s moral theory. In 
particular, Berger’s reading of what he calls Mill’s “strategic” conception of moral rules 
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is a well-developed idea, even if it provides a questionable understanding of Mill’s 
theory of rights.             
 In chapter four, I provide an argument for the Ecumenical interpretation of 
Utilitarianism. Aside from arguing for the superiority of the Ecumenical reading as 
compared to the Orthodox reading, I discuss methodological questions concerning how 
Utilitarianism, as a text, will be employed in the remainder of the dissertation. More 
plainly, my interpretive methodology is to put the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism at the 
center, draw heavily on Mill’s other writings on moral theory to reveal resonances with 
the passages in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism. In some cases I employ passages from 
the first four chapters of Utilitarianism but only when doing so brings out a point to 
which Mill’s contemporary utilitarians, in general, could ascribe. This last point is 
justifiable, it seems to me, since it fits with the Ecumenical approach to the text as a 
whole. If one reads Utilitarianism’s first four chapters as a common, rather than partisan, 
defense of utilitarianism, then there seems to be good reason to trust his statements that 
principally concern utilitarian theory more generally.  
 This chapter is arguably the most important chapter of the dissertation. By 
examining many of the fine details of Mill’s historical context and correspondence so as 
to make the Ecumenical reading more compelling, I make the case for reading Mill as a 
sanction utilitarian considerably more plausible. As I point out at the end of chapter four, 
passages that previously supported the alternative readings are now nullified whereas the 
passages that support the sanction utilitarian view are prioritized in importance. To date, 
no Mill scholar has employed this new reading of Utilitarianism in interpreting Mill’s 
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broader moral theory. This dissertation is partly an exercise in seeing just how different 
Mill’s theory looks when one adopts this radically revisionary reading of this famous 
text in Mill’s moral theory.   
 In chapter five, I outline my textual argument for Mill’s theory of moral 
wrongdoing and his concept of moral obligation. This is a crucial chapter of the 
dissertation because it develops my argument that Mill’s theory of moral obligation 
provides the basic framework out of which his utilitarian theory can be formed. By basic 
framework I mean the conception of moral obligation Mill believes that all moral 
theories must have, regardless of whether such theories recognize a commitment to 
utilitarianism. I argue that Mill’s theory of moral obligation, while compatible with the 
sanction utilitarianism that he seems to hold, does not itself presuppose or require a 
commitment to utilitarianism or consequentialism.  
 On my interpretation, Mill’s theory of moral wrongdoing holds an action is 
wrong precisely when it would be appropriate for an agent to feel the internal sanction of 
conscience for performance of the act. Other punishments, like social or legal penalties, 
may also be applied but these penalties have no special conceptual connection with 
moral wrongdoing. As Mill explains in chapter five of Utilitarianism and elsewhere, this 
theory of wrongdoing, at least on his iteration of it, includes expressed commitments to 
the possibility of supererogatory action, a conception of moral obligation that is 
expressly at odds with a commitment to maximizing the moral good, and a claim that 
moral obligation is fundamentally rule-oriented. For various reasons, Mill’s theory of 
moral wrongdoing, when combined with the commitments just mentioned, reveals itself 
 18 
 
to be at odds with both the act and rule utilitarian interpretations. Throughout the 
chapter, I remind the reader of ways in which this is so, though my argument for the 
nature of Mill’s own utilitarianism appears in the final chapter.   
 In chapter six, I argue for reading Mill as a sanction utilitarian. As noted above, 
much of this argument depends upon the conclusions reached in the previous chapter on 
Mill’s theory of moral wrongdoing. This will involve setting out the argument for how 
several different components of Mill’s moral theory work together. Most notably, it will 
include a discussion of Mill’s approach to the Art of Life, self-regarding action, and his 
theory of moral rules. I will then turn to some notable objections to the sanction 
utilitarian interpretation of Mill’s view. In particular, I will examine a handful of 
objections from Berger and Brink. Some of the objections will concern more textually 
oriented challenges while others will challenge the conceptual coherence of the 
interpretation I have offered here.  
 In the seventh chapter, which will be especially brief, I provide an overview of 
chief lessons that emerge from the dissertation. The objective here is not to summarize 
the dissertation as a whole but to state as clearly as possible what the dissertation claims 
to have accomplished in arguing for a particular interpretation of Mill’s moral theory. If 
the interpretation I argue for in this dissertation is correct, Mill may not be quite the 
utilitarian that he is usually thought to be, but he is surely just as interesting and, 
perhaps, more philosophically astute than is sometimes supposed.      
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CHAPTER II  
RULE UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL  
  
 The next two chapters serve as a critical review of the major debates surrounding 
the interpretations of Mill’s utilitarianism. In general, these chapters aim to clarify, 
explain, and, to some extent, evaluate some of the primary ways in which Mill has been 
interpreted. Though the next two chapters will consider a variety of perspectives on 
Mill’s utilitarianism, they do not aim at exhaustiveness. Instead, the focus is on 
prominence and relevance. That is to say, rather than surveying any and all 
interpretations of Mill’s utilitarianism that have been offered since Mill began 
promulgating his views in the mid-nineteenth century, I will aim at selecting and 
explicating those issues and positions that are useful for identifying the most plausible 
and useful interpretations that can stand either in unity or helpful contrast to my favored 
interpretation.  
 With regard to my reading of Mill as a sanction utilitarian, the reader should be 
able to see alternative conceptions of how Mill thinks utility should be promoted or 
maximized, how Mill understands moral rules, and, the importance and relevance of 
Utilitarianism to Mill’s larger intellectual biography. Put more succinctly, and too 
crudely, this chapter surveys scholarly attitudes to Mill’s moral theory and, to a lesser 
extent, his intellectual biography as it relates to his utilitarianism. For each of the 
positions I discuss, the goal is not to discuss the position in great depth or to a degree 
such that my favored position is clearly the correct one—though I will flag puzzles, 
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shortcomings, and difficulties for interpreter’s view as they arise. I will include some 
discussion of how the various positions respond to alternative views, but the argument 
for the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong and sanction utilitarian interpretations will not 
come until the fifth and sixth chapters respectively. In a sense, my objective is to reveal 
the difficulty and complexity of Mill interpretation in the next two chapters so as to 
provide a context for what I argue for in chapters five and six.      
 As was noted in the previous chapter, understandings of Mill’s normative theory 
have clustered around three primary positions: act, rule, and sanction utilitarianism. 
These are far from the only interpretations of Mill’s moral theory, but they are, in the 
view of most scholars, the primary candidates for the most plausible interpretations.
28
 
The plan here is to critically evaluate these interpretations by examining, in case of the 
act and rule utilitarian interpretations, two of each interpretation’s foremost proponents. 
In some cases, this will involve a discussion of several works by each author. In other 
cases, a single influential piece that stands as an important interpretation in its own right. 
The respective representatives for the positions will be Urmson and Fuchs (rule 
utilitarianism) and Berger and Crisp (act utilitarianism). Lyons, Miller, and Jacobson, the 
prominent sanction utilitarian interpreters, will be discussed throughout the dissertation, 
and chapters five and six build on their work, as I argue for the sanction utilitarian view.    
 
 
                                                 
 
28
For a very recent discussion of the general views adopted in the scholarship see David Brink, 
Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2013).  
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Urmson’s rule utilitarian interpretation 
 Many Mill scholars trace the origin of contemporary debate surrounding the 
interpretation of Mill’s ethics to J.O. Urmson’s article more than sixty years ago.29 
Despite being critical of Urmson’s interpretation, Berger writes that, “it would not be 
unfair to say that much of the current attention to the more general controversy stems 
from an article published in 1953 by Urmson, arguing for a kind of rule utilitarian 
interpretation of Mill.”30 Similar assessments of the article’s importance can be found in 
statements from David Copp, John Gray, and Jacobson.
31
 Urmson’s article is noted for 
its defense of the rule utilitarian reading, but also for its influential call for interpreters to 
take more care in their readings and criticisms of Mill.  
  In his opening paragraph, Urmson suggests that Mill’s critics seem to rush ahead 
in their criticism without bothering to reading the whole of Utilitarianism, let alone the 
other works that inform his arguments: “Instead of Mill’s own doctrines a travesty is 
discussed, so that the most common criticisms of him are simply irrelevant.”32 Although 
Urmson makes no serious attempt in this short essay to argue for the decisive plausibility 
of Mill’s views, “it will be maintained that, if interpreted with, say, half the sympathy 
automatically accorded to Plato, Leibniz, and Kant, an essentially consistent thesis can 
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 J.O. Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 3 (1953): 33-39. 
 
30
 Fred Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John 
Stuart Mill (Berkeley: California University Press, 1984), 65. 
 
31
 David Copp, “The Iterated-Utilitarianism of J.S. Mill,” supplementary Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 5 (1979): 75-98; John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1983), 32; Jacobson, “Diversity of Utilitarianism,” 1-2. 
 
32
 Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill,” 33. Urmson’s judgment 
here seems to have been justified as almost all contemporary discussions of Mill’s normative go back to 
Urmson’s essay, but rarely before, except in special cases like G.E. Moore’s critique of Mill’s “Proof” for 
the principle of utility.     
 22 
 
be discovered which is very superior to that usually attributed to Mill and immune to the 
common run of criticisms.”33 William Stafford has remarked that Urmson was a part of a 
larger movement in the middle of the twentieth century that kicked off a “hermeneutic” 
trend in Mill scholarship.
34
 Whereas many previous readers of Mill’s moral theory had 
interpreted him with considerable derision, Urmson inspired scholars like John Rees, 
John Robson, and Alan Ryan to take an alternative approach to works like On Liberty 
and Utilitarianism, whereby, “instead of reading his texts destructively, awarding ticks 
and crosses as if marking an exam paper, Mill is read sympathetically, in an attempt to 
fully understand his arguments and intentions.”35   
 To situate his own interpretation, Urmson discusses what he calls the received 
view of Mill’s utilitarianism. “On this interpretation Mill is looking for a test of right or 
wrong as the ultimate test by which one can justify the ascription of rightness or 
wrongness to courses of action, rightness and wrongness being taken to be words which 
we understand.”36 Not only is that test the ultimate end, it is the immediate end. In other 
words, individuals should justify each of their actions with respect to the promotion of 
utility. Some rules of thumb might be permitted when one is in a hurry, but no other 
                                                 
 
33
 Ibid. 
 
34
 This sometimes gets referred to as “Revisionism” in Mill interpretation. For deeper discussion 
of that term and its origins see Gray, On Liberty: A Defence, 10. Gray provides a fairly comprehensive, list 
of contributors on 131n17. For a more recent discussion of the revisionist literature and its influence on 
Mill scholarship see D.G. Brown “Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionism,” Philosophy, Politics, and 
Economics 9 (2010): 5-45.    
 
35
 William Stafford, John Stuart Mill (New York: St. Martins, 1998), 16-17. See also J.C. Rees, 
“A Re-Reading of Mill’s On Liberty,” in J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G.W. Smith, eds. 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 169-190; John Robson, The Improvement of Mankind : The Social and 
Political Thought of J.S. Mill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968); Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of 
John Stuart Mill (London: Macmillan, 1970). 
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 Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill,” 34.  
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considerations other than utility are permitted in justifying both immediate and ultimate 
ends of actions. Urmson recognizes that, if this is Mill’s view, it is open to two serious 
objections. First, it fails to take seriously the view that promising to undertake an action 
commits one to a moral duty to undertake that action, even apart from the consequences 
that follow from breaking or keeping the promise. Second, it seems to place every action 
in the moral domain such that trivial differences in utility resulting from an action can 
amount to a moral wrong. On this understanding of Mill’s ethics, “a man who, ceteris 
paribus, chooses the inferior of two musical comedies for an evening’s entertainment 
has done a moral wrong, and this is preposterous.”37 
 Urmson claims that if Mill’s utilitarianism really were subject to these objections 
his moral philosophy would hardly be worth looking into. Yet, Mill does not hold this 
sort of view. As a replacement for the received view, Urmson offers the following 
interpretation that affirms these four points:  
 A. A particular action is justified as being right by showing that it is in accord 
 with some moral rule. It is shown to be wrong by showing that it transgresses 
 some moral rule. 
 B. A moral rule is shown to be correct by showing that the recognition of that 
 rule promotes the ultimate end. 
 C. Moral rules can be justified only in regard to matters in which the general 
 welfare is more than negligibly neglected.  
                                                 
 
37
 Ibid., 35. 
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 D. Where no moral rule is applicable the question of rightness or wrongness of 
 particular acts does not arise, though the worth of the actions can be estimated in 
 other ways.
38
 
 Without going into great detail about the passages Urmson provides in support 
points A-D, I will give a general characterization of his two main points, especially as 
they relate to issues that have been discussed by other Mill scholars.
39
 His first concern 
is to cite passages from the second chapter of Utilitarianism where Mill treats rules not 
as easily discarded rules of thumb but rather as providing “an essential part of moral 
reasoning.”40 Though Urmson does not use the term himself, this emphasis on the 
importance of rules in grounding moral rightness and wrongness is responsible for the 
claim that Urmson is among the first to read Mill as a rule-utilitarian.
41
 Urmson defends 
his reading by calling attention to Mill’s discussion of what he calls secondary principles 
or secondary rules. In Utilitarianism Mill notes that secondary principles cannot be 
formulated without admitting of exceptions but: 
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 Most of Urmson’s article is aimed at providing support for A, B, and D, while C receives scant 
treatment (though many of his qualifications throughout the article suggest that he is aware of this). He 
writes that support for C comes more out of Mill’s On Liberty, than Utilitarianism; especially in Mill’s 
discussions of self and other regarding actions. See Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy 
of J.S. Mill,” 38-39. 
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 Ibid., 36. Urmson does admit that Mill sometimes speaks of moral rules as “corollaries” from 
the supreme principle of utility and that this has led some to read moral rules as easily discarded 
principles. In an attempt to downplay the importance of Mill’s usage of the term “corollary”, he says that, 
“Mill obviously cannot wish it be taken literally; in fact it is hard to state the relation of moral rules to a 
justifying principle with exactitude and Mill, in a popular article in Fraser, did not try very hard to do so.” 
Ibid., 38. As a supporter of the Ecumenical interpretation of Utilitarianism, I cannot help but note this 
early appeal to Utilitarianism’s status as a “popular article in Fraser” when he is attempting to downplay 
passages that sit uneasily with his reading.       
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 See Miller, J.S. Mill,  220n16, and Alan Fuchs, “Mill’s Theory of a Morally Correct Action,” in 
The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, ed. Henry West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 140. 
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 we must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary 
 principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no 
 case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and 
 if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of 
 any person by whom the principle itself is recognised.
42
  
 Urmson claims that this quote alone provides significant support for A [“A 
particular action is justified as being right by showing that it is in accord with some 
moral rule. It is shown to be wrong by showing that it transgresses some moral rule”] 
and D [“Where no moral rule is applicable the question of rightness or wrongness of 
particular acts does not arise, though the worth of the actions can be estimated in other 
ways”]. In further support of A and D, Urmson discusses the fourteenth paragraph in 
chapter five where Mill seems to link punishment by sanctions to moral obligation, and 
notes that there are actions we wish people would undertake, but yet would not convert 
those actions into moral obligations.
43
 After quoting the passage, Urmson says, “How 
supporters of the received view have squared it with this passage I do not know; they do 
not mention it . . . Mill makes it quite clear that in his view right and wrong are derived 
from moral rules . . .”44    
                                                 
 
42
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 Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill,” 35. 
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 Gray, however, has challenged Urmson’s reading, in part, by questioning 
Urmson’s identification of a tight conceptual connection between secondary principles 
and moral rules.
45
 Gray argues that Mill only speaks of moral rules as they pertain to 
justice, which, as some passages in chapter five suggest, is merely a sub-department of 
morality rather than morality as such (which seems implied by A). As Mill puts it:  
  Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials 
 of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, 
 than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found 
 to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, 
 implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.
46
  
Gray argues that this passage concerning justice and the earlier cited passage on 
sanctions in chapter five together, lead one to think that that moral rightness and 
wrongness refer to punishability rather than the institution of a moral rule. Gray allows 
that rules are more important to Mill than the received view had previously understood 
them, but not exactly in the way that Urmson suggests. In other words, according to 
Gray, Urmson has gone some way in shifting the debate about Mill’s theory of moral 
rules, but he has not yet provided conclusive evidence for A and D. On my judgment, 
however, Gray is correct to worry that Urmson has not proved his case from a textual 
point of view.
47
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 The second important point in Urmson’s article concerns his reading of the 
famous first formulation of the Greatest Happiness Principle: “The creed which accepts 
as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness.”48 As Urmson sees it, “This seems to be the well-
known sentence which is at the bottom of the received interpretation.”49 Yet, Urmson 
thinks, a closer reading of Mill’s claim does not support the received view and should 
instead be read as supporting his proposition B [“A moral rule is shown to be correct by 
showing that the recognition of that rule promotes the ultimate end”]:  
 But note that strictly one can say that a certain action tends to produce a certain 
 result only if one is speaking of type- rather than token actions. Drinking alcohol 
 may tend to promote exhilaration, but my drinking this particular glass either 
 does or does not produce it. It seems, then, that Mill can well be interpreted here 
 as regarding moral rules as forbidding or enjoining types of action, in fact as 
 making the point that the right moral rules are the ones which promote the 
 ultimate end (my proposition B). . . . And this, or something like it, is the 
 interpretation which consistency requires.
50
   
Thus, on Urmson’s view, to speak of tendencies is to commit to speaking about types, 
not tokens, of actions, and types of action can readily understood and categorized as 
falling under various rules.   
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 This line of argument from Urmson is challenged by Berger, who argues that 
Urmson’s understanding of ‘tend to’ is too narrow, and that it can make sense to speak 
of particular actions, rather than types of action, having tendencies.
51
 In other words, it is 
not necessary that talk of tendency be tied to classes of actions rather than particular 
actions. Berger does admit that one can use ‘tend to’ in order to refer to types or classes 
of actions, and that Mill sometimes uses the phrase this way. Yet, Berger suggests, even 
if Urmson’s example of alcohol’s tendency to produce exhilaration tells us something 
about how English users use and understand the phrase ‘tend to’, Urmson has not shown 
that when we speak of the tendency of particular actions tending to produce pleasure or 
pain we are speaking nonsense. To make a rather pedestrian point, particular actions can 
have many consequences—some of which are pleasure producing and some of which are 
pain producing. This is true even when one is speaking of the pleasure and pain 
experienced by the same person undertaking the action in question. If, on balance, an 
action produces more pleasure than pain, then it seems sensible to speak of that action 
tending to produce pleasure. Furthermore, if there any good consequences that follow 
from a particular act then it seems sensible to speak of that act having some tendency 
toward the good. Ultimately, Berger thinks that this more expansive way of speaking 
about tendencies more closely follows Mill’s use of the term throughout this corpus of 
writings. He also gives a helpful and, in my view persuasive, argument that Mill inherits 
this usage from earlier utilitarians like Bentham and John Austin.
52
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 In part because of Gray’s and Berger’s criticisms on these two points, few Mill 
scholars take Urmson to have given a completely satisfying textual argument for his 
view. As was noted above, this does not necessarily detract from the article’s importance 
since it appears to be at the locus of a revived methodology in interpreting Mill’s moral 
theory. As Urmson himself noted, he was really attempting little more than a “skeleton 
plan” of Mill’s account of moral reasoning. In my view, Urmson’s skeleton plan is 
ultimately on the right track (as will be evident in chapter five and six) even if he did not 
supply all of the necessary textual and philosophical justifications for the view.
53
  
 
Fuchs’ rule utilitarian reading  
 Despite the fact that Urmson’s paper appeared in 1953, it has shown continuous 
relevance to the debate on Mill’s moral theory. In 2006, Fuchs contributed an essay to a 
guidebook to Mill’s Utilitarianism, which has provided a new rule utilitarian 
interpretation of Mill that has garnered considerable scholarly attention.
54
 Fuchs’ 
primary contribution to the debate is three-fold. First, he reviews and explains central 
passages motivating the rule utilitarian reading. I will also argue, however, that he 
includes some misleading quotations that speak against his interpretation. His second 
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valuable contribution to the literature is a helpful rejoinder to L.W. Sumner and Henry 
West, who see Mill adopting both act and rule utilitarianism in cases of apparently 
conflicting valid moral rules. Fuchs does well in responding to these points overall, but 
here too I will argue that he does not respond quite as strongly as he might have. Third, 
Fuchs uses a much wider reading of Mill’s texts than Urmson to argue for his rule 
utilitarian interpretation, and as, such, provides a better comparison for the sanction 
utilitarian view I will consider in chapters five and six.    
 As with Urmson, I will not discuss all of Fuchs’ major points. For instance, in the 
course of defending his own rule utilitarian reading of Mill, Fuchs surveys many of the 
texts commonly cited by those favoring the act utilitarian interpretation. I will, for the 
time being, pass over this discussion since the next chapter discusses the act utilitarian 
interpretation in detail. Similarly, Fuchs discusses several points related to Mill’s 
doctrine of sanctions and supererogation; but these points receive significant attention 
later in chapter five so I will introduce them here only as necessary. Finally, Fuchs does 
not engage in extensive debate concerning the many understandings of rule 
utilitarianism. 
 The discussion of Fuchs will proceed by first examining the main passages that 
are Fuchs sees as motivating the rule utilitarian reading as it contrasts with the act 
utilitarian reading. While I find much that is satisfactory in Fuchs’ treatment of Mill, I 
will raise some objections to Fuchs’ interpretation, especially in his use of passages from 
Mill’s System of Logic. I will also briefly introduce Mill’s theory of the Art of Life and 
his doctrine of supererogation, both of which create difficulties for the act utilitarian 
 31 
 
view. In the next section, I will examine Fuchs’ response to objections that Mill adopts 
both act and rule utilitarianism in his conception of moral rules.    
 Fuchs opens his discussion of Mill’s rule utilitarianism by reminding the reader 
that while it is important to remember that rule utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory, 
it does not evaluate actions with direct reference to the good. Instead, rule utilitarians 
evaluate actions on the basis of conformity to moral rules. Of course, these rules 
themselves should promote utility—perhaps by maximizing it, but not necessarily. As a 
means of exploring how this might go, Fuchs considers utilitarian generalization, which 
represents one possible, though ultimately unlikely, reading of Mill’s rule 
utilitarianism.
55
 On the utilitarian generalization view, every moral action is evaluated 
with reference to the utility resulting from the general or universal performance of 
actions of that type. Thus, while utility might be maximized when, say, a particular agent 
free-loads and successfully avoids paying her income taxes with minimal loss of goods 
or services to her or other agents, the utilitarian generalization theory condemns this 
action on the basis that if everyone were to undertake that general type of action then 
general utility would be dramatically lowered. As an example of why one might think 
that this is Mill’s view Fuchs cites the following passages for support:  
 in the case of . . . things which people things which people forbear to do, from 
 moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be 
 beneficial—it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously 
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 aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be 
 generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from 
 it.
56
    
 Following this quotation Fuchs writes, with perhaps too much confidence, that 
this passage alone “gives an explicitly and unequivocal rejection of act-utilitarianism as 
the correct formulation of Mill’s theory.”57 The apparent rationale for this rather bold 
statement is that Mill seems to be claiming that even in cases where a particular action is 
judged to have, on balance, positive consequences from the standpoint of utility, one 
must consider what would likely happen if the action were to be practiced generally in 
order to determine its moral status. It is not enough, in other words, to identify an 
action’s moral status by identifying whether the action will have, on balance, positive 
consequences. Mill appears to be claiming that to identify the rightness or wrongness of 
an action one must classify an action as being of a particular type. This, of course, is 
unnecessary from an act utilitarian standpoint since all that the agent need to consider, 
strictly speaking, are the likely causal ramifications resulting from this particular action.   
 Mill’s employment of language consistent with the utilitarian generalization 
interpretation is not confined to Utilitarianism. In the following passage from The 
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System of Logic Mill seems to affirm that an action’s moral rightness is not directly 
measured against how it results in pain or pleasure:  
  There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action . . . by 
 which happiness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being 
 produced than pleasure. But conduct of which this can be truly asserted, admits 
 of justification only because it can be shown that on the whole more happiness 
 will exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make people, in 
 certain cases, regardless of happiness.
58
 
Fuchs also points to a case where Mill responds to a question regarding whether or not 
the utilitarian should readily tell a lie if greater utility seems to result from that action. In 
Fuchs’ view, Mill’s answer to this query seems more friendly to the utilitarian 
generalization interpretation than the act utilitarian view as he writes that, “The duty of 
truth as a positive duty is also to be considered on the ground of whether more good or 
harm would follow to mankind in general if it were generally disregarded and not merely 
whether good or harm would follow in a particular case.”59 Again, Mill is saying that it 
is important to consider separation of the good or harm resulting from the type of action 
and the good or harm resulting from the action itself.  
 Fuchs clearly makes some notable points in these passages, though the rhetorical 
strength of his argument is ultimately undermined because of the misleading nature of 
his quotation. Fuchs uses the ellipses to omit one of Mill’s critical qualifications on the 
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sentence from the System of Logic. Compare Fuchs’ quote to the unabridged opening 
sentence from the text itself: “There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes 
of action (though the cases are, I think, less frequent than is often supposed) by which 
happiness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced than 
pleasure.”60 Fuchs leaves out the parenthetical remark regarding how often this kind of 
case is thought to occur, which seems inappropriate as it obscures a non-trivial 
qualification.
61
 Fuchs’ rendering lets the reader suppose that these cases might be rather 
common occurrences. After all, Mill does say in the beginning of the sentence that there 
are “many” such virtuous actions where happiness is sacrificed. Fuchs might reply that it 
does not matter just how often this occurs since the maximizing act utilitarian should not 
allow for any such cases. I would agree on this point (that the passage is especially 
troubling for the act utilitarian interpretation if this is allowed at all), though Fuchs’ 
omission is still important since the passage speaks to the degree to which Mill separates 
the promotion of utility from an action’s moral worthiness. However, this is a relevant 
piece of evidence in the question of whether Mill has a maximizing conception of 
utilitarianism at all, so his selective quotation here proves misleading to the reader trying 
to decide such questions.     
 This interpretive difficulty notwithstanding, Fuchs finds these passages initially 
suggestive of the utilitarian generalization interpretation but ultimately opts for what he 
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calls an ideal moral code interpretation.
62
 On this view, an action is right when it accords 
with a moral code that has been internalized across the members of society. The ideal 
moral code interpretation differs from the utilitarian generalization interpretation in that, 
in the latter, an individual, acting on her own, determines the rules that best accord with 
utility. On the ideal code view, the code’s rules are inculcated in agents through various 
types of social mechanisms like parental upbringing and general enculturation. It is thus 
less dependent on an individual working to apply the principle of utility in light of a 
proper classification of an action’s type.63   
  Fuchs cites several considerations in favor of the ideal code view, though the 
primary reason seems to be that the utilitarian generalization account seems to permit the 
agent to consider a rule’s effect on utility in comparative isolation from other moral 
rules. That is to say, rather than following a single procedure as is the case in the 
utilitarian generalization scheme, Mill seems to allow for a hierarchy of rules and 
general procedure for rule adjudication that is more complex than the utilitarian 
generalization view seems to allow. On the ideal moral code account, moral rules are 
evaluated as part of a general code, which is:  
 a set of rules that together would maximize utility if it was adopted and followed 
 by the overwhelming majority of the members of society. Morally correct 
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 actions, in this view, are those required by the rules of such a code, while wrong 
 or permissible actions would similarly be defined in terms of its rules.
64
  
It is worth noting here that Fuchs adopts a maximizing conception of moral rules, which 
is a point I will challenge later in the chapter.       
 In support of his reading, Fuchs argues that Mill did not regard moral rules as 
mere rules of thumb. Rules of thumb, by their nature, are merely provisional and should 
be disregarded when, as the act utilitarian would have it, the potential gains in utility are 
sufficient to warrant it. Mill, though, seems to regard some moral rules, such as those 
ensuring our expectations of liberty and security, as having a claim which, “assumes that 
character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other 
considerations . . .”65 Given that this “character of absoluteness” seems squarely opposed 
to rules of thumb that can be casually cast aside, Fuchs concludes that Mill must have 
some other conception of rules at work in the text of Utilitarianism.     
 Fuchs is correct to stress the importance Mill places on agent’s sense of security, 
and its inflexible character. Fuchs points out that this concern appears in works outside 
of Utilitarianism. The concern about security appears also in Mill’s replies to William 
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Whewell, a prominent critic of the utilitarian doctrine.
66
 Mill notes in his arguments 
against Whewell that even if it were supposed that the “traceable consequences” would 
favor the summary murder of some especially odious individual, the utilitarian would 
advise against such a course of action.
67
 If society allowed for a case-by-case moral 
allowance of killing to promote utility and if it, “were thought allowable for any one to 
put to death at pleasure any human being whom he believes that the world would well be 
rid of, nobody’s life would be safe.”68 The implication here, of course, is that if none feel 
safe, then utility, in the long run, will be negatively affected. This passage in Whewell, 
then, coheres with Mill’s claim in Utilitarianism, that we depend on security for an 
enjoyment of any but the most transitory pleasures, “since nothing but the gratification 
of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next 
instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves.”69 For this reason, Mill 
says that protecting our sense of security is protecting “the very groundwork of our 
existence.”70  
 The key, then, to the ultimate promotion of utility for Mill comes in encouraging 
members of a society to adopt readily understood, generally internalized and consistently 
enforced moral rules. Fuchs illustrates this point by quote from the System of Logic 
where Mill writes that when it comes to legal rights and “the rule of veracity,” even 
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when utility would be increased by deviation from the rules in a particular case, it is 
“necessary for general security . . . that the rules should be inflexibly observed.”71 This 
talk of the inflexible observance of rules hardly seems compatible with speaking of them 
as rules of thumb, thus strengthening the rule utilitarian interpretation of Mill’s view.   
 Once again, however, this last example from Mill’s System of Logic is the result 
of selective and potentially misleading quotation. As before, Fuchs obscures parts of 
Mill’s quote so as to change the full meaning of the Mill’s sentence. Mill presents his 
comment about the “inflexible observation of moral rules” as a disjunction rather than as 
a straightforwardly definitive statement about the inflexible character of the rules.
72
 
Mill’s full quote says that, “It is necessary for general security, either that the rules 
should be inflexibly observed, or that the license of deviating from them, if such be ever 
permitted, should be confined to definite classes of cases, and of a very peculiar and 
extreme nature.”73 Though this difference (between the full quote and Fuchs’ 
abbreviation) can probably be accommodated on rule utilitarian grounds, it is worth 
noting, especially when considering the question of how Mill thought of the nature of 
exceptions to moral rules. It is more troubling (and Fuchs does not call attention to this 
fact in his citation) that this passage comes from an Appendix H in the System of Logic. 
Appendix H includes those passages that were dropped in later editions of the text 
(beginning with the third edition in 1851). This would mean that Mill had dropped this 
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passage by the time that most scholars believe he began composing Utilitarianism.
74
 
These textual issues do not mean the passage is irrelevant to Fuchs’ case, but it does 
seem to weaken his intended point concerning the continuity of Mill’s thoughts on rules 
across various texts. 
 In his discussion regarding the superiority of the ideal code interpretation over 
the utilitarian generalization reading of Mill, Fuchs noted that Mill had a complex 
understanding of the hierarchy of various rules. Specifying the nature of this hierarchy 
and its contours is an essential part of understanding Mill’s commitment to his rather 
unusual form of utilitarianism. Part of the specification of this complex hierarchy 
concerns specifying the scope of the moral domain. Fuchs interprets Mill as a 
maximizing rule utilitarian, though one who sees the moral domain as but one of the 
areas of human action that can be evaluated from the perspective of utility. To be clear, 
morality, which is governed by the principle of utility, is surely important to Mill, but he, 
“also recognizes other important aspects of our practical lives, such as the cultivation of 
personal character traits and the implementation of public policies, that, while not 
strictly matters of moral obligation, would nonetheless play vital roles in any 
comprehensive attempt to realize the greatest good.”75 Fuchs’ mention here of the 
cultivation of character traits and the implementation of public policies refers to Mill’s 
idea that action can be evaluated with respect to its proper categorization into the 
aesthetic, prudential, and moral dimension. Mill calls this theory the Art of Life.    
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Mill’s Art of Life 
 While Fuchs discusses the Art of Life, I will review it here in a way that more 
closely follows Miller, who provides an especially helpful presentation of the doctrine.
76
 
I will examine the Art of Life here in some detail as it will provide a foundation for 
future discussions of the doctrine throughout the dissertation. In Mill’s view, all arts 
have some axiological first principle that stipulates the end at which the art is aimed.
77
 
This stands in contrast to his view of the sciences, which are fundamentally descriptive 
in nature. Art, as Mill sees it, is prescriptive in that once a first principle is in place 
various rules can be provided to promote the specified end. Though there might be 
various kinds of arts in this sense (ship building, drawing, architecture, etc.) that have 
different stipulated ends, Mill believes there is an overarching “master” art that he calls 
the Art of Life. The Art of Life governs which activities should be pursued at various 
times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the principle governing the Art of Life is the principle of 
utility: “The general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the 
test by which they should be tried, is conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or 
rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of happiness is the 
ultimate principle of teleology.”78 As D.G. Brown has argued, while Mill sometimes 
casts this principle in action-guiding language, Mill seems to understand the principle of 
utility as a strictly axiological principle that specifies that happiness is the only thing 
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desirable as an end.
79
 In other words, it is not necessarily the case that all actions should 
be directly evaluated with respect to their effect on utility. Instead, in giving the 
principle as he does, Mill is explaining that any rule’s value within a given department in 
the Art of Life’s subsidiary structure of rules is going to have value in light of the 
principle of utility. It is in this sense that the principle of utility is axiological rather than 
action guiding as such. Put differently, the principle of utility stipulates what has value 
(viz., whatever contributes to utility), but it does not stipulate precisely how or to what 
extent agents should realize or pursue those values.    
 Mill explicates the Art of Life somewhat differently in his System of Logic and 
“Bentham,” but in both instances the Art of Life has three distinct evaluative 
departments, all of which serve the principle of utility in different domains of life.
80
 In 
the department of aesthetics one evaluates characters, in morality conformity to moral 
rules, and in prudence matters of personal and public policy. Fuchs seems to be correct 
when he observes that a judgment in one department’s assessment can but need not 
coincide with another’s. A person judged to have a beautiful character might correctly 
follow a moral rule, but so also might a person with an ugly character.
81
 For instance, 
one type of person might obey a moral rule out of a love for humanity, while another 
might grudgingly follow the rule simply because she suspects that she cannot avoid 
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external punishments for breaking the rule. As such, while both might be performing a 
morally right action (i.e. following the moral rules), and thus be positively evaluated 
from the perspective of morality, they can also be evaluated differently from an aesthetic 
point of view.   
 Regardless of how exactly the system fits together (Mill leaves several open 
questions concerning the intricacies of the doctrine unexplained), the most important 
point here is that morality comprises only one of these three departments. Mill highlights 
this point in his criticism of Bentham. Mill claims that Bentham commits a mistake in 
his evaluation of all of the domains of life from the standpoint of morality:  
This error, or rather one-sidedness, belongs to him not as a utilitarian, but as a 
moralist by profession, and in common with almost all professed moralists, 
whether religious or philosophical: it is that of treating the moral view of actions 
and characters, which is unquestionably the first and most important mode of 
looking at them, as if it were the sole one: whereas it is only one of three, by all 
of which our sentiments toward the human being may be, ought to be, and 
without entirely crushing our own nature cannot but be, materially influenced.
82
 
Though Fuchs does not cite this passage, it would help his rule utilitarian reading of Mill 
since it affirms the claim that Mill’s moral theory contains a hierarchy of rules as well 
the claim that not every area of life fits within the domain of morality (as is the case for 
the act utilitarian reading).     
  
                                                 
 
82
 Mill, “Bentham,” CW, 10, 112. Emphasis added. 
 43 
 
Fuchs’ reply to Sumner and West 
 With this understanding of Mill’s Art of Life in place, one can better understand 
some of the difficult challenges concerning the rule utilitarian reading that Fuchs 
considers next. As was noted above, in some cases an affirmative judgment in one 
department of evaluation (does the agent seem to have a good character?) is consistent 
with an affirmative judgment in another department (did she follow the correct moral 
rule?). But what is to be done if the rules governing, say, the department of prudence 
conflict with the department of morality? Fuchs highlights the problem by pointing to 
the fact that Lyons’ interpretation initially favored privileging the moral domain over the 
prudential in cases of apparent conflict, while later suggesting just the reverse.
83
 Sumner 
raises a similar difficulty by suggesting that, in cases when disaster is likely to follow 
upon following a valid moral rule, Mill allows for agents to appeal directly to utility in 
order to decide what to do.
84
  
 West argues that this difficulty concerning conflicting domains in the Art of Life 
is part of a larger issue in Mill interpretation. West claims that act utilitarian 
justifications are a part of both adjudicating cases of conflict in the Art of Life and 
within the doctrine of moral obligation itself. In particular, there are three cases where 
these act utilitarian appeals are appropriate: cases between two or more conflicting moral 
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rules, cases where simple exceptions to rules seem required for reasons of expediency, 
and cases where one faces a completely novel situation in which there is no applicable 
moral rule.
85
 Since West’s worries provide a notable challenge to the rule utilitarian 
view, I will note the considerations in favor of each of these cases as well as Fuchs’ 
responses. As in the previous section, I will raise some difficulties with Fuchs’ 
arguments and the ultimate soundness of his interpretation.  
 West’s first case concerns conflicts between valid moral rules. Mill seems well 
aware of potential conflicts between moral rules.
86
 He writes that, “There exists no moral 
system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation.”87 
Furthermore, Mill seems to say that utility is to be directly appealed to in just such cases: 
“If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide 
between them when their demands are incompatible.”88  Yet, Fuchs argues that Mill does 
not take the view that these cases of conflicting moral rules should be resolved in an act 
utilitarian way. “I understand [Mill], rather, as treating such potential conflicts as 
requiring limitations on the scope or range of applicability of each of the abutting rules, 
so that there really is no ultimate conflict between them.”89  
 In order to illustrate what he does think Mill intends, Fuchs mentions a case from 
late in chapter two of Utilitarianism. In considering whether one should withhold bad 
news from a dangerously ill person, Mill seems to allow that that the rules regarding 
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truth telling might be in conflict with rules protecting innocent lives.
90
 However, Mill 
does not suppose, as we would expect on the act utilitarian analysis, that one weighs the 
consequences of each alternative course of action and then acts on the one that 
maximizes utility. Instead, Mill suggests that the simple rule prohibiting lying as such 
does not apply when an innocent life is in question, and another rule stands in its stead. 
The relevant rule would be more like, “Don’t lie, except to save innocent lives,” as 
opposed to the more simple “Don’t lie.” In this way, the exceptions are built into the rule 
itself for reasons of utility. Mill notes, though, that such exceptions must be carefully 
limited so as to not lessen the emphasis that moral agents rightly place on truth telling:  
 But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may 
 have the least possible effect in weakening reliance of veracity, it ought to be 
 recognized and, if possible its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good 
 for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one 
 another and marking out the region within which one or the other 
 preponderates.
91
   
This passage is important since it explains Mill’s appeal to general utility in the earlier 
paragraph discussing conflicting rules.
92
 Considerations of utility can be used in order to 
set up what exceptions should be built into the rule itself so as to delineate where rules 
might apply and where they might not (i.e. where one rule should “preponderate” and 
one should not).      
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 Fuchs also notes that Mill’s discussion of how to handle apparently conflicting 
rules is discussed not only in chapter two of Utilitarianism but also in his analysis of 
justice in chapter five and his essay on Whewell. In the latter essay Mill gives a similar 
treatment to how to handle decisions regarding whether or not to break the rule against 
lying in light of other conflicting concerns:  
 The essential is, that the exception should be itself a general rule; so that, being 
 of definite extent, and not leaving the expediencies to the partial judgment of the 
 agent in the individual case, it may not shake the stability of the wider rule in the 
 cases to which the reason of the exception does not extend.
93
  
This passage is important in two ways. First, it stresses that Mill is willing to allow some 
degree of complexity into his rules for exceptions. The rules are probably less complex 
than would be the case in the utilitarian generalization scheme discussed earlier. Second, 
Mill seems concerned to limit the role of individual discretion in application of the rule, 
so that others may come to depend on regular compliance. This fits with Mill’s concern 
about cultivating a sense of security across society.
94
 
 In chapter five of Utilitarianism, Mill provides a comparable analysis of building 
the exceptions into the general rule when there appear to be conflicting rules concerning 
justice and the saving of human lives. “To save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a 
duty to steal or take by force the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap and compel to 
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officiate the only qualified medical practitioner.”95 That Mill would allow these 
exceptions seems surprising given how unbending he seems to regard the dictates of 
justice. After all, shortly before this passage Mill has written that, “Justice is a name for 
certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more 
nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the 
guidance of life.”96 Perhaps for this reason, Mill immediately explains these exceptions 
by saying:  
  In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually 
 say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is 
 just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the 
 particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of 
 indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the 
 necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.
97
 
Fuchs suggests that this passage illustrates Mill’s penchant for using rule utilitarian 
methods to delineate the applicability of potentially conflicting moral rules. “In this case, 
the justified extent of the right to private property is limited somewhat by the utility of 
curtailing that right with a built-in exception for all situations in which innocent life is at 
stake.”98 This supports the rule utilitarian reading, since Mill seems more concerned with 
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accommodating the proper exceptions in the rules themselves than with simply directing 
agents to weigh the utility of potential options in a more direct way.  
 In light of all these passages, it seems, then, that one need not conclude that 
conflicting rules necessitate a direct appeal to the principle of utility in deciding what to 
do in particular actions. In general, the rule utilitarian solution is to appeal to greater 
complexity in the rules to handle such cases, since allowing for direct appeals to utility 
would undermine everyone’s confidence, since no one can be sure that the rules will be 
followed. If everyone is made aware of the exceptions, as Mill seems to propose, then 
confidence in the rules can remain sufficiently high to promote the feeling of security 
that is so important for Mill.    
 West’s second class of cases where direct utility calculations are permitted in 
Mill’s moral theory do not involve conflicts of rules so much as the connection between 
those rules and their justification in terms of utility. Specifically, this second class of 
cases involves situations where one violates a rule and does a direct utility calculation 
regarding possible alternative courses of action because one sees that violating the rule 
would result in maximized utility.
99
 West admits that Utilitarianism does not contain any 
instances of Mill giving examples of this kind, but seems to think that he would have or 
should have because of other features of his view. An example of what kind of case 
West has in mind concerns the case of charity. Specifically, he is concerned with 
strategic international giving (which has, let us suppose, greater efficiency in terms of 
happiness increased per dollar given) versus giving to local causes. When obeying the 
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moral obligation to give to charity, an individual has some discretion in carrying out this 
obligation. “If one gives from one’s resources to those of one’s own country or 
neighborhood, when it will relieve minor distress, rather than giving to those of another 
country or class where it would relieve great distress, that would seem to be an instance 
deserving of the reproaches of enlightened utilitarian public opinion or at least one’s 
conscience.”100 Since utility would be so much more greatly impacted by more strategic 
international giving, West concludes that Mill should allow for direct appeals to utility to 
give an individual guidance in how to follow her moral duty to beneficence. 
 Fuchs’ response to West suggests that the latter has projected too much of his 
own (or even our own) values onto Mill. “But while we might agree with West’s moral 
assessment of the example, Mill I believe would not have.”101 In chapter five of 
Utilitarianism, Mill specifically includes ordinary acts of beneficence and charity as 
imperfect duties, which do not, on Fuchs’ or my view, require utility maximization.102 
He seems, in fact, to sketch a theory of moral obligation that requires much less of 
agents than the maximally best.
  
Moreover, insisting that one has a general duty to 
maximize rather than follow a moral rule seems to elide Mill’s distinction between 
obligatory conduct and supererogatory action.  
 Before turning to Mill’s theory of supererogation, however, it is worth pausing to 
consider the nature of Fuchs’ interpretation concerning Mill’s account of rules. On the 
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ideal code interpretation that Fuchs argues for, agents construct rules that, if widely 
internalized, would maximize utility. One complication with that account is that, at 
times, Mill seems to have a less lofty conception of what utilitarians should aim for. To 
see just how low the bar is set, so to speak, consider Mill’s claim that, “As a rule of 
conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be attempted than 
to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting to do such good as they have 
undertaken.”103 This hardly reads like someone constructing rules that aim to maximize 
utility. Mill presumably is aiming to promote, rather than maximize utility through the 
use of moral rules. Thus, while Fuchs seems correct in correcting West’s reading of 
Mill’s imperfect duties, there is a question as to whether Fuchs’ own reading of Mill’s 
theory of moral rules is itself too demanding given the passage just quoted.  
 Putting this worry about Fuchs’ conception of rule utilitarianism aside, it is worth 
briefly mentioning Mill’s account of supererogatory action, a topic that will be featured 
in later chapters.
104
 I will mention just two passages here to make the relevant point.
105
 
In chapter five of Utilitarianism, Mill admits that there are actions (perhaps of just the 
sort that West is imagining) that are laudable but not morally binding—that is there are 
actions:  
 which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, 
 perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not 
                                                 
 
103
 Mill, “Auguste Comte and Positivism,” CW, 10, 339. 
 
104
 For a more involved discussion of these passages see Jacobson, “Diversity of Utilitarianism,” 
10-11. 
 
105
 I passed over Fuchs’ discussion in the article as it was rather brief and not terrifically 
substantiated. See Fuchs, “Mill’s Theory of Morally Correct Action,” 147-148.  
 51 
 
 bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, 
 we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment.
106
  
It is thus possible for the utilitarian to admire someone who strategically gives away 
their money so as to maximize utility, but that does not mean that such actions are 
matters of moral obligation since Mill plainly seems to see such actions as above the 
demands of duty.    
 To put this discussion back in the context of West’s concerns, Mill may well 
recognize a moral obligation to be charitable, though it is not obvious that that obligation 
requires that we have an obligation to maximize utility with our charity. The second 
passage concerning supererogation can be found in Mill’s essay on Comte where he 
remarks that moral obligations create a moral standard that agents should follow, “But 
above this standard there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted 
heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, though not 
converted into an obligation.”107 With this analysis in place, we can see that West’s 
analysis will not do. On his reading of Mill, humans seem obliged to override a moral 
rule in cases where utility would clearly be maximized. However, in light of the 
discussion of imperfect duties and supererogatory action this seems mistaken as it 
overlooks Mill’s point that there might be courses of action that are admirable but not 
obligatory and obligatory but not ideal. Though we can commend the generous and 
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utility maximizing donor, we can recognize that he is not morally bound to behave as he 
does.  
 Fuchs, then, resists West’s claim that a moral rule can be suppressed so as to 
maximize utility. He does allow, though, that there can be exceptions to rules in cases 
where following the rules would lead to disasters. This leads me to consider a point 
raised by Sumner in his discussion of rules and disasters in Mill’s thought. Sumner has 
argued that Mill recognizes a general duty to avoid disasters. As he interprets Mill, when 
this duty conflicts with other moral rules the agent should make a direct appeal to the 
principle of utility in her moral deliberations.
108
 In citing justification for his claim, 
Sumner appeals a passage in Utilitarianism where Mill mentions cases where it would 
be permissible to, as he says, “overrule the general maxims of justice.”109 However, 
while it is true that Mill seems to be allowing for exceptions in these kinds of dire cases 
where disasters might ensue, it does not follow that one must make a direct appeal to 
utility in deciding to suspend the rule. Fuchs argues that most disastrous consequences 
(e.g. the death of an innocent person or the loss of liberty to a whole democratic nation) 
that could arise from following some moral rule are likely violations of some dictate of 
justice, “since they would constitute wrongful harms from which their victims would 
have rights to be free.”110  If this is so, then this case is essentially no different than the 
first class of cases that West mentioned. There, as here, the rule in question should be 
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amended so as to allow one to avert the disaster. In such instances as this there is no 
need for a direct appeal to utility as the act utilitarian would have it. Still, one can 
imagine an interlocutor inquiring what is to be done when following a rule would lead to 
disaster and there are no known relevant, countervailing rules to appeal to. Should the 
agent appeal to act utilitarian considerations, then, on Mill’s view? Fuchs says no:  
 The question a Millian rule utilitarian would ask is: Would the rule with a 
 general built-in exception for averting disaster bring about greater utility than 
 that same rule without such an exception? If so, then that exception becomes a 
 part of the correct moral precept, and therefore invoking it would not really 
 constitute a violation of the opitimific, revised rule at all.
111
  
 West’s third and final class of cases concerns those instances where there seem to 
be no applicable rules in the ideal code to handle a morally relevant situation. In these 
cases agents should make a direct appeal to utility just as act utilitarians would. Fuchs 
admits that this is an important issue as there are likely to be situations where no extant 
moral rules speak conclusively to the matter at hand. Mill seems in concert with this 
opinion as he notes that we might use ad hoc calculations of the sort that seem initially 
like the kind act utilitarians favor. That said, Mill goes on to say that we cannot act like 
judges who simply apply the law in a rigidly mechanical fashion. Instead, he says that 
agents are more like legislators or administrators. As Fuchs quotes Mill on this point, 
legislators and administrators go back and forth between according their conduct to a 
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given rule and allowing their conduct to be “formed on the merits of the particular 
case.”112  
 One might be inclined to read this last bit of phrasing as an endorsement of act 
utilitarian thinking. However, Fuchs makes the point that “legislators and administrators 
usually do not make rulings limited to individual isolated cases; they more typically 
enact general laws, rules, and regulations governing broad classes of activity.”113 Indeed, 
shortly after instructing deliberators confronting a new situation to which a rule does not 
apply to make their decisions “on the merits of particular cases,” Mill directs agents to 
use decidedly rule utilitarian methods in acting as legislators and administrators. They 
should identify the proper end of action (in this case the principle of utility) and then 
use:  
 Science to inquire what are the kinds of actions by which this end, this happiness 
 or this perfection of character, is capable of being realized. When Science has 
 framed propositions, which are the completed expression of the whole of the 
 conditions necessary to the desired end, these are handed over to Art, which has 
 nothing further to do but to transform them into corresponding rules of 
 conduct.”114  
In deliberating in this way, then, agents are engaged in writing part of the ideal code 
when confronting new situations. This seems evident in Mill insisting that new rules of 
conduct (as he puts it) are issued at the conclusion of the deliberation. Part of this 
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deliberation as ideal rule utilitarian agents, of course, involves considering whether 
utility would be able to justify the difficulties in deciding if it should be made into a 
legal rule as well as problems related to getting agents to internalize the moral rule in 
their consciences, enforcing it among other agents, and so on. While this process has its 
complications, all of these considerations are decidedly part of the rule utilitarian scheme 
of morality and involve no direct appeal to the principle of utility as the act utilitarian 
would suppose.
115
     
 There is much to be said for this response as a way of responding to the worry 
that agents must make direct appeals to utility. Once again, however, Fuchs’ quotation 
comes as a fruit from a possibly poisoned tree. This passage is taken from Appendix H, 
which was dropped by Mill in later editions of that book. As such, one cannot be sure 
how to read it as a reflection of Mill’s thoughts on moral philosophy from the period of 
the 1850s to when he died in 1873.
116
 Given that this is the period when Mill seems to 
have formulated the central moral and political theories that scholars of his moral theory 
are typically interested in, the fact that Mill elected to drop this language in the text does 
not help Fuchs’ case against the act utilitarian reading.  Thus, while this passage does do 
helpful work in describing how Mill might handle such cases in a rule utilitarian way, it 
seems less than wholly satisfactory as a representation of Mill’s mature thought in moral 
philosophy. Later, in the next chapter, I will return to the question of Mill discusses 
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these types of cases, though for the time being it is less than obvious how the ideal code 
utilitarian can respond to West’s third kind of case.   
 
Conclusion  
 As we have seen, then, Fuchs’ account does a great deal to improve upon 
Urmson’s initial rule utilitarian interpretation from over sixty years ago. Fuchs’ reading 
provides persuasive evidence to favor the ideal code version of rule utilitarianism over 
the utilitarian generalization theory as a reading of Mill, though it is less clear that he 
provides a definitive account of Mill’s moral theory. I provided some reason to believe 
that Mill may not have a maximizing conception of moral rules, while also pointing to 
some oversights and omissions in Fuchs’ choice of sources. That said, as the next 
chapter will make clear, by way of providing a point of contrast, that these rule 
utilitarian interpretations bear fairly close resemblance to the sanction utilitarian 
interpretation that I will eventually be arguing for, even if a rule utilitarian approach 
have been found wanting, as an interpretation of Mill, in some respects.   
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CHAPTER III  
ACT UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL 
  
 As in the previous chapter discussing the rule utilitarian reading, this chapter will 
critically examine two prominent defenders of the act utilitarian interpretation of Mill. 
This chapter will be notably different than the previous one in that there were no 
difficulties in attaching the rule utilitarian label to Urmson and Fuchs. Matters are more 
complicated in the case of act utilitarianism. Crisp fully accepts the act utilitarian label 
for his reading of Mill, while Berger does not, and several of Berger’s arguments suggest 
that Mill is far from holding the type of position outlined by Crisp.
117
 Nonetheless, 
Berger’s views, in some respects, also sit uneasily with the rule and sanction utilitarian 
readings. In a sense, his reading of Mill is a sui generis reading, and I want to be candid 
in my acknowledgement that his pairing with Crisp in this section is somewhat 
contrived. So, caveat emptor. Even Crisp does not recognize Berger as sharing the act 
utilitarian interpretation and classifies Berger’s interpretation of Mill as “non-
utilitarian,” though Crisp does not explain why he classifies Berger in this way.118  
 Philosophical categorizations are, of course, rarely comprehensive. That said, 
there are two broad reasons to pair Crisp and Berger in this section. First, the two 
authors share a reading of Mill that emphasizes the point that Mill is quite comfortable, 
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in certain specified circumstances, with direct appeals to utility to determine the 
rightness of a particular action for the sake of utility. Rule utilitarians, of whatever 
variety, only make reference to utility in considering how to comply with, amend, or 
create a new rule in cases of conflicting rules, potential disasters, or situations where 
rules are not readily applicable. Thus, the fact that Crisp and Berger read Mill as 
allowing for direct appeals to utility is at odds with a crucial component of the rule 
utilitarian position. That said, both have benefited from the insights of the scholarship 
that came after Urmson, and each allow that moral rules play a significant role in Mill’s 
moral theory. All moral rules, on their respective views, are, strictly speaking, 
provisional, but they do provide an absolutely essential component to complying with 
utilitarianism in a direct way.  
 The second reason to discuss these two interpreters together is that Crisp and 
Berger both give a prominent place to Mill’s statement of the Greatest Happiness 
Principle in chapter two of Utilitarianism. They both find Urmson’s initial rule 
utilitarian reading of that chapter problematic and disagree with the emphasis that some 
have placed on Mill’s apparent linking of moral wrong to punishment in chapter five of 
Utilitarianism. In general, it would not be misleading to say that both read Mill as a 
proponent of a much more demanding moral scheme than is given under the sanction 
utilitarian view, though the precise nature of this will only become evident as we explore 
their respective readings in more detail.  
 I will begin with Crisp’s account, which can establish the sharp contrast with the 
rule utilitarian reading before moving on to Berger’s less easily categorized 
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interpretation. My reading of Crisp will be significantly longer and more involved than 
my discussion of Berger. This is, in part, because Berger provides less of a foil to the 
sanction utilitarian position than Crisp.   
 
Crisp’s interpretive methodology 
 To begin, it is worth saying a few words about the broader outlines of Crisp’s 
text and his methodology for interpreting Mill. In this chapter I will be focusing on his 
book Mill on Utilitarianism, especially Crisp’s fifth chapter on Mill’s account of a 
morally right action.
119
 Mill on Utilitarianism provides a discussion of both biographical 
and philosophical issues relevant to Mill. He includes chapters discussing Mill’s life and 
intellectual trajectory away from his earlier Benthamite roots as well as chapters devoted 
to all the major issues in Utilitarianism, such as debates over his theory of value, his 
“proof” of the principle of utility, his account of justice, and so on. He also has particular 
chapters analyzing On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in light of the act utilitarian 
interpretation articulated throughout the text (but put most forcefully in the fifth 
chapter). Once Crisp has his reading of Mill’s utilitarianism in place, in other words, he 
interprets all of Mill’s later writings in light of Mill’s apparent act utilitarianism.   
 In Crisp’s view, works like On Liberty and The Subjection of Women serve as 
interesting examples of Mill’s theory in application; it is in Utilitarianism that one finds, 
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“the summation and defence, of [Mill’s] thoughts on the doctrine which provided the 
foundation for his views in other areas.”120 Crisp argues that in these other texts, Mill is 
discussing secondary, rather than primary, principles. In works on secondary principles, 
Mill is trying to convince readers to change their attitudes on issues like paternalistic 
state policies and the unfair treatment of women. While the attitudes Mill defends in 
those writings might be consistent with the principle of utility he ultimately avows, to 
Crisp, Mill is writing more as an activist pushing a cause than as a careful philosopher 
articulating his deductions. In those writings, “What was important—what the greatest 
happiness principle itself required—was to get people straight on these secondary 
principles. In his writing on these contentious issues, Mill is of course attempting to state 
what he believes; but he is also using the skills of a rhetorician to persuade.”121 
Utilitarianism is the work that provides the defense of the doctrine on which these works 
depend, and the scholar can, in Crisp’s view anyway, take Mill at his word in 
Utilitarianism in a way that one cannot in these other texts.  
 As will be evident in the upcoming discussion, Crisp’s commitment to 
Utilitarianism as a keystone text for elucidating Mill’s first principles colors the rest of 
his interpretation. To give just one example, consider his reading of the following 
passage from On Liberty: “It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which would 
be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of 
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utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions.”122 When Mill 
affirms his commitment to utility here, Crisp takes this to mean that Mill’s arguments 
about liberty “cannot ground any kind of liberalism which is inconsistent with his act 
utilitarianism.”123 In other words, any subsequent aspects of that book that seem to be in 
conflict with Mill’s act utilitarianism should be read as Mill writing as a rhetorician 
rather than as philosopher spelling out his views.   
 Of course, this is not the only way to read Mill’s affirmation of his commitment 
to utility in this passage. One might think that Mill’s discussion of liberty in this famous 
work can and should inform the reader as to what kind of utilitarianism Mill ultimately 
defends. Further, merely saying that utility is the ultimate appeal does not mean that Mill 
supposes that it is clear what this means and how it will fit into his overall argument. In 
his mention of Mill’s affirmation here, Crisp cuts off the end of this sentence, where Mill 
adds, “. . . but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests 
of a man as a progressive being.”124 It is notable that Mill immediately goes on to 
explain the way in which those interests and their promotion will be informed by the 
limits society must have in compelling individuals to promote the general good—thus 
further supporting the idea that Mill intends to explain his application of the doctrine of 
utility in the work in question.
125
 In my view, this is because Mill knows that, given the 
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complexity of utility, saying that utility is the “ultimate appeal” is not saying anything 
that is especially definite.   
 It is also helpful to remember that though the two works were written during 
roughly the same period (as will be discussed next chapter), Mill could not depend on 
the readers of On Liberty to understand his supposed commitment to act utilitarianism as 
it is purportedly given in Utilitarianism since the former was published two years ahead 
of the latter. Crisp is correct in saying that utility is Mill’s ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions, but the precise nature of that appeal, as should be evident by now, is less than 
obvious.     
  
The greatest happiness principle and the levels of morality 
 Throughout his chapter on right action, Crisp generally practices what he 
preaches regarding his privileging of Utilitarianism as the key text for interpreting Mill’s 
moral philosophy. His method in this chapter is to give an argument for a particular 
reading of the greatest happiness principle and then to contextualize that reading within a 
set of distinctions and potential objections that have occupied both Mill scholars and 
utilitarians more generally. Following the discussion of the greatest happiness principle, 
I will introduce four of his distinctions concerning utilitarian conceptions of rightness, 
evaluating outcomes, and decision procedures. Getting clear on these will be helpful for 
understanding Crisp’s reading of moral rules, the demandingness of moral theory, the 
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Art of Life and supererogatory actions, and Crisp’s account of sanctions (which will be 
components of his argument that I focus on in later sections of this chapter).  
 Crisp strongly identifies his reading of Mill’s ethics with Mill’s famous gloss on 
utilitarianism in chapter two of Utilitarianism, where Mill writes that, “The creed which 
accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend 
to produce the reverse of happiness.”126 In a rather daring way (to my eyes) Crisp claims 
that, “This passage is the clearest statement in Utilitarianism of Mill’s moral theory.”127 
While I will not go into the details here, Jacobson could hardly disagree more with Crisp 
on this point, and he has challenged Crisp’s reading of the greatest happiness principle 
by arguing that the principle is formulated so as to be purposefully vague.
128
 It is also 
worth pointing out that Mill gives a different and apparently incompatible version of the 
principle later in chapter two.
129
    
 Crisp’s claim for the importance and clarity of the greatest happiness principle 
appears to be based on the specific context in which Mill states the claim. Mill’s 
exposition of the principle falls within the chapter titled “On What Utilitarianism Is,” 
which comes after Mill has mentioned (at 1.5) that he aims to give an account of 
utilitarianism and a proof of it, in the text. Crisp also notes that the phrase ‘right’ must 
mean ‘morally right’ since Mill is speaking of a “creed” that is concerned with the 
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principles of morals. In Crisp’s view, the reading of the principle is that “actions are 
right insofar as they increase happiness and wrong insofar as they decrease it, by 
increasing unhappiness.”130 Right actions, then, come in degrees, but, “The right action 
can be understood as, or stipulated to be, the morally best action.”131 The right action 
will be the one that maximizes happiness, though some actions, by increasing 
unhappiness, can be better or worse in degrees. This last point is brought out by Mill’s 
immediate qualification that, “by happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of 
pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”132 If Mill had not added this 
qualification, one might think that promoting happiness, regardless of how much pain 
was intermixed with it, could serve as the dominant concern in evaluating the rightness 
of actions. With addendum about absences and privations of pain and pleasure, Mill 
makes it clear that rightness is about achieving the optimum balance of pain and 
pleasure. Summing up his exposition of the principle, then, Crisp writes that, “The right 
(morally best) action will be that which produces the greatest of pleasure over pain, or, if 
this is not possible, the least balance of pain over pleasure.”133   
  With his reading of the greatest happiness principle in place, we can now turn to 
the distinctions that motivate Crisp’s interpretation. The first distinction concerns how 
one evaluates outcomes from a utilitarian point of view. The distinction can be plainly 
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seen in light of the following thought experiment. Suppose a patient is facing a serious 
medical condition, and two courses of treatment are available to the doctor who must 
make a decision for the patient. Treatment A will leave the patient with a high level of 
welfare (stipulated at 50 units), and Treatment B will leave the patient with a 
significantly lower level of welfare (stipulated at 25 units). Treatment A has a 1% 
chance of success, and if it fails the patient dies. Treatment B has 99% chance of success 
and minimal consequences if it fails. Suppose the doctor elects to undertake Treatment A 
and is successful. If one is an actualist about utilitarian outcomes then one evaluates the 
rightness or wrongness of an action in light of what in fact happens as it regards the 
balance of pleasure and pain. From an actualist point of view, the doctor’s action was the 
right one. Alternatively, one could be a probabilist about outcomes. On this view, one 
must consider what the agent understands of the probabilities of the resulting pleasure 
and pain balance resulting from the action in question. In this case, from the probabilist 
point of view, the doctor did the wrong action since the probabilities for the good 
outcome were so low and the likely negative consequences were so high.  
 This distinction maps onto Mill in a less than straightforward way. Crisp says 
that this is because “the difference between actualism and probabilism appears not to 
have greatly concerned Mill.”134 I am discussing it here as it serves as an example of 
how Crisp tries to map later developments of utilitarian and consequentialist theory onto 
Mill’s thought. On the one hand, Crisp reads Mill as an actualist about outcomes based 
on the latter’s endorsement of the greatest happiness principle passage. Crisp writes that 
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Mill’s view is an actualist one because, “it takes into account only what would actually 
happen. The right action in any circumstance is the one which will actually turn out to 
produce the greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain.”135 Yet, soon after saying 
that this is Mill’s view, Crisp admits that the evidence for Mill’s opinion on the matter is 
inconclusive. At times, as in the passage giving the greatest happiness principle, Mill 
sounds like an actualist but elsewhere he says that an action depends on the intention or 
foreseeable consequences of an action.
136
 Crisp’s solution to this difficulty is one that he 
will employ throughout this discussion: he suggests that Mill considers the question of 
moral rightness on two different levels.   
 To explain his reading of Mill’s conception of rightness as residing on two 
levels, he suggests a second distinction arising out of Sidgwick, concerning the 
subjective and objective conceptions of utilitarian rightness.
137
 Subjective conceptions of 
rightness evaluate actions with respect to expected utility, whereas objective conceptions 
of rightness evaluate actions with regard to the action’s resulting utility. The doctor 
might have done the objectively right action from the standpoint of utility (i.e. the action 
brings about greater utility than other possible choices), though from the subjective point 
of view, the doctor did the wrong action since he lacked the proper justification from his 
limited point of view. Using this distinction, Crisp states that one can say that Mill 
accepts probabilism on the subjective level but actualism on the objective level. Of 
                                                 
 
135
 Ibid., 99. 
 
136
 For example see “Bentham,” CW, 10, 112. Mill’s concept of expected consequences will get a 
more detailed treatment in the discussion of Berger.   
 
137
 See Henry Sidgwick The Methods of Ethics, 7
th
 ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 
207-208. 
 67 
 
course, Crisp saying that Mill adopts this point of view does not commit Mill to claiming 
that agents should adopt either the subjective or objective stance in our moral 
deliberation or praising and blaming of other agents. For example, just because one has, 
objectively, done something morally wrong, it might be contrary to the demands of 
utility to actually blame that person. Subjectivism and objectivism are only concerned 
with evaluating right action, but not necessarily with determining how to think about 
promoting the right action—which is where Crisp turns his attention next.  
 Crisp draws a third distinction between direct and indirect understandings of 
utilitarianism insofar as they concern the criterion of right action. Crisp states that the 
direct act utilitarian criterion for right action is that, “an action is right if and only if it 
maximizes welfare. Its rightness consists in its having the property of being welfare-
maximizing.”138 This is a direct type of utilitarianism, which applies the maximizing 
principle directly to acts, which stands in contrast to an indirect rule utilitarian theory 
where rightness depends on conformity to rules, “which maximize happiness were most 
or all people to accept them.”139 More specifically, he contrasts a multi-level act 
utilitarian reading with the rule utilitarian reading as it is given by Urmson. Since he 
raises familiar objections to Urmson’s interpretation like those discussed in the previous 
chapter, I will not spend time rehearsing the problems here.  
 Crisp’s fourth and final distinction is his most important one. This distinction 
contrasts alternative decision procedures for act utilitarian agents. He notes that his 
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reading of Mill as an act utilitarian commits him only to a certain view about what 
rightness consists in but not the ways in which agents should deliberate about how to 
actually achieve right action. Crisp identifies three types of act utilitarian decision 
procedures: single level, self-effacing, and multi-level. The single level act utilitarian 
decision procedure is dominated by constant appeals to utility with the aim of 
maximizing welfare. This procedure “requires that one be entirely impartial between 
people (or rather, their utilities), and that one be educated to the point where the theory 
can be rationally applied.”140 Given the difficulties of a constant calculation of utility, 
Crisp, joining many others, doubts whether single level act utilitarianism is even 
psychologically possible. That is to say, even if an agent did all that she could to follow 
a single level act utilitarianism, the demands of strict impartiality and careful calculation 
would probably be overwhelming to the extent that she would not be able, mentally or 
emotionally, to maintain her initial commitment.  
  Aside from the empirical question of whether it is possible, there is also a 
philosophical difficulty with the view. That is to say, aside from the psychological 
question, there is a question as to whether a conceptual analysis of the theory itself will 
show that it is best pursued on something besides a single-level. As Mill himself noted in 
responding to standard objections to utilitarianism, constant calculation for the sake of 
utility might itself not best promote utility. In response to the objection that one does not 
have time to calculate all of the effects for actions, Mill says that this objection is 
misplaced:  
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 This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct 
 by Christianity, because there is not time, on every occasion on which anything 
 has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. There has been 
 ample time, namely, the whole duration of the human species. During all that 
 time mankind have been learning by experience, the tendencies of action; on 
 which experience all that prudence, as well as the morality of life, is  
 dependent.
141
    
The use of experience, then, allows humans to derive various rules that have been found 
to promote utility, thus obviating the need for constant calculation. Single level act 
utilitarianism, then, fails at both the psychological and philosophical level. 
 In the above passage, Mill points to the need to use past experiences to provide 
guidelines for how utility might be promoted. These guidelines comprise what Crisp 
calls the rules of customary morality. Crisp writes that it is crude and possibly 
misleading to call these ‘rules of thumb’, and, later in the chapter, he claims that it is a 
mistake to regard them as “merely” rules of thumb.142 The rules of customary morality, 
on the act utilitarian scheme, do have an important role to play in Mill’s theory, but it 
does not commit him to what has been called a self-effacing act utilitarianism.
143
 On this 
view, for purely act utilitarian reasons, one never appeals to act utilitarian justifications 
for right action. Crisp says that Mill’s view is neither single-level nor self-effacing, but 
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multi-level. As he describes it, “Mill’s multi-level view is a messy compromise between 
a single-level view and a self-effacing view.”144 
 On Mill’s messy multi-level view, the rules of customary morality are most 
commonly used on the first level of moral deliberation. These customary rules do not 
necessarily have act utilitarian justifications. Crisp gives the example of two conflicting 
non-act utilitarian principles of customary morality in the familiar case of promising to 
meet a friend for coffee and then being suddenly called away, just before leaving to meet 
your friend, to help a co-worker in urgent need. To decide between our commitments in 
this kind of case, one can employ act-utilitarian reasoning. To be clear, Crisp reads Mill 
as believing that customary morality itself allows for direct appeals to utility at least in 
some cases. In this way, customary morality, for Mill, operates on two levels: one non-
utilitarian and one utilitarian.  
 To justify this reading of Mill’s theory of customary morality, Crisp appeals to 
several passages from the second and third chapters of Utilitarianism. To begin with, he 
quotes Mill’s closing words in the second chapter:  
 We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary 
 principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no 
 case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and 
 if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of 
 any person by whom the principle itself is recognised.
145
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While Urmson quoted this very passage in support of his reading by emphasizing Mill’s 
commitment to the express connection between moral obligation and secondary 
principles (i.e. moral rules), Crisp interprets the passage as stressing Mill’s directive that, 
“one should not consult the principle of utility except when two utilitarian principles 
conflict.”146  
 In response to the question of why Mill ties moral obligation to secondary 
principles rather than the primary principle of utility, Crisp appeals to the opening 
paragraph of the third chapter of Utilitarianism, where Mill admits that the principle of 
utility does not feel binding on humans currently, but, with proper education, we may 
come to feel as much in the future. Crisp notes, quite correctly, that Mill saw utilitarian 
morality as a progressive enterprise that was sure to evolve in its demands on agents. As 
Mill says in chapter two (echoing sentiments expressed in many places): “That the 
received code of ethics is by no means a divine right; and that mankind have still much 
to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happiness, I admit, or rather, earnestly 
maintain.”147 Crisp supposes, though, more controversially, that Mill envisions a future 
customary morality that ties moral obligation to the principle of utility more directly. In 
support of this supposition, he points to a passage where Mill says that with proper 
education humans:  
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 . . . may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, 
 consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct 
 impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the 
 habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a 
 large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence.148  
 At this point, it will be helpful to recapitulate Crisp’s understanding of Mill’s 
multi-level view and then add his final complication to it. Customary morality operates 
on two levels: one non-utilitarian and the other utilitarian. To use Crisp’s example, one 
operates on the first level when one says, “That action was courageous” and takes that 
statement, on its own terms, to mean that what one did was the morally correct action. 
When non-utilitarian rules conflict, one can move from the first level of customary 
morality to the second level and appeal directly to utility. Crisp admits that, for Mill, 
human feelings of moral obligation are only tied to moral rules and not to the direct 
promotion of utility itself. Still, while Crisp does not say so directly, he seems to think 
that this will change in time with a proper utilitarian education. In Utilitarianism, Mill 
demonstrates a commitment to the progressive nature of morality, and, as Crisp reads 
him, Mill supposes that, with the correct educational apparatus, moral agents will come 
to tie feelings of moral obligation to the principle of utility apart from those cases of 
conflicting obligation. Yet—and here is the new complication—Mill also operates on a 
third level, the level of philosophy, which is distinct from the two levels of customary 
morality. This is the level at which Mill is operating when he is discussing the greatest 
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happiness principle. Though he does not spell this out as much as he might, it seems as if 
Crisp understands this level is a kind of meta-level wherein one might speak about how 
the levels are to function and what their aim is (in this case, to maximize utility). It is not 
entirely clear what other propositions, besides the greatest happiness principle are on this 
level. Three other possibilities are when Mill describes the nature of the Art of Life, how 
supererogatory duties fit into utility maximization, and the different ways in which duty 
might be thought of on different levels. Crisp makes it clear, though, when Mill is 
speaking about moral matters, he might be speaking about any of the three levels, and it 
is sometimes difficult to tell what level he is referring to in giving different 
pronouncements.  
 As Crisp admits, Mill’s commitment to these three levels of moral discourse 
makes interpreting his moral philosophy quite difficult. For instance, when Mill says in a 
letter that inequality is bad in itself (a claim, which, at face value, is inconsistent with 
utilitarianism), “it is not clear whether he is operating at the level of philosophical 
theory, or that of customary morality.”149 Nonetheless, though Mill sometimes strongly 
identifies his doctrine with the dictates of customary morality, Crisp reads him as 
committed to the act utilitarian ideal. Engaging in these three levels of moral discourse 
might make Mill appear inconsistent at times, “But when he was engaged in doing 
serious moral philosophy that is, in making claims about what really makes actions right 
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or wrong, he would have denied that actions are wrong just because they are actions in 
contravention of customary morality.”150  
 Putting aside for a moment the methodological issue of how one knows when 
Mill is doing “serious moral philosophy,” it is unclear what Crisp takes this last claim to 
establish or affirm. Neither the rule nor sanction utilitarian interpreters would claim that 
Mill takes contravention of customary morality (as Crisp has defined it) to be sufficient 
for wrongness, since Crisp has built it into the view that customary morality includes 
obligations for an agent to practice “the act utilitarian principle of impartial 
benevolence.” 151 As was mentioned in Fuchs’ analysis of benevolence, rule utilitarians 
can allow that one can do less than the best thing possible and still do a morally right 
action. This is still true even on a more standard understanding of “conventional 
morality.” Insofar as rule and sanction utilitarian interpreters insist on Mill’s belief that 
some spheres of action are beyond the bounds of moral reproach because they are purely 
self-regarding, there can be many actions that go against customary morality that are 
nonetheless deemed allowable by Mill.
152
 People might engage in offensive or 
unpleasant actions that go against the rules of morality as some people (as a matter of 
opinion) understand it, but, insofar as they do not result in the violation of a distinct right 
of another agent, Mill allows that such actions are not in the moral sphere at all.
153
 As a 
result, it is unclear what Crisp thinks he is accomplishing with his statement. Neither 
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rule nor sanction utilitarianism would understand conventional morality, as Crisp 
suggests, to comprise the whole of morality such that contravention of it necessarily 
constitutes a moral wrong.   
  
The demandingness of morality 
 Now that Crisp has sketched his multi-level act utilitarian view in general, he can 
begin to examine its application to particular issues. Below, I will outline Crisp’s 
analysis of Mill’s evaluation of the demandingness of morality, the Art of Life and 
supererogation, and his analysis of punishment. Getting clear on Crisp’s take on these 
issues is important since his readings provide some of the sharpest contrasts to the 
sanction utilitarian perspective. Berger, as we will see, differs from the sanction 
utilitarian perspective as well, though not quite as stridently as Crisp.    
 As Crisp rightly reminds the reader, Mill confronts the issue of morality’s 
demandingness in paragraph nineteen of chapter two in Utilitarianism. Mill makes two 
notable claims in that paragraph that are germane to the concern about demandingness. 
In contrast to those critics who think utilitarianism too easy for its advocacy of the life 
concerned with pleasure, others say that its commitment to strict impartiality and 
consuming concern for the welfare of others is far too difficult to be a plausible theory of 
morality. Such a morality seems to seriously curtail the degree to which one is entitled to 
pursue one’s personal projects and relationships. On the utilitarian view, these things are 
apparently only allowed insofar as they contribute, on balance, to the maximization of 
utility. While an agent’s enjoyments of these activities counts (i.e. it gets added to the 
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balance of pleasures and pains), it counts no more or less than anyone else’s pleasure. In 
the eyes of many commentators, then and now, this kind of domination and crowding 
out of one’s personal projects and commitments is unacceptable.154  
 Perhaps sensitive to this type of concern, Mill provides a passage in chapter two 
of Utilitarianism that seems to lessen the “extremism” of the demands of utilitarian 
morality.
155
 To respond, Mill draws a now familiar distinction between the criterion of 
moral rightness and the deliberation of everyday agents trying to follow the criterion of 
rightness. One might make this type of objection to utilitarianism: 
 But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound 
 the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what 
 are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics  
 requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the  
 contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, 
 and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them.
156
 
As Crisp reads this passage, Mill is affirming the legitimacy of customary morality 
insofar as it guides us not to be so directly concerned with direct promotion of utility. 
Utility provides the grounding for customary morality, and Mill understands that utility 
will be maximized in the long run if customary morality is not made overly onerous. 
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Nonetheless, Crisp writes that in Mill’s view, “Utilitarianism—pure impartiality—
should play a greater role in customary morality than it now does.”157  
 Of course, given his act utilitarian reading of Mill, it is hardly surprising that 
Crisp would see Mill as wanting to make morality more demanding. Crisp does not 
neglect, however, to add that Mill continues in the same paragraph to soften the blow of 
utilitarianism’s demands still further by stating that: 
  The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object 
 of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in 
 his power to do this on an extended scale . . . are but exceptional; and on these 
 occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility.
158
   
Troubling though this aspect of the passage is for Mill’s apparent careless phrasing 
regarding when one can directly appeal to utility, Crisp makes, in my view, an especially 
worrying interpretive move to try to save his interpretation at this point. As he sees it, 
Mill is exaggerating about just how often one can promote utility in a significant way. 
“Utilitarianism is almost certainly much more demanding than Mill allows. It is tempting 
to think, in fact, that Mill is deliberately being disingenuous here.”159 He suggests that 
Mill is probably concerned with not putting people off by thinking that utilitarianism is 
overly demanding before they have given it a fair try. Crisp floats the idea that Mill 
seems to adopt a more honest assessment of utilitarianism’s demandingness in the 
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closing paragraphs of his third chapter on the sanctions of morality. Whatever the 
plausibility of this last suggestion, one cannot help but remark that this seems strange 
behavior indeed for a text that is supposed to provide a clear statement of the foundation 
of Mill’s views on morality. After all, by Crisp’s own admission, it was in Mill’s other 
texts like On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, where Mill is, “using the skills of a 
rhetorician to persuade.”160 
 Aside from these two passages from paragraph nineteen of chapter two, Crisp’s 
analysis of the demandingness of morality also includes a mention of Mill’s famous 
letter to John Venn. This letter is among of the most commonly cited passages for those 
favoring the act utilitarian reading, and it is one of the more compelling passages on 
their side.
161
 In that letter Mill says:  
 I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to 
 test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those 
 which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the  
 consideration of what would happen if every one did the same is the only means 
 we have of discovering the tendency of the act in a particular case.
162
  
When Brown first brought this passage to the attention of Mill scholars, he said that the 
letter provided “unequivocal evidence” of Mill’s act utilitarianism and could hopefully 
“close the whole controversy” over the nature of Mill’s utilitarianism.163 Crisp does not 
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go that far, but does note that this passage does nicely explain why it is that in so many 
places Mill insists on affirming the importance of customary morality; thereby lessening 
the stress on individuals looking to maximize utility. In confronting difficult moral 
duties we might be inclined in some cases to make an exception of ourselves, and Mill’s 
point in the above letter is that it is often best to imagine what would happen if everyone 
did the same in similar cases. “There may be exceptional cases, however, in which 
following the customary morality turns out not to maximize happiness, and in these 
cases Mill, as an actualist, must accept that customary morality should not have been 
followed.”164 That is to say, in some instances, like those mentioned above regarding 
cases of conflicting secondary principles or opportunities to be a great public benefactor, 
that one can test the demands of utility by looking at the act itself. 
 As a whole, then, Crisp sees Mill as holding to the idea that utilitarianism is a 
demanding moral doctrine, even though he is not always straightforward about just how 
often this is so. Mill views customary morality as being a suitable guide much of the 
time in our moral lives, since utility is what justifies conventional morality to begin with. 
On this topic, however, Crisp is keen to point to the concern that one must not confuse 
what makes an action right or wrong (i.e. utility maximization) and the process of 
deliberation itself. As Crisp reads him, Mill often comments as if the dictates of 
customary morality are far from perfect models of utilitarian deliberation, though Mill 
hopes that this will become less so over time. 
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The Art of Life and supererogation  
 In the next section of his argument, Crisp turns his attention to the Art of Life, a 
topic that fits rather awkwardly onto a straightforward understanding of act 
utilitarianism. His analysis of this topic leads him into Mill’s theory of supererogation 
and moral duty more generally. The reason these topics are prima facie difficulties for 
the act utilitarian view can be expressed in a fairly straightforward way. If actions are 
morally wrong when they fail to maximize utility, then any time, no matter what one is 
doing, one is in danger of committing a moral wrong. To put it rather dramatically: there 
are no separate spheres of life apart from morality and no escape from its dictates since 
its commands seep into every human activity. As Crisp will suggest, for Mill, the escape, 
insofar as there is one, comes in how humans talk about their lives. As one has probably 
come to expect at this point, Crisp’s general interpretation on these points is to say that 
though Mill sometimes talks as if morality is not the sole domain of life, when he is 
being his most careful, he holds that all actions are evaluable under the principle of 
utility, which, as Crisp reads it, is the central principle of morality itself. In other words, 
one need not always discourse in terms of the principle of utility in order to be bound by 
the principle of utility.   
 Crisp is straightforward in his acknowledgement that Mill discusses the Art of 
Life in both his System of Logic and at least some of that doctrine’s implications in 
Utilitarianism. As was discussed in chapter two, in the System of Logic, Mill explains 
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that there are three departments of life: morality, prudence, and aesthetics.
165
 Crisp does 
acknowledge that, in Utilitarianism, there are a few places where the author implies that 
morality is only one sphere of action. He seems to do this, for example, in the chapter 
concerning his famous “proof” for the principle of utility when he writes that, 
“Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of 
the criteria of morality.”166  That said, Crisp insists that Mill is still committed to the idea 
that we are to aim at utility maximization even if there are ways of talking about various 
areas of life do not make this immediately apparent. As he sees it, “The various 
departments are merely ways of referring to different discourses, which can only roughly 
be distinguished from one another by the concepts they involve.”167 For instance, one 
might talk about a friend’s loyalty as something praiseworthy and indicative of a fine or 
beautiful character (and thereby under the category of “aesthetics”). However, if one is 
being careful and true to one’s utilitarian principles, then one must admit that loyalty is 
only valuable for its promotion of utility.
168
 The fact that loyalty is justified only to the 
extent that it accords with utility maximization does not entail that one always qualify 
one’s language by avowing that this is so.169   
 The justification for Crisp’s analysis of different discourses depends on his 
analysis of the principle of utility. Crisp believes that the Art of Life does not threaten 
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Mill’s act utilitarianism because the principle of utility governs all human actions and 
dictates its ends under a maximizing utilitarian framework. As was discussed earlier, in 
the System of Logic, when Mill outlines the Art of Life in its clearest form, Mill makes it 
clear that the principle of utility provides that, “The general principle to which all rules 
of practice ought to conform, and the test by which they should be tried, is 
conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other 
words, that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of teleology.”170 While it 
has been discussed above how Mill conceives of arts and sciences as they relate to the 
principle of utility, what is distinctive about Crisp’s interpretation is that he sees the 
principle of utility as, “the principle that happiness should be maximized.”171 Since this 
is a contentious claim, I will look briefly at Crisp’s argument for it and raise some 
objections. As noted above, many Mill scholars follow Brown’s claim that the principle 
of utility is an axiological claim (i.e. a claim about what is valuable) rather than a claim 
about what is to guide or justify actions. At this point, however, I will merely point to 
some reasons to doubt Crisp’s claim about Mill’s commitment to utility maximization 
based on his commitment to the principle of utility.   
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 After making the claim about the principle of utility meaning that happiness 
should maximized, Crisp acknowledges in a footnote that while Mill does not use the 
term “maximization” in his principle of utility he does speak of “conduciveness” to 
happiness, which Crisp seems to imply amounts to the same thing.
172
 However, this 
seems to be a conceptual mistake. Something can be conducive to production of 
phenomena without being maximally productive of phenomena. Different types of 
materials, for example, can be conducive to the transfer of electricity, but some types of 
metals are better conductors of electricity and presumably there is some material that is 
maximally conductive of electricity.  
 Crisp may suspect here that this justification will not be enough to conceptually 
tie the principle of utility to a thesis about the maximization and thus goes on to provide 
a second argument. Crisp writes that, after stating the principle of utility, Mill goes on to 
talk about how this principle allows the utilitarian to encourage various dispositions of 
character that might “on the whole” promote human happiness even if in some cases this 
will involve situations where an agent experiences more pain than pleasure in a 
particular instance.
173
 Crisp concludes from this that, “the reference to quantity of 
happiness strongly suggests that his principle here is that happiness should be 
maximized.”174 This point seems too hasty as well, however, as it begs the question 
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against those who read Mill as a satisficing utilitarian.
175
 Suppose a satisficing utilitarian 
is facing a situation where she can make one of three choices, A, B, and C, where these 
choices reflect positive welfare outcomes for all agents from an impartial perspective. To 
keep things simple let us suppose that the agent is justifiably equally certain of the 
welfare outcomes that will result from A, B, and C where A will result in +10 units of 
welfare, B will result in +8, and C will result in -2 units of welfare. The right action for 
the maximizing act utilitarian would plainly be action A, and to choose B or C would be, 
to different degrees, morally wrong. The satisficing utilitarian, however, can say that 
suboptimal choices like B can be a morally right action, even if it is not the best choice 
from the standpoint of quantitative utility. Choosing action A might be morally right or it 
might instead be (depending on the specific type of satisficing utilitarianism) 
supererogatory. Choosing C would be wrong on the satisficing view since it does not, on 
the whole, promote utility. In light of both of these arguments, it seems that Crisp is 
lacking a solid rationale in equating the principle of utility as it is given in the System of 
Logic with the dictate that one maximize utility.
176
 Neither Mill’s identification in the 
principle of utility of an action’s conduciveness to happiness, nor his qualifying 
comments concerning the quantitative nature of happiness compel him to accept a 
maximizing understanding of utilitarianism.       
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 Crisp’s analysis of Mill’s Art of Life holds that, while we might not always talk 
about every action being in the sphere of morality, every action is ultimately justified by 
its relation to the moral demands of maximizing utilitarianism. This leads him to tackle 
the issue of how to account for those passages where Mill seems to speak of 
supererogatory actions. These are presumed to be a problem since, if Mill is a 
maximizing act utilitarian, then, supererogation is impossible (since one is always 
morally obligated to do the best action).  
 Crisp’s solution is to apply his familiar method of saying that Mill is simply 
using different discourses to meet different rhetorical needs. Mill’s practice of referring 
to some actions in ways that sound as if they are supererogatory is itself merely the ploy 
of the maximizing utilitarian who wants to secure general, if imperfect, compliance, 
since perfect obedience to the utilitarian cause is unlikely as it is thought too demanding. 
As Crisp reads him, Mill recognizes a two-fold conception of duty when he is operating 
on the third level of philosophical act utilitarianism.
177
 First, when Mill is speaking 
about customary morality and what it should enjoin, Mill says that, “x is a duty if 
making it a duty would maximize utility.”178 Second, when Mill is thinking about how 
one operates within morality itself he can ask himself, “What really is the fundamental 
moral duty? Here Mill’s answer is: to maximize overall happiness.”179 Once again, then, 
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apparent textual tensions in Mill’s texts are explained by appealing to Mill’s penchant 
for employing different discourses in secret service to his act utilitarianism.    
 Since I will develop my own reading of Mill’s theory of supererogation at a later 
point, I will raise two points of concern with this argument. First, Crisp’s analysis here 
gives no explicit readings of the passages where Mill seems to acknowledge the 
existence of supererogatory action, including those passages from Utilitarianism, which 
is where Mill is supposed to be speaking of first principles.
180
 While Mill’s discussions 
of supererogation often involve discussion of general utility and clarify comments on 
moral duties in light of his commitment to utility, this fact does not entail a maximizing 
act utilitarian reading of those passages. Further argumentation is required to show that 
Mill means that something is a duty when it will maximize utility to convert it to a duty; 
especially since Mill never puts the matter in this way directly.
181
 Second, Crisp’s 
reading of Mill’s second sense of duty rests on his reading of the principle of utility as a 
maximizing principle of morality, which, as was discussed above, is underdetermined by 
the arguments he gives.  
 
Sanctions and utility maximization  
 Crisp now turns his attention to Mill’s theory of sanctions and his account of 
justice. My discussion of his account will be abbreviated but focused. The aim here is to 
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note those places where Crisp adopts a reading of those sections of chapter five that are 
essential to the heart of the sanction utilitarian position. In particular, the focus is on 
what Crisp makes of the interrelation between justice, punishment, and Mill’s criterion 
of morality.  
 Crisp focuses his interpretation of these topics as they are discussed in the fifth 
chapter of Utilitarianism. Unsurprisingly, one of Mill’s primary concerns in that chapter 
is to explain how justice can be made consistent with utilitarianism. As he explains in 
the opening lines of the chapter, one of the longstanding difficulties for those who 
recognize utility as a standard of right and wrong is the compatibility between utility and 
justice.
182
 Mill hopes that he can overcome this obstacle by detailing the various facets 
of justice and showing how the powerful sentiments that humans attach to it are in fact 
compatible with a commitment to utility. To that end, he begins his discussion by 
charting the different spheres in which the term of justice is commonly employed (legal, 
moral, desert, contracts, impartiality, equality) and the etymology of the term itself.
183
 In 
the section on etymology, Mill notes that the term ‘justice’ has a foundational relation 
with the idea of conformity to the law, and human sensibilities concerning what ought to 
be the case.
184
 Mill goes on to say that this account, while helpful, does not distinguish 
moral obligation from obligation more generally. To clear this up he adds the following 
claim:  
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 For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters 
 not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We 
 do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be 
 punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his 
 fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This 
 seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple 
 expediency.
185
 
 Crisp notes that several interpreters have used this passage to argue that Mill 
does not hold to the act utilitarian criterion of rightness.
186
 To give two examples of the 
interpreters he is concerned with, Crisp glosses Ryan’s reading of this passage by saying 
that, “An act a is wrong if and only if a coercive social rule against doing acts of kind a 
would be justified by increasing overall welfare.”187 Alternatively, Crisp claims that 
Gray’s reading of the passage holds that, “An act a is wrong if and only if punishing it 
would have the best consequences.”188  
 The mistake that all of these interpreters share, Crisp thinks, is that the fourteenth 
paragraph of chapter five is thought explicate Mill’s criterion for morality. They also 
make a mistake, as he sees it, in interpreting the principle of utility as a theory of the 
good rather than a theory of the right. If the principle of utility is a theory of goodness 
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(i.e. a theory about what is, in fact, good rather than how to promote it), then Mill can 
possibly hold to a non-act utilitarian criterion of rightness. However, both of these 
claims must be mistaken from Crisp’s point of view. To begin with, Mill has already 
provided a criterion of the rightness of actions in his discussion of the greatest happiness 
principle, which is, as purportedly, “the clearest statement in Utilitarianism of Mill’s 
moral theory.”189 This implies that however they read the principle of utility, Mill’s 
account of rightness is already in place, thus committing him to a direct maximizing 
view. In light of this, reading Mill as offering an alternative account of right action in the 
passage above, which couches rightness in terms of punishment rather than welfare 
maximization, “would commit Mill to an internal contradiction.”190   
 To avoid the supposition that Mill embraces a contradiction, Crisp takes the line 
that Mill is talking in this passage merely about what Mill thinks that wrong means, not 
altering his criterion of moral rightness. Crisp says that when Mill writes, “We do not 
call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that . . .” it is best to drop the “to imply” 
and read it as about what is meant when using the term wrong. Crisp notes that this 
reading is justified because, in general, these paragraphs are supposed to be where Mill 
is “analysing the ‘notions’ of right and wrong.”191 In other words, Mill is not 
propounding some type of justified punishability as his criterion of rightness or 
wrongness. Instead, Mill is saying that when one acts wrongly that means that one ought 
to be punished for it. That punishment may, depending on the circumstances involved, 
                                                 
 
189
 Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, 95. 
 
190
 Ibid., 128. 
 
191
 Ibid.  
 90 
 
be meted out through law, opinion, or one’s conscience, but it should be punished one 
way or another every time one commits a moral wrong.  
 Crisp’s idea is that Mill still holds that failure to maximize utility is wrong but he 
also holds that one should be punished for that failure. Crisp notes that Mill remarks in 
an earlier part of the chapter that punishment by the law might fail to maximize 
happiness and suspects that the same is also true with regard to public opinion.
192
 
Punishment, then, might just be carried out by the wrongdoer’s conscience. One can 
imagine a case, though, where an action fails to maximize utility but the actor does not 
feel guilty. Mill does not have to retract his claim that such an action is still wrong in 
such a case, “For it is consistent with his act utilitarian version of the principle of utility 
to claim that such conduct ought to be punished by conscience.”193 The principle of 
utility is still the standard by which one evaluates actions, but it does not govern 
consciences directly in the sense of always directing them to act in light of its dictates. 
Conscience, unlike blame from others and the law, is not subject to conscious control. 
Nonetheless, insofar as one can, the principle of utility would have it that one 
appropriately feels guilty each and every time one does less than the morally optimal act.     
 On Crisp’s reading of Mill’s doctrine, then, even if it is not appropriate, for 
reasons of utility, to punish a person by the penalties of law or public opinion, that 
person still should feel guilty in any and all cases where she is failing to maximize 
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utility. Crisp clarifies his reading of the passage more formally and succinctly when he 
writes that “According to Mill, when I say ‘a is wrong’ I mean ‘a is such that its 
performance ought to be punished by law, opinion, or conscience.’”194 This means that 
punishment will always be appropriate when one fails to maximize utility for that it is 
what acting wrongly means. In fact, he puts the point quite strongly when he says that, 
“there is no imaginable case of an agent’s failing to maximize happiness to which Mill 
would be forced to retract any attribution of wrongness.”195  
 To sum up, Crisp takes the view that Mill supplements, rather than replaces, his 
account of wrong action by claiming that every wrong action must be punished. This is 
evident, Crisp believes, by the fact that Mill is exploring the meaning of right and 
wrong, just as he has been exploring the meaning of the sentiment of justice. Those, like 
Lyons or Gray, who interpret the chapter five paragraph on punishment in such a way as 
to suppose that Mill is offering an alternative conception of right and wrong, mistakenly 
suppose that the principle of utility is merely an account of the good rather than an 
account of right action. Mill’s account of right action, Crisp thinks, is plainly given by 
the greatest happiness principle, so to avoid reading Mill as contradicting himself, Crisp 
must suppose that this is merely an addendum to that prior claim. While Crisp has tried 
to soften some of the difficulties that arise from adopting the claims in 5.14, 
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“Nevertheless it cannot in the end be denied that Mill’s position is not helped by the 
addition of . . . the analysis of ascriptions of wrongness that he gives.”196   
 At this point it may be helpful to give an overview of my discussion of Crisp and 
my evaluation of his arguments before moving on to Berger. I began by discussing 
Crisp’s interpretative methodology and how Crisp reads Utilitarianism as Mill’s 
elucidations of the first principles of his moral theory. I also noted the centrality of the 
greatest happiness principle to his account and explained four distinctions that Crisp 
introduces to argue for his reading of how Mill treats specific issues in moral theory. The 
most important of these distinctions concerned Crisp’s reading of Mill as a multi-level 
utilitarian. I then raised some worries concerning Crisp’s understanding of customary 
morality and precisely how the different levels are supposed to work. In the next section, 
discussing the demandingness of morality, I questioned Crisp’s claim that Mill was 
exaggerating in his claims about just how demanding morality is. If Utilitarianism is 
supposed to be the keystone text for interpreting Mill’s views, it seems awkward for 
Crisp to say that Mill should not be taken at his word in this passage. In the next section 
discussing the Art of Life, I objected to Crisp’s claim that the Art of Life required one to 
maximize utility. He seemed to unjustifiably rule out the possibility that Mill 
understands the Art of Life in a way that is compatible with a satisficing utilitarian 
reading. In the last section discussing Mill’s theory of sanctions, I noted that Crisp 
commits himself to the claim that every instance of failing to maximize utility is a case 
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where an agent should be punished. Crisp admits that the passage fits awkwardly with 
Mill’s view as he has explained it thus far.  
 
Introduction to Berger 
            As I noted in my introduction to this chapter, Berger’s interpretation is not, 
strictly speaking, an act utilitarian one. In truth, his interpretation does not sit perfectly 
with any of the standard categorizations, and Berger is candid about that. At the opening 
of his chapter on the greatest happiness principle and moral rules (which will be the 
focus of my discussion here), Berger gestures to the wide literature concerning whether 
Mill is best read as an act or rule utilitarian before making his stance clear: “I do not 
wish to enter this controversy. Mill’s theory was neither an act- nor a rule utilitarian 
theory as those terms are strictly defined.”197 Berger’s interpretation differs notably from 
Urmson’s, Fuchs’, and Crisp’s. He differs most from the rule utilitarians in his account 
of moral rules (he thinks that Mill allows for agents to, in some cases, to appeal directly 
to the principle of utility) and from Crisp in his account of self-regarding action and 
supererogation (he thinks that Mill does exclude some domains of life from the demands 
of morality). At the more general level, his interpretation of Mill’s theory incorporates 
the following four elements, not all of which will be discussed  here: a theory of moral 
rules consistent with act utilitarian theory, a theory of moral wrongness that is essentially 
tied to punishment, an account of supererogatory acts where such acts are praiseworthy 
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when done but not punishable when not done, and an account of certain actions, namely 
self-regarding ones, that do not properly fall into the sphere of moral right and wrong. In 
light of his commitment to these views, it seems that he is correct to say that his view is 
consistent neither with the act nor rule utilitarian view. 
 
Berger’s interpretative methodology   
 Berger’s unconventional conclusions on Mill’s moral theory seem to arise from 
his interpretive methodology. Of the figures discussed so far, Berger’s methodology is 
the closest to the one employed in this dissertation, though his is much wider in its scope 
and application. His account is distinctive in the following three ways. First, Berger 
acknowledges that Utilitarianism does not serve as a definitive guide to Mill’s moral 
theory.
198
 While some scholars hold that this text itself suffices for an expression of 
Mill’s moral theory, Berger denies that Mill holds to a single, coherently worked out 
moral theory, all things considered. Toward the end of his chapter on Mill’s account of 
morality, he says that he “heartily agrees” with the bold pronouncement from Sumner 
that there is no definitive moral doctrine in Mill and that scholars are wasting their time 
searching for such an entity.
199
 Second, Berger builds his interpretation from an 
especially wide base of Mill’s writings. Not only does he quote liberally from standardly 
consulted works and Mill’s correspondence, but he also draws from lesser-known 
writings including Mill’s many book reviews, newspaper articles, public speeches, and 
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commentary on his father’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. Each of 
these sources, of course, requires somewhat different treatment than Mill’s more formal 
published works, and Berger shows sensitivity to this fact. Thirdly, Berger goes some 
length to situate Mill’s views in light of his immediate utilitarian predecessors like 
Bentham, James Mill, and Austin. For reasons of economy, this aspect of his work will 
not be as evident in the treatment below as some of these other features, but his 
considerable efforts to properly contextualize Mill’s ideas and their originality (or lack 
thereof) is impressive and should be acknowledged. In chapters five and six of this 
dissertation, I aim for a similar level of thoroughness and care in my interpretation of 
Mill’s ideas.   
 The most important methodological difference between Berger’s approach and 
mine is that, though he is somewhat wary about using Utilitarianism as a guide to Mill’s 
views on moral theory, in my view, he does not take this consideration sufficiently 
seriously and does not properly privilege chapter five as the most important entry point 
into understanding Mill’s theory of morality. This difference in methodology has notable 
consequences for our diverging interpretations. Berger sees Mill as adding what he calls 
the punishability criterion (in U, 5.14) to his earlier given proportionality criterion of 
moral rightness (i.e. the greatest happiness principle in U, 2.2) in a way that makes 
Mill’s final view ambiguous. According to Berger, Mill “gave no indication as to how 
the proportionality and punishability criteria are to be reconciled. This part of the theory 
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was never sufficiently clarified or developed.”200 Berger is correct to note Mill does not 
sufficiently clarify his view on these points. However, if Mill had ecumenical aims for 
the second chapter of Utilitarianism, this would not be surprising. Mill would not have 
thought that he needed to explain how to reconcile these two parts of his moral theory 
since one of the criteria was not properly a part of his theory. I join Jacobson in 
affirming that, in Mill’s statement of the proportionality criterion, he is not giving his 
own criterion of morality, but rather an ambiguously phrased creed that could be 
affirmed by many utilitarians.
201
 However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the 
punishability criterion can be treated differently and taken as a proper statement of 
Mill’s views on the matter.   
 Putting aside our different viewpoints on these issues, Berger’s position is clearly 
a nuanced one that has implications and applications extending beyond what will be 
discussed here, and my treatment of Berger’s arguments will be focused primarily on his 
strategy account of rules. While Berger’s analysis of Mill’s moral and political views is 
as thorough and wide-ranging as one will find in the scholarly literature, it is his strategy 
conception of rules that seems to be his most distinctive contribution to the literature and 
is arguably the most commonly cited aspect of his comprehensive interpretation.
202
 It is 
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also the most directly act utilitarian aspect of his book, which provides a proper foil to 
my account and justifies my pairing of his work with Crisp’s. 
 
Analysis of the strategy conception of rules   
 At the center of Berger’s strategy conception of moral rules is his distinction 
between the meaning of a term and the test or criterion for that term’s application. 
Berger argues that, while this distinction can be found (usually without full explication) 
often enough in Mill’s account of morality, it was explicitly employed by Austin and 
James Mill.
203
 One can see the relevance of the distinction in light of a few helpful 
analogies. One can test if there is oxygen present by lighting a match and seeing if it will 
burn. While this procedure can be used to help identify whether oxygen is present, the 
test’s result (i.e. the match burning or not) does not provide one with the meaning of 
oxygen. Alternatively, to be a good typist means that the typist is someone who types 
accurately and with speed. Still, one can test whether or not one is a good typist by 
setting some benchmark standards and seeing if the typist performs up to the standard. 
The relevance of this distinction in utilitarian theory can be grasped when one considers 
the claim about what it is meant when talking about the tendency of an action to promote 
happiness. As Berger explains it, “what it means to say that the tendency of an act is 
good is that its effects are predominantly good, that is, that it produces more happiness 
than unhappiness.” However, for various reasons, it is often difficult to determine the 
consequences of actions and whether they, in fact, promote happiness. To cite just one 
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difficulty, actions do not occur in isolation from one another, and sorting out the many 
causes and rippling effects of even a single action, let alone all of one’s actions, is 
famously difficult. This can include, of course, actions related to one’s character. It has 
long been thought that many actions are the result of an agent’s habits or character traits. 
When one adds to this acknowledgement the fact that a single action can lead to distant 
effects through the alteration of the respective characters of other agents, the difficulties 
involved in discerning the tendencies of actions seems near impossible. In the face of 
these challenges: 
  What is wanted for practical situations is a guide (or guides) to conduct that 
 have some degree of reliability that have some degree of reliability in predicting 
 all of these consequences, and which can be applied with sufficient convenience 
 that it is fit to serve as a practical test of our actions.
204
   
Berger is stressing here that these tests are essential elements to the theory as it is 
practiced in daily living. However, it is a mistake to confuse the test by which conduct is 
determined to be consistent with a principle and the meaning of the principle itself. For 
Berger’s account, this is important as it clarifies what he takes to be the rule utilitarian 
interpreter’s error: when Mill stresses the high status of moral rules in his theory of 
morality he is pointing to the importance of testing actions with respect to promoting 
utility, without altering his account of the meaning of promoting utility. The extensive 
use of moral rules remains a strictly epistemological device in service of a larger 
commitment to an act utilitarian account of utilitarian maximization.  
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 Now that the nature of the distinction is clear, Berger can elaborate on how this 
high view of moral rules can function within a generally act utilitarian framework. As 
has already been noted in this chapter, but which Berger is sure to include here, rules 
serve as ready guides to conduct that avoid problems of immediate calculation. 
Moreover, one’s adherence to a rule (as an example to others) can alter the likelihood of 
others conforming to a rule in the future. Similarly, behavior conforming to a rule might 
inculcate a habit that makes future compliance easier, thus further promoting utility. If 
one gets into a situation in which no rule seems applicable, it is often helpful to ask 
oneself what the utility outcome would be if the act in question were made into a rule. In 
this way, one has some reasonable test concerning whether or not utility is being 
promoted or maximized. Supposing that one does think that it would be beneficial for 
utility for the act to made into a general rule, one can ask the further question of whether 
the rule is just minimally consistent with utility or whether it would be an ideal rule (i.e. 
maximally productive in terms of utility).  
 The answer to these questions, however, should always be done in light of the 
progressive spirit of utilitarianism. Calculating the effects of an action by considering 
what would happen if a rule were generally followed in similar situations is going to be 
an imperfect science. Given the inevitable imprecision of calculation coupled with the 
fact that no generally recognized system of moral rules will perfectly promote utility, it 
is important that utilitarians remain open to reforming moral rules. In deciding on what 
reform is best, however, the appeal will be the principle of utility as it relates to the act 
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in question. Contrary to the rule utilitarian interpretation favored by Fuchs, other moral 
rules will not suffice to settle questions of reform.  
 In this way moral rules are deeply important to the utilitarian theory, but only a 
matter of testing the theory. Moral rules promoting utility do not constitute the meaning 
of Mill’s utilitarianism. The meaning of Mill’s utilitarianism refers to an act’s tendency 
to promote utility. This aspect of his theory is in larger part why Berger is being included 
here as contributing to the act utilitarian interpretation of Mill.  
 To avoid possible confusions regarding this distinction of test and meaning, 
Berger adds three important explanatory points before turning to the textual argument 
for his position.
205
 The first point is that in many domains of life one can best attain one 
goal by effectively aiming another. It is common in bowling, for instance, for bowlers to 
aim their tosses at the arrows a few feet in front of them rather than at the pins 
themselves. In many cases, by aiming at the arrows one thereby more successfully 
knocks down the pins. Success in bowling, after all, is not determined by seeing who 
most directly aims at the pins but rather by who uses their aim, whatever it is, to 
successfully knock down the pins. In the case of morality, following moral rules might 
well best promote utility, even if conformity to the moral rules is not the proper goal of 
morality. Following the moral rules does not ensure that one will have done the right 
thing since the question or moral rightness is about promotion of utility in specific 
actions rather than in adherence to rules. Even so, if one uses the moral rules in a 
reasonable way that nonetheless fails to promote utility, and is therefore wrong, this can 
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serve as a reason to not blame the agent. On the view Berger puts forward, “A person 
does what is right only what the person has done has predominantly useful 
consequences.”206 Unlike Crisp who reads Mill as being committed to the claim that all 
wrong actions are worthy of at least some punishment, Berger allows that some actions 
might be wrong but not subject to punishments like moral blame.  
 Berger’s two final points concern the seriousness with which one should regard 
moral rules. Specifically, he says that moral rules are neither mere summaries of past 
experience nor mere rules of thumb. To say that moral rules are mere summaries of past 
experience is just to say that they are shorthand statements of descriptive facts about 
prior events. In contrast, the moral rules on the strategy conception stand as normative 
standards of conduct. Of course, the normativity in question has force only in light of the 
ultimate commitment to the principle of utility, but the rules stand as principles of 
conduct with normative force nonetheless. In those rare cases when the principle of 
utility speaks against rule obedience, then the rules should be disregarded.  
 Just as moral rules are not mere summaries of past experience, neither are they 
mere rules of thumb. Berger denies that his interpretation regards moral rules as rules of 
thumb, “if that is meant to imply that the rules are subject to constant scrutiny and 
assessment, and may be readily foregone if the agent judges them not useful in the 
particular case.”207 The strategy conception of rules recognizes that there will be many 
cases in which one will abandon one’s personal judgment on a matter and follow the 
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relevant moral rule. Berger admits that, in some cases, this might lead one to do the 
wrong thing from the standpoint of utility. Nonetheless, the risk of bias, incomplete 
knowledge, and mistaken miscalculations may well render strict rule obedience the most 
prudent choice. Echoing familiar points raised in Crisp’s interpretation, Berger notes that 
it is consistent for the act utilitarian to affirm that one should be inflexible in following 
moral rules (i.e. be self-effacing).
208
 For instance, one might judge that stability of 
behavior might be especially important for setting examples for others or so to preserve 
firmness of character in oneself and avoid temptations to violate a rule.
209
 Depending on 
the circumstances, it makes sense for agents to regard the rules as more or less flexible 
without giving up on the act utilitarian criterion of morality. After all, when 
circumstances align in the just the right way and “one can be fairly certain of good 
consequences, or where the rules adopted conflict, the act utilitarian must then sanction, 
resorting to the Principle of Utility itself, judging the act chiefly by its consequences.”210     
 It might be helpful at this point to summarize Berger’s strategy conception of 
rules by understanding them dialectically.
211
 On one end of the dialectical pole is the 
stress on the importance of moral rules and on the other are the ways in which those 
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rules might be altered, reformed, or displaced for the sake of their ultimate justification 
(i.e. the promotion of utility). If the rules are not regarded as important and generally 
followed, then the ultimate goal behind them is thwarted. Then again, if the rules are 
given too much importance, they lose the grounding on which they attained their 
prominence in the theory. One can see this dialectic in the distinction between the 
meaning and test of the utilitarianism theory. Thinking in terms of rules might serve as 
the best test of whether utility is being promoted, but that does not thereby make them 
contribute to the meaning of utilitarianism. Still, while they do not contribute to the 
meaning of utilitarianism on this theory, they retain an essential role in the practice of 
being an act utilitarian as they will be the means by which one makes most of her moral 
decisions. That said, the rules will be in need of reform and qualification, and such 
reforms will take place under the jurisdiction of the principle of utility, rather than some 
other moral rule. Despite the fact that they can be reformed and replaced, Berger stresses 
that the rules should not be regarded as mere summaries of past experience or rules of 
thumb. The moral rules should serve as forceful normative demands rather than as 
factual generalizations about prior experiences. Similarly, they should not be subject to 
constant re-evaluation. Instead, the moral rules should be regularly obeyed both for the 
sake of utility itself (i.e. the rule would not be a valid rule if it did not generally promote 
utility) and the character of the agent and others watching the agent. The rules should be 
followed rigorously except when one is quite sure of successfully promoting utility by 
forsaking a moral rule or come across circumstances in which moral rules seem to be in 
tension with one another. 
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Textual justifications for the strategy conception of rules  
 Up to this point I have outlined Berger’s account of the strategy approach to 
moral rules, but I have not yet examined the textual justification for this reading. In this 
textual argument, I will draw what I take to be some of strongest passages that support 
the strategy conception of rules from texts that are unequivocally legitimate textual 
resources.
212
 I will examine four passages that Berger cites from Mill’s Autobiography, 
his essays on “Bentham” and “Whewell,” and, finally, Utilitarianism. As I read him, 
Berger, in contrast with Crisp, seems more concerned about working through the 
implication of passages justifying the strategy conception of moral rules as they are 
found in works other than Utilitarianism. Berger seems more concerned with showing 
that Mill does not say anything, or at least not much, that contradicts the strategy 
conception of moral rules in Utilitarianism, though it is better elucidated in other 
passages.
213
 
 One of Berger’s initial tasks in supporting the strategy reading is establishing 
Mill’s penchant for using indirect goals as a common means of reaching some higher 
goal. In particular, Mill seems to have had this view about the nature of happiness. 
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 I say “not much,” since, as mentioned earlier, Berger admits that Mill does not do much to 
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Mill’s attitude on this point comes out clearly in those places in which he is separating 
his views from those of Bentham and his father. As Mill understood them, both of these 
figures had seriously incomplete understandings of human nature and the optimum 
means by which humans attain happiness—whether that be happiness for oneself or for 
others. This attitude is revealed in a justly famous passage from his Autobiography. In 
the passage, Mill has just recently emerged from his mental crisis wherein he realized 
that the pursuit of utilitarian social reforms would not provide his life with the meaning 
and purpose of which he had been continually assured.
214
 Following his recovery he 
comes to see that the nature of his mentors’ mistake and adopts a different approach:  
 I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of 
 conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be 
 attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who 
 have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the 
 happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or  
 pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at  
 something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was 
 now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en 
 passant, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are 
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 immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. 
 Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is 
 to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life. Let 
 your self-consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust  
 themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately circumstanced you will inhale 
 happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, 
 without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal  
 questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life. And I 
 still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of 
 sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment, that is, for the great majority of  
 mankind.
215
 
 The principal importance of this passage is Mill’s claim that directly aiming at 
happiness is not, in fact, the best way to achieve it. Moreover, inquiring as to how 
successful one has been in achieving the goal (“Am I happy?”) frustrates the 
achievement of that very goal. The only thing to be done is to aim at some other goal 
suitably related to the ultimate one and work to achieve that. Mill is clearly talking here 
about the pursuit of personal happiness rather than general aggregate happiness, but 
Berger employs the passage as a means of establishing a broader pattern in Mill’s 
thought that extends to the domain of morality. Just as Mill allowed for indirect pursuits 
of personal happiness, so also does he allow for indirect pursuits of morality through a 
strategy conception of rules.    
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 This attitude toward indirect pursuit of goals appears not only in Mill’s 
autobiographical reflections but also in his early critical writings on Bentham, which 
comprise the second major text relevant to the strategy conception of rules. In one 
passage, Mill notes that he agrees with Bentham in affirming the principle of utility as 
the ultimate standard of conduct, but he does not share Bentham’s view that:  
  All right thinking on the details of morals depends on its express assertions. 
 We think utility, or happiness, much too complex and indefinite an end to be 
 sought except through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning which 
 there may be, and often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate 
 standard; and about which there does in fact prevail a much greater unanimity 
 among thinking persons, than might be supposed from their diametrical  
 divergence on the great questions of moral metaphysics. As mankind are much 
 more nearly of one nature, than of one opinion about their own nature, they are 
 more easily brought to agree in their intermediate principles, vera illa et media 
 axiomata, as Bacon says, than in their first principles: and the attempt to make 
 the bearings of actions upon the ultimate end more evident than they can be made 
 by referring them to the intermediate ends, and to estimate their value by a direct 
 reference to human happiness, generally terminates in attaching most importance, 
 not to those effects which are really the greatest, but to those which can most 
 easily be pointed to and individually identified. Those who adopt utility as a 
 standard can seldom apply it truly except through the secondary principles; those 
 who reject it, generally do no more than erect those secondary principles into 
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 first principles. It is when two or more of the secondary principles conflict, that a 
 direct appeal to some first principle becomes necessary; and then commences the 
 practical importance of the utilitarian controversy; which is, in other respects, a 
 question of arrangement and logical subordination rather than of practice;  
 important principally in a purely scientific point of view, for the sake of the 
 systematic unity and coherency of ethical philosophy.
216
 
 Berger notes that some have taken this passage to show Mill’s allegiance to some 
kind of rule consequentialism. He thinks that this is a mistake for a few reasons. To 
begin with, in the passage Mill seems to suggest that it is our judgment in applying the 
principle of utility that is often mistaken. As Berger sees it, Mill is not stating that 
applying the principle of utility directly is an error, as such, but rather that it is often 
done poorly given the prejudices and limitations and of human judgment. Mid-way 
through the quoted passage, Mill says that attempts to evaluate the goodness of an action 
by means of direct consideration of human happiness pick out “not to those effects 
which are really the greatest, but to those which can most easily be pointed to and 
individually identified.”217 Berger says that “the right result would seem to be what the 
Principle of Utility would tell us to do, applied directly, but correctly. It is because use 
of secondary principles will yield that result that their adoption is urged.”218 Here, then, 
one can see the strategy conception in play insofar as it stresses the use of secondary 
rules because of the epistemological limitations of moral agents.  
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 Berger brings out two further points regarding this passage and its relation to the 
strategy conception of rules. To begin with, in the passage Mill seems to be 
distinguishing the test of morality from a theoretical point of view and from a practical 
point of view in just the way that the strategy conception advocates. Humans are not to 
use rules because they reveal the meaning of the principle of utility. Instead, they should 
use rules because of human frailties and uncertainties in applying the principle of utility 
directly to moral situations.  
 The second point Berger makes concerns common interpretations of this passage. 
Some commentators have taken the above quoted passage on Bentham to say that Mill is 
claiming that it is only when rules conflict that one consults the principle of utility. 
Berger cites two reasons to believe that this is a bad reading. First, Mill says that direct 
applications of the principle of utility are seldom correct, which seems to leave open the 
possibility that it is sometimes done properly. Second, Mill notes that when the two 
principles conflict, it is necessary that one make a direct appeal to the first principle. The 
fact that it is necessary to appeal to the principle in this case does not show that it is the 
only time in which it can be appealed to; only that it must be appealed to in at least this 
type of circumstance. Taken together, these points suggests that Mill should be read as 
being in favor of the idea that one can appeal directly to the principle of utility and as 
outlining at least one, but by no means the only, type of situation in which one might do 
so. This dual emphasis on both the possibility and danger of direct appeals to utility sit 
nicely within the dialectic of the strategy conception of rules.    
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 In a third passage that Berger uses to discuss the strategy conception of rules, he 
examines Mill’s critical essay on William Whewell. In his writings on utilitarianism, 
Whewell raised the objection that since humans cannot be thought to reliably calculate 
the effects of their actions, it will sometimes be difficult or even impossible to tell if one 
has done the right thing. This seems clear when one looks at a case of lying. How can 
the utilitarian, Whewell asks, reliably determine if an agent has done the right thing by 
telling a lie? In his reply, Mill admits that it is indeed difficult to examine the effects of a 
single instance of lying, so: 
 We must look at them multiplied and in large masses. The portion of the  
 tendencies of an action which belong to it not individually, but as a violation of a 
 general rule, are as certain and calculable as any consequences; only they must 
 be examined not in the individual case, but in classes of cases.
219
 
In other words, when considering whether or not one should tell a lie, one should 
consider the question almost in the way described by the utilitarian generalization 
position mentioned in chapter two. On that view, actions were evaluated according to 
whether generalizing the rule used in the situation would maximize utility. This is what 
Mill seems to be getting at in talking about considering the action as a member of a class 
of cases.  
 But this passage makes Mill sound more like a rule utilitarian than an act 
utilitarian. Berger, though, is more interested in what Mill says next. In his essay, Mill 
notes that Whewell expected this kind of reply from the utilitarian and responded in turn 
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by saying that the liar could claim that she did not wish for his case to be drawn into the 
general class of cases. This response will not do, however, and Mill’s response, Berger 
says, reveals some important ideas about his theory of moral rules: 
 But it does not depend on him whether or not it shall be drawn into consequence. 
 If one person may break through the rule on his own judgment, the same liberty 
 cannot be refused to others; and since no one could rely on the rule’s being 
 observed, the rule would cease to exist. If a hundred infringements would  
 produce all the mischief implied in the abrogation of the rule, a hundredth part of 
 that mischief must be debited to each one of the infringements, though we may 
 not be able to trace it home individually. And this hundredth part will generally 
 far outweigh any good expected to arise individual act. We say generally, not 
 universally; for the admission of exceptions to rules is a necessity equally felt in 
 all systems of morality . . . That the moralities arising from the special  
 circumstances of the action may be so important as to overrule those arising from 
 the class of acts to which it belongs, perhaps to take it out of the category of 
 virtues into that of crimes, or vice versa, is a liability common to all ethical 
 systems.
220
 
 From this passage Berger draws two significant points relevant to the discussion 
here.
221
 First, Berger notes that this case is clearly not an instance where an agent has to 
use her own judgment in applying the principle of utility because there are no rules 
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present.
222
 As such, when Mill says that a person must use her own judgment to 
determine that, “the moralities arising from the special circumstances of the action may 
be so important as to overrule those arising from the classes to which it belongs,” it is 
presumed that she is making this judgment in a way that maximizes utility in accordance 
with the strategy conception of rules. Second, and this point is implied by the first, Mill 
does seem to be allowing that, in certain circumstances, agents may suspend a standing 
rule. This seems a threat, then, to the rule utilitarian idea that a rule is always in play 
when making a moral decision. 
 At this point, however, I want to raise an objection to Berger’s textual argument. 
He is correct in saying that Mill allows for an exception to be made to the relevant rule. 
And if this was all Mill had said on the issue it would indeed look rather bad for a rule 
utilitarian reading. However, Berger’s analysis of this passage is misleading in light of a 
point that Mill makes in the very next paragraph about how to think of exceptions to 
rules:  
 At all events, the existence of exceptions to moral rules is no stumbling-block 
 peculiar to the principle of utility. The essential is, that the exception should be 
 itself a general rule; so that, being of definite extent, and not leaving the  
 expediencies to the partial judgment of the agent, it may not shake the stability of 
 the wider rule in cases to which the reason of the exception does not extend.
223
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In this way, Mill seems to be seeking a way to make exceptions to rules, even, matters of 
rules. It is not enough when evaluating whether an agent has done the right action, for 
the agent to make a judgment that a particular case warrants the suspension of a rule 
with no further thought as to whether a new rule, concerning the extension of exceptions, 
should be put in place. 
 In the fourth and final passage I want to examine concerning the strategy 
conception of rules, Berger confronts a challenge raised by Urmson’s rule utilitarian 
reading of Mill. In the very last lines of chapter two of Utilitarianism, Mill remarks that:  
 We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary 
 principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no 
 case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and 
 if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of 
 any person by whom the principle itself is recognised.
224
 
Urmson used this quote to argue that moral rules are not rules of thumb for Mill, “but an 
essential part of moral reasoning.”225 Berger grants that this is so—indeed the strategy 
conception of rules says the same thing—but also holds that the quote does not 
necessarily provide support for a rule utilitarian reading of Mill. This is for two reasons. 
First, Mill says that direct appeals to first principles (i.e. the principle of utility), “is 
requisite only in cases of conflict of rules; it does not say that such an appeal is 
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inappropriate in other cases.”226 This is important for Berger in that he takes himself to 
have shown, in the passage from the essay on Bentham, that direct appeals to utility are 
permissible on Mill’s utilitarian scheme.     
 The second reason this passage does not necessarily support the rule utilitarian 
reading is that Urmson’s point looks past the practical reasons that Mill might have said 
that secondary principles (i.e. moral rules) are always involved in matters of moral 
obligation. Rules may always be involved in matters of moral obligation because, as 
fallible agents, it will be convenient to have rules to refer to in cases of moral concern. 
However, it is a stronger claim to say that an act is justified because it conforms to a 
moral rule. Indeed, if Mill would have made such a claim, it would seem to be in tension 
with a passage in the same paragraph, which emphasized the importance of allowing for 
exceptions to rules.
227
  
 Later, in the fifth chapter of this dissertation concerning Mill’s theory of moral 
obligation, I will argue that Mill recognizes a stronger connection between rules and 
moral obligation. I will argue that Mill understands the very meaning of a morally wrong 
action to involve the violation of a rule. If this is right, then it would challenge, to some 
extent, the strategy conception of rules that Berger has argued for here.  
 At this point it will be helpful to summarize the conclusions suggested by these 
four passages I have discussed. First, the passage from the Autobiography suggests that 
Mill was explicitly aware of the idea of pursuing a single end (personal happiness) by 
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way of aiming at other ends. This is important since it provides the basic model under 
which the strategy conception of rules operates. Second, in the passage from the essay 
on Bentham, Mill seems to allow for direct appeals to the principle of utility in order to 
decide moral questions and even suggests that this might be done correctly. This is 
important since rule utilitarian interpretations have stressed that what makes actions right 
is conformity to a justified moral rule—rather than their conformity to a first principle 
like the principle of utility. The third passage, from Mill’s essay on Whewell, concerns 
the nature of exceptions to moral rules. Berger argued that Mill allows that there can be 
cases where there can be exceptions to moral rules. I pointed out, however, that Berger’s 
argument on this point was misleading in that Mill goes on to say that the exceptions 
themselves should be made into rules. The fourth passage challenged Urmson’s reading 
of a passage from Utilitarianism where Mill says that every case of moral obligation is a 
case where a secondary principle (or moral rule) is involved. Berger noted that even if 
this was so it did not necessarily support the rule utilitarian reading since a rule might be 
involved for reasons having to do with practicality more than ultimate philosophical 
justifications.  
 
Objection to Berger       
 In what follows I want to raise an objection to Berger’s account of the strategy 
conception of rules. The objection concerns the strategy conception of rules and its 
relation to rights.  The objection comes from Brink in his argument for what he calls 
Mill’s deliberative utilitarianism. Brink’s conception of deliberative utilitarianism 
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involves interpreting Mill such that the latter is committed to “a conception of happiness 
whose dominant component consists in the exercise of one’s rational capacities.”228 The 
precise details of what this entails is not important for my purposes. What is important, 
however, is Brink’s worry about how Mill’s utilitarianism seems to allow special 
protection of rights and liberties that are in tension with the strategy conception of moral 
rules. Berger plainly allows for exceptions to moral rules in cases where utility could be 
promoted and agents are justifiably confident that they are not mistaken in predicting the 
consequences of actions or acting in a self-serving way. In this way, moral rules only 
have legitimacy given their practical necessity and human being’s cognitive and 
affective limitations. Brink worries that this conception of moral rules means that the 
rights that are protected by these rules “are not counterfactually stable.”229 That is to say, 
they can be overridden in cases where agents can reliably and efficiently suspend those 
rights. This is unacceptable to Brink:  
 And it seems that genuine moral and political rights should be counterfactually 
 stable. Where an agent’s claim to something is a protected by a moral rule or 
 right, it would be wrong to deprive her of that thing, even if we are perfect and 
 costless calculators of utility and departure from the rules here had no bad  
 spillover effects on our behavior elsewhere.
230
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As a textual justification for thinking that Mill would agree with this statement Brink 
cites a passage from chapter five of Utilitarianism concerning the relationship between 
utility, justice, and rights: 
 Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials 
 of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, 
 than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found 
 to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, 
 implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.
231
 
The fact that Mill seems to insist in this passage on the paramount importance of the 
rules of justice (which are a type of moral rule), suggest that something like 
counterfactual stability is more important to him than the strategy conception of rights 
would imply.
232
  
 Brink leaves off at this point in his objection to Berger’s view, but I want to add 
some further passages to strengthen the objection. Though Brink does not cite the 
passage in this context, certain passages of On Liberty seem to speak of rights in rather 
absolutist terms. For instance, in the opening chapter Mill says, “The only part of the 
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. 
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
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himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”233 The fact that Mill 
identifies an individual’s absolute sovereignty as a matter of right seems in tension with 
the idea that the rights could be suspended for the sake of the promotion of utility. 
Similarly, later in the chapter after he has further discussed the rights that individuals 
have to the liberties that he has been describing, Mill says that, “No society in which 
these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of 
government; and none is completely free in which they do exist absolute and 
unqualified.”234  The fact that Mill gives this sort of unqualified protection of these rights 
and liberties, while still explicitly operating under the auspices of utility as a guarantor 
of rights, does seem to sit uneasily with the strategy conception of rights that Berger has 
argued for here.
235
    
 It is also worth recalling Mill’s emphasis on security and the stability of the rules 
of justice in chapter five of Utilitarianism. There, Mill remarks that security is set apart 
from other societal benefits: 
 . . . but security no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all 
 our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond 
 the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of 
 any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by 
 whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. Now this most indispensable 
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 of all necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery 
 for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play.
236
 
Mill’s reference here to the “machinery” for preserving rights, which must be running 
constantly, seems to be in line with Brink’s claim that moral rights need to be 
counterfactually stable on Mill’s account. Indeed, Mill says, at the opening of the same 
paragraph of chapter five, “To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which 
society ought to defend me in the possession of.”237 To have a right, Mill seems to be 
saying, is to be justified in expecting that it will be protected by society. On Berger’s 
view, not only may your right be overridden without society coming to your protection, 
but doing so would be the morally correct action from the utilitarian standpoint. Brink 
seems to regard this as unacceptable as a reading of Mill’s theory of rights. For instance, 
Mill would presumably say that agent should be able to depend on her property rights 
being counterfactually stable, and not suspended even in those cases when utility will be 
maximized, in at least one case, by suspending them. In light of the passages that I have 
suggested could supplement this objection, I take it that Brink’s objection does raise a 
plausible worry for Berger’s account.  
 In my view, Berger’s view is an improvement, overall, on Crisp’s act utilitarian 
reading.
238
 However, his view also has some problematic passages to account for. That 
said, the strongest challenges to Berger’s reading will come in the upcoming chapters. 
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This includes the next chapter, which examines, among other matters, the legitimacy of 
treating the greatest happiness principle, as it is given in Utilitarianism, as an important 
statement of Mill’s own moral theory.   
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CHAPTER IV  
MILL’S ECUMENICAL UTILITARIANISM AND HIS CURIOUS FINAL CHAPTER 
  
 This chapter is essential to the dissertation in that it provides the rationale for the 
interpretive methodology that I later employ to argue that Mill should be read as a 
sanction utilitarian. In this chapter, I will reiterate some of the main components of 
Crisp’s understanding of how to interpret Utilitarianism as he is my primary foil. While 
this was discussed to some extent in the previous chapter, I will revisit it here to bring 
out the relevant contrasts with my favored interpretive approach. There will also be 
some discussion of the implications for reading Mill as I suggest, and these too follow 
some of the points mentioned in the previous chapter.  
 
Introduction and chapter outline   
 It is a philosopher’s commonplace to regard Utilitarianism as the most important 
work for interpreting Mill’s distinctive moral theory.239 I will argue that this view is 
mistaken and that Utilitarianism, as a whole, should play a relatively minor role in 
interpreting Mill’s moral theory. I maintain, instead, that much of Utilitarianism should 
be understood as an ecumenical text, wherein Mill is attempting to articulate and defend 
a common creed that could command the assent of many utilitarians, rather than to 
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elaborate upon his own version of utilitarianism. Furthermore, I argue that Mill seems to 
have held Utilitarianism as a whole in low regard.
240
 If this interpretation is correct, then 
the locus of debate concerning Mill’s moral theory should move away from some of the 
famous passages of Utilitarianism and toward other texts that, I will argue, provide 
better insight into what Mill really thought. This reading—I’ll call it the Ecumenical 
Reading—holds for the first four chapters, but not for chapter five. That final chapter, 
which explains the relation between utility and justice, should be read rather differently. 
So, my claim is that interpretations of Mill’s moral theory that emphasize his comments 
on moral obligation and punishment in chapter five are on stronger ground  given the 
reading I argue for in this chapter.
241
  
 The first section of this chapter describes what I call the Orthodox reading, the 
interpretation that privileges Utilitarianism in determining Mill’s moral theory, and 
contrasts it with my Ecumenical reading. The second section will explain the reasons for 
rejecting two key components of the Orthodox reading: namely, that the Orthodox 
reading rests on false beliefs both about Mill’s intended audience and about Mill’s 
opinion of the importance of the text. The third section will provide evidence for 
thinking that Mill intended to write an ecumenical defense of utilitarianism. The fourth 
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section will explain why the fifth chapter should be read differently than the other parts 
of the text. I will close by articulating the potential implications for interpreting Mill’s 
text as I suggest.
242
  
     
The Orthodox reading  
 The Orthodox reading, in this context, is defined by the privileged place it gives 
Utilitarianism in interpreting Mill’s moral thought. Put roughly, this means that if Mill 
makes a claim in Utilitarianism that seems in tension with a claim in other writings, one 
should give priority to the passage in Utilitarianism. The Orthodox reading is perhaps 
most strikingly defended by Roger Crisp. In Crisp’s view, works like On Liberty and 
The Subjection of Women serve as interesting examples of Mill’s theory in application, 
but it is in Utilitarianism that one finds Mill’s most candid and straightforward 
discussion of utilitarian theory.
243
 Earlier and later works can be understood in light of 
Utilitarianism, but the latter is to be given priority in comparison to Mill’s other texts on 
moral philosophy. Crisp explains just how much authority he wants to accord to 
Utilitarianism when he says, “in so far as Mill was an evangelist, Utilitarianism, first 
published as a series of three essays, can be seen as his bible.  . . . it was clearly intended 
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to be the summation, and defense, of his thoughts on the doctrine which provided the 
foundation for his views.”244  
 Crisp adopts this standpoint as an interpretive principle in light of Mill’s 
tendency to write as a social reformer cum rhetorician rather than as a philosopher. In 
some cases, especially when Mill is writing on topics that are dear to him, Mill “may be 
attempting to express himself in the way most likely to persuade us, rather than to reveal 
his own views most clearly.”245 This is what Mill is up to, Crisp suggests, in On Liberty 
and The Subjection of Women.
246
 In those writings, so the reasoning goes, Mill is 
thinking it is better to do what is necessary to convince readers to accept his policy 
proposals than to inquire into the ultimate theoretical foundations for accepting 
utilitarianism. This is not to say that Mill is intending to deceive, per se, but merely that 
he has a less than forthcoming attitude about his motivations.
247
 Crisp tries to capture the 
nuances of this by suggesting that, “In his writing on these contentious issues, Mill is of 
course attempting to state what he believes; but he is also using the skills of a rhetorician 
to persuade.”248 Crisp is not alone in underscoring the importance of reading Mill as a 
rhetorician. Though he adopts an alternative interpretive strategy for Mill’s texts, John 
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Rawls, like Crisp, stresses the importance of reading Mill as an intellectual public figure 
urging social reform. Recalling Mill’s rhetorical aims can help the reader adopt a more 
charitable attitude toward his writing’s defects such as, “their often loose and ambiguous 
terminology, and their almost incessant lofty style and sermonizing tone untroubled by 
self-doubt, even when the most intricate questions are being discussed. Those who 
disliked him said that he sought to convince, and, when that failed, to convict.”249  
 According to Crisp, Mill has quite different aims for Utilitarianism. In contrast to 
his writings on broader social issues, when writing Utilitarianism Mill’s rhetorical skills 
are merely in the background of the work, so to speak, and he is operating primarily in 
the mode of careful philosopher espousing the first principles of his brand of 
utilitarianism. In his other writings on moral and political topics, Mill’s conclusions 
derive their justification, implicitly or explicitly, from the foundation established in 
Utilitarianism. Thus, Crisp takes a decisive stance in the debate over how Mill’s liberal 
and utilitarian commitments might be reconciled. Some philosophers have suggested that 
Mill’s political writings reveal a deep disparity between these two essential aspects to his 
thought.
250
 Whether Mill’s liberalism and utilitarianism are consistent with each other, 
and whether Mill held to one set of commitments more strongly than the other, are 
preeminent questions in Mill scholarship.
251
 Crisp is not in doubt on this question. In his 
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attempt to confront this worry, he quotes Mill as giving clear affirmation of his 
commitment to utilitarianism within the text of On Liberty: “It is proper to state that I 
forego any advantage which would be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract 
right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all 
ethical questions.”252 Crisp takes this to mean that Mill’s elucidation of the concept of 
liberty “cannot ground any kind of liberalism which is inconsistent with his act 
utilitarianism.”253 While there are some potential worries with interpreting Mill’s 
comments this way, Crisp is at least clear on the question of how to understand Mill’s 
utilitarian and liberal commitments.    
 
The Ecumenical reading: Mill’s audience and his attitude toward the text   
   In contrast to the Orthodox reading, the Ecumenical reading of Utilitarianism 
interprets the book as a work where, for the most part, Mill is aiming to discuss 
utilitarianism more generally as opposed to his peculiar understanding of it. Moreover, 
while the text has assumed a prominent place in many readings of Mill, the Ecumenical 
position points to several reasons to think that, while Mill initially seems to have hoped 
for a broad audience for his work, he eventually came to hold Utilitarianism in fairly 
low regard.  
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 One can begin to see why this is the case by considering Mill’s choice of 
publishing venue. As is well known, Utilitarianism was published in successive editions 
of Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, in October, November, and December of 
1861.
254
 Crisp writes that Fraser’s was a “general intellectual journal,” and that, 
“Utilitarianism, unlike On Liberty or the Subjection of Women, was not written for 
widespread public consumption.”255 This opinion is belied by the evidence. To the extent 
that circulation numbers are reliable, circulation records of Fraser’s put it toward the top 
of comparable intellectual publications of the time. Records from the 1860s suggest that 
Fraser’s was competitive with the conservative monthly Blackwood’s Magazine, and 
typically outsold the Edinburgh Review and Westminster Review.
256
 At the risk of 
anachronism, one might helpfully compare Fraser’s to a modern publication like 
Atlantic Monthly, a magazine engaged with political and cultural issues of central public 
concern but written in a non-academic style. Taken together, it seems clear that by 
publishing in that venue Mill was hardly avoiding “widespread public consumption.” 
 More telling is what Mill published in Fraser’s aside from the articles that were 
later republished as Utilitarianism. The Orthodox reading of Utilitarianism might lead 
one to expect that Mill’s other Fraser’s essays were also matters of technical 
philosophy, wherein Mill is attempting to get clear on first principles in other parts of his 
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philosophical system. Yet, this is not the case. Instead, one finds Mill firmly engaged in 
matters of large public concern. Mill’s other publications in Fraser’s included a response 
to Thomas Carlyle’s argument for white supremacism, a discussion of recent voting 
reform proposals, an analysis of the difficulties of a non-interventionist foreign policy, 
and an opinion piece on the American Civil War.
257
 As usual, Mill approached these 
articles with critical insight and verve, but his eyes seem fixed on practical matters at 
hand, rather than in the philosophical heavens above.      
 To appreciate the kinds of audience and purposes Mill had in mind, it is helpful 
to recall Stefan Collini’s work on the Victorian “Public Moralists.”258 Public Moralists 
included figures like Matthew Arnold, James Fitzjames Stephen, John Morley, and 
Henry Fawcett, who shared a common communicative objective more than a shared 
ideological perspective. Rather than writing in an attempt to convince each other in high-
minded monographs, they articulated their respective viewpoints in periodicals aimed at 
those parts of the middle class who took ideas seriously. As Collini describes it, in 
writing for publications like Fraser’s, Mill and his fellow Public Moralists were 
reminding, “their more self-interested contemporaries of the strenuous commitments 
entailed by the moral values embedded in the public discourse of their society.”259 
Collini’s analysis is buttressed by what Mill said to his peers about Utilitarianism in his 
correspondence. While this goes some way toward illuminating Mill’s apparent authorial 
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intentions, one can also turn to more direct evidence of his desire to reach a broad 
audience with Utilitarianism. To one of his regular correspondents (and later biographer) 
Alexander Bain, Mill writes:  
  I do not think of publishing my Utilitarianism till next winter at the earliest, 
 though it is now finished, subject to any correction or enlargement which may 
 suggest itself in the interval. It will be but a small book, about a fifth less than the 
 Liberty, if I make no addition to it. But small books are so much more read than 
 large ones that it is an advantage when one’s matter will go into a small 
 space.
260
 
Again, it would seem odd for Mill to speak in this way if he did want the work to be read 
by a popular audience. Indeed, in the same letter, Mill advises Bain himself to publish 
one of his recent essays in Fraser’s instead of waiting to publish it as a book, since 
doing so will ensure that it is, “much more widely read . . .”261 
 If it seems evident that Mill was aiming at fairly broad readership for his essays, 
it is less clear that he took himself to be articulating the first principles of his moral 
philosophy. In January 1862, almost immediately after the work’s publication, Mill 
writes to his fellow utilitarian and regular correspondent George Grote expressing some 
doubts regarding the ultimate significance of what he had done. Mill remarks that though 
he is glad Grote enjoyed the essays, he is unsure about the ultimate efficacy: “The most 
that writing of that sort can be expected to do, is to place the doctrine in a better light, 
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and prevent the other side having everything their own way, and triumphing in their 
moral and metaphysical superiority as they have done for the last half century. . . .”262 
These limited hopes hardly sound like someone who has clarified the essential elements 
of his theory upon which all of his other practical writing depends (as Crisp argues). It 
does, however, read like someone who has just written a work that is aiming to improve 
the public opinion of utilitarianism more generally. 
 The possibility that the text has achieved its canonical status for reasons apart 
from its reflection of Mill’s definitive views on moral philosophy has been recognized 
for some time. In his 1882 biography of Mill, Bain wrote of Utilitarianism that, “This 
short work has many volumes to answer for. The amount of attention it has received is 
due, in my opinion, partly to its merits, and partly to its defects. As a powerful advocacy 
of Utility, it threw the Intuitionists on the defensive; while by a number of unguarded 
utterances, it gave them important strategic positions which they could not fail to 
occupy.”263 More recently, Alan Ryan takes a similarly ambivalent view of the text when 
he comments that Utilitarianism has, “become a classic more through the efforts of its 
opponents than those of its friends.”264 The work has, no doubt, attracted its share of 
enemies and has been carefully examined in philosophy seminars and monographs since 
its publication. The fact that Utilitarianism has been so widely studied and critiqued, 
however, does not imply that it should be regarded as Mill’s definitive work on moral 
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theory. As Bain says above, Mill has a few “unguarded utterances,” in Utilitarianism, 
but this is just what one might expect given Mill’s intended audience. Reflecting on this 
suggests alternative reasons for the text’s popularity: its pedagogical and literary 
qualities.  Mill’s brevity, memorable phrasings, and vivid examples attract readers and 
teachers to the text, but few are usually satisfied with the arguments as they stand. John 
Skorupski notes as much when he remarks these features are what, “makes 
Utilitarianism intensely tantalizing: there is a lucidity and basic rightness of approach 
which always brings one back to it, but the very things it gets right seem to cry out for 
more painstaking explanation and careful defence.”265   
 Even if Crisp were correct in his claim that Utilitarianism was originally 
intended to be a careful philosophical treatise aimed at a limited scholarly audience, a 
claim that seems dubious given the above considerations, it appears the utilitarian 
evangelist Mill did not glow with pride once his so-called “bible” was completed. In 
1866 Mill was given an opportunity by his publisher, William Longman, to supply a list 
of works for Longman to submit to the Durham Cooperative Institute so that they might 
be distributed at no cost. While On Liberty, Essay on Representative Government, and 
the Principles of Political Economy were among the titles chosen, Utilitarianism was 
conspicuously absent.
266
 Mill did not even seek to make sure that Utilitarianism was 
issued in an especially cheap volume, as he did for his much more technical Logic.
267
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 This type of behavior is not an aberration when compared with Mill’s public 
statements regarding Utilitarianism. In his Autobiography, a work that Mill extensively 
revised at the end of his life to give a proper view of his intellectual development, Mill 
did not seem to regard the work as being especially important.
268
 He mentions the text 
only once, in passing, and accords it only five lines in a work that extends over two-
hundred pages.
269
 This is despite the fact that he dedicates the final chapter to discussion 
of other important works like his On Liberty and the Logic, two works that Mill says that 
are more likely than any others to be continually read.
270
        
 Apart from Mill’s comments in the Autobiography, many of Mill’s decisions 
related to the revision of the work speak to his apparently lukewarm opinion on the 
document. As was his custom, some objections to Mill’s essays were included in the text 
when it was published in book form. For instance, in a footnote to chapter two Mill 
discusses one reader’s objection that an action must have a proper motive in order to be 
judged a moral one.
271
 Similarly, later editions of the text include a note explaining that 
Herbert Spencer does not wish to be identified as an opponent of utilitarianism as Mill 
implies that he is in chapter five.
272
 These alterations notwithstanding, Mill ultimately 
proved less than diligent in responding to important objections to his theory and in 
revising the work in light of those objections—a practice that stands in sharp contrast to 
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his behavior toward works like the Principles of Political Economy (seven editions) and 
his Logic (eight editions). While Mill often revised these works in light of rather subtle 
changes of opinion, he failed to alter some of the text of Utilitarianism even when doing 
so, in at least one documented case, would have saved Mill from the criticism of 
generations of philosophers.
273
  
 In 1868 Theodore Gomperz, who was preparing a German translation of the text, 
wrote to Mill explaining that he had noticed a potential fallacy in Mill’s famous “proof” 
for the principle of utility concerning Mill’s analogy between “the visible,” “the 
audible,” and “the desirable.”274 Mill responded by noting that he had not had time to go 
back and alter the passage to avoid the problem, but that perhaps he should do so. 
Indeed, rather than taking the time to alter the passage himself (as would seem 
appropriate if this is the foundational work of his moral theory) Mill invites Gomperz to 
resolve the issue for him: “I beg that in the translation you will kindly reserve that 
passage to yourself, & will remove the stumbling block, by expressing the real argument 
in such terms as you think will express it best.”275 Contrary to what one would expect if 
Mill deeply cared about the work, Mill never went back to revise the passage. This is in 
spite of the fact that he remained active in his correspondence and in revising other texts 
for new editions. If Utilitarianism was Mill’s definitive statement of his moral theory, 
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this neglect seems odd indeed.  
 
The Ecumenical reading: Mill’s intellectual context    
 At this point I have given reasons to suppose that Mill aimed Utilitarianism at a 
popular audience and that he eventually came to hold the work in comparatively low 
regard. I have said little, however, concerning what Mill seems to have intended to 
accomplish in the work. I suggest that Utilitarianism is Mill’s attempt to provide an 
iteration of utilitarianism that could be accepted by many utilitarians, and a response to 
standard objections commonly leveled against the theory. To support this suggestion, I 
will provide reasons to think both that Mill saw a need for a work of this sort, and that 
recognized that he was in a position to undertake it in an effective way.  
 To appreciate why Mill might accept the task of writing an ecumenical defense 
of utilitarianism, one must recall his intellectual status at the time at which he wrote the 
essays that became the book. Following his famous “mental crisis” in his early twenties, 
Mill undertook significant intellectual projects that established his reputation as a serious 
thinker.
276
 These included his editorship of the periodical the London and Westminster 
Review, and the publication of his System of Logic (1843) and the Principles of Political 
Economy (1848). The first of these was important for expanding Mill’s intellect and 
connections in the larger circles of Victorian intellectuals, while the latter two were 
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important in establishing Mill as a pre-eminent mind within those circles. Arthur 
Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister who had once studied with the utilitarian 
Henry Sidgwick, wrote that Mill’s authority in the universities as a result of his Logic 
was, “comparable to that wielded forty years earlier by Hegel in Germany and in the 
Middle Ages by Aristotle.”277 At his death in 1873, Mill was at work on the eighth 
edition, which, despite its length and difficulty, was still selling well. Mill’s Principles 
was similarly successful and, according to his biographer Richard Reeves, “established 
Mill as the highest-profile economist of the Victorian era.”278 The book was read widely 
in the universities and sold well: a People’s Edition of the book went through multiple 
editions and sold more than ten-thousand copies.
279
 In 1905, legal scholar A.V. Dicey 
gave a speech in which he said that, “At Oxford we swallowed Mill, rather undigested: 
he was our chief intellectual food until 1860.”280 While this might exaggerate the state of 
affairs somewhat, it is undeniable that Mill’s work on logic and political economy 
established him as one of the outstanding intellects of his time, even before the 
publication of some of the works that are commonly read today like On Liberty, 
Utilitarianism, and The Subjection of Women.     
 Despite his standing as an intellectual in the universities, Mill was well aware 
that the utilitarian doctrine itself was not as equally well received. In an 1847 letter to his 
former tutor and fellow utilitarian John Austin, Mill wrote that Austin should compose a 
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defense of utilitarianism: “This last may wait long for any one with the intellect & the 
courage to do it as it should be done. And until it is done we cannot expect much 
improvement in the common standard of moral judgments & sentiments.”281 Mill’s 
urgings were unsuccessful, however, and Austin never took up the work. Over ten years 
later Mill wrote to Gomperz saying that he was thinking of taking up the task himself 
since, “There are not many defences extant of the ethics of utility, and I have sometimes 
thought of reprinting this and other papers I have written on the same as well as on other 
subjects.”282 Mill’s language here is interesting as he does not say that what is needed is 
for him to outline his own understanding of utilitarianism, but rather the ethics of utility 
as such. Mill’s casual tone regarding these essays is interesting as well. In Crisp’s view, 
Utilitarianism is elucidating the first principles of Mill’s moral philosophy that provide 
the theoretical grounding for his other normative projects. By 1858, most of the prose 
that would become Utilitarianism would have already been written, and yet, in this letter 
to Gomperz, he seems less than fully decided as to whether he will even publish it.  
 Mill gives a suggestion to what ultimately led him to publish the essays in a letter 
to his French correspondent Charles DuPont-White. Mill writes that he and Dupont-
White seem to be in large agreement in their understanding of utilitarianism, but that 
Mill must correct his correspondent on one important point of fact:      
 Like many French, you appear to be of the opinion that the idea of Utility is in 
 England the dominant philosophy. It is nothing of the sort. I understand that one 
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 might see in that doctrine a certain analogy with the spirit of the English nation. 
 But in fact it is, and it has almost always been, very unpopular there. Most 
 English writers do not only deny it, they insult it: and the school of Bentham has 
 always been regarded (I say it with regret) as an insignificant minority.
283
     
This further establishes the idea that Mill saw the image of the utilitarian doctrine as 
what was in need of repair, rather than the doctrine itself. This is just what an 
ecumenical defense might accomplish. It is also worth highlighting Mill’s use of the 
term “regret” concerning the minority status of “Bentham’s school.” If Utilitarianism is 
supposed to stand as Mill’s definitive statement of his own views apart from Bentham’s, 
as Crisp supposes, this kind of language appears very strange indeed, especially as it 
comes in October 1861 (i.e. just as the essays were to be published in Fraser’s).  
 The consideration that there was a need to improve the standing of the utilitarian 
position may have been one factor leading to the publication of the essays, but so also 
might have been Mill’s own recognition of his growing influence on public opinion. In a 
letter to Bain in 1859 Mill remarks on a favorable review of his Dissertations and 
Discussions in the National Review from Henry Martineau. Mill says, “I really had no 
idea of being so influential a person as my critics tell me I am. But being thought to have 
influence is the surest way of obtaining it really.”284 In the very next paragraph, Mill 
mentions that he has taken up the task of revising some previously written essays and 
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some additional matter into “a little treatise on Utilitarianism.”285       
 
Mill’s final chapter  
 The points above are intended to support the claim that Mill was both in a good 
position to offer a general defense of utilitarianism, and that he recognized the need to 
do so. A crucial exception to the thesis that Mill uses Utilitarianism to argue for a 
general defense of the doctrine concerns the fifth and final chapter. In that chapter Mill 
considers the question whether utility is compatible with justice. It is the longest chapter 
of the book and, as many critics have noticed, this chapter sits somewhat awkwardly 
with the other essays. Even Crisp admits that Mill does little to integrate its contents 
with the other essays.
286
 In what follows, I will argue that this chapter has a distinct 
origin and apparently different purpose than the other chapters. As such, it may be 
interpreted differently than the other chapters.  
 In much of the text of Utilitarianism, Mill sidesteps matters of controversy 
within the doctrine of utilitarianism itself. He largely shuns heterodox utilitarian 
statements, and seeks to respond to various criticisms that have been commonly leveled 
against the theory. Throughout the text Mill discusses the theory in light of its 
intellectual forebears like Epicurus and Bentham and avoids matters of sectarian dispute. 
As Jacobson has noted, “when Mill does put forward an original claim [in 
Utilitarianism], it is in response to some general objection to the theory; and when he 
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advances an original argument, it is usually in support of a generally held thesis.”287 For 
instance, though he seems to offer a novel argument in chapter four “Of What Sort of 
Proof is the Principle of Utility Susceptible?” Mill provides a defense of a tenet that all 
of his contemporary utilitarians would accept: the principle of utility.
288
 When Mill does 
depart from standard utilitarian thinking, he usually notes explicitly that he is doing so—
as in the case of his “higher pleasures” discussion in chapter two. Here, Mill explains 
that, contrary to the claims of their opponents, utilitarians have long recognized the 
importance of mental, as opposed to sensual, pleasures. Yet, he says, they have done so 
by relying on arguments concerning the circumstantial benefits of relying on these 
pleasures rather than on their intrinsic nature:   
  And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might 
 have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire 
 consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the 
 fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than 
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 others.
289
 
Some writers have disputed the extent to which Mill is departing from Bentham in these 
words, but the relevant point here is that when Mill steps outside of utilitarian orthodoxy 
he flags that he is doing so.
290
 Throughout the text, Mill either avoids the controversial 
topics that he addresses elsewhere in his work (e.g. the treatment of women) or discusses 
those topics in ways that could appeal to different types of utilitarianism (e.g. the nature 
of moral rules).  
 This practice changes, however, in the fifth chapter on justice. Here, Mill 
mentions several points that suggest he is giving his own views concerning controversial 
doctrines in utilitarian philosophy, including his views on supererogation and the Art of 
Life.
291
 Concerning supererogation, he writes: 
 There are other things . . . which we wish that people should do, which we like or 
 admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet 
 admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not 
 blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of 
 punishment.
292
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This is not a point that Mill raises only to abandon later in the text or in other writings. It 
is reiterated when he responds to a reader’s worry about a similar point in chapter five of 
Utilitarianism. There Mill refers to cases where one might undertake “admirable acts of 
virtue,” which might inspire others to similarly noble acts but are not necessarily cases 
of duty or obligation.
293
 Mill’s stance here stands in contrast to some utilitarians who 
took the view that one had a moral obligation to do everything one could for the sake of 
utility.  
 Mill’s doctrine of the Art of Life concerns his claim that morality is not the sole 
standpoint from which one can evaluate human action. Mill alludes to his doctrine of the 
Art of Life in chapter five of Utilitarianism when he speaks about the domain of 
morality being something apart from “the remaining provinces of Expediency and 
Worthiness,” which are to be considered as separate spheres from the domain of 
morality.
294
 Though he expresses his view somewhat differently in different works, Mill 
divides the world into three standpoints one uses in evaluating actions: “Morality, 
Prudence or Policy, and Aesthetics; the Right, The Expedient, and the Beautiful or 
Noble, in human conduct or works.”295 Roughly, this schema suggests that actions might 
be evaluated in light of the standards of morality, the standards of prudence, or 
aesthetically. To be clear, the significance of the Art of Life discussion in this context 
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lies not in the details of the account as such but in the fact that Mill brings it up at all 
when he has otherwise avoided topics that are controversial within the utilitarian camp.  
Apart from these considerations, there are several other reasons, drawn from the 
historical evidence, to treat Mill’s fifth chapter apart from the other chapters. Some of 
the most important evidence concerns the fact that the fifth chapter seems to have been 
written as a separate essay and attached to the other four essays at a later date. This is not 
an especially contested point in the literature, even by Crisp, who comments on how 
Mill’s writing there stands apart from the other essays. Evidence from Mill’s 
correspondence and journals suggest that he began work on the essays that would later 
become the first four chapters of Utilitarianism in 1854.
296
 The key piece of evidence for 
chapter five’s separate composition comes from Mill’s step-daughter Helen Taylor. 
Following the death of her mother, Harriet Mill, Taylor assumed the role of Mill’s 
caretaker and close companion, and became his literary executor at his death. In her 
introductory note to Three Essays on Religion, Taylor provided some important context 
for the work:  
The two first of these three Essays were written between the years 1850 and 
1858, during the period which intervened between the publication of the 
Principles of Political Economy, and that of the work on Liberty; during which 
interval three other Essays—on Justice, on Utility, and on Liberty—were also 
composed. Of the five Essays written at that time, three have already been given 
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to the public by the Author. That on Liberty was expanded into the now well-
known work bearing the same title. Those on Justice and Utility were afterwards 
incorporated, with some alterations and additions, into one, and published under 
the name of Utilitarianism.
297
   
For the purposes of this study, what is especially important is Taylor’s emphasis that the 
essay on justice, which is the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, is a separate document from 
the other essays on utility. In that light, then, it is worth noting that Taylor’s comments 
in the quote above correlate with some other evidence concerning Mill’s composition of 
an essay on justice evident in his correspondence with Harriet Mill. In June 1854, while 
traveling, Mill said that, “I do not find the essay on Justice goes on well. I wrote a good 
long piece of it at Quimper, but it is too metaphysical, & not what is most wanted but I 
must finish it now in that vein & then strike into another.”298 Similar language is 
repeated in Mill’s brief discussion of Utilitarianism in his Autobiography where he 
writes that shortly after Harriet’s death: 
. . . I took from their repository a portion of the unpublished papers which I had 
written during the last years of our married life, and shaped them, with some 
additional matter, into the little work entitled “Utilitarianism”; which was first 
published, in three parts, in successive numbers of Fraser’s Magazine and 
afterward reprinted in a volume.
299
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Given the context already introduced, it seems likely that the “additional matter” is the 
essay on justice. In fact, this phrasing concerning the “additional matter” is precisely 
Mill’s choice of terms when he wrote to Bain in 1859 about adding some material to his 
previously written essays on utilitarianism.
300
 
 The claim that Mill might have worked on the essay later than the other four is 
further supported by Mill’s comment in chapter five directing readers to consult a recent 
work by Bain on the topic of the close conceptual relationship between morality and 
punishment. At the end of one of Mill’s paragraphs on these points Mill provides a 
footnote (which was given in the initial essay in Fraser’s) saying that one can, “See this 
point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain in an admirable chapter (entitled ‘The 
Ethical Emotions, or the Moral Sense’), of the second of the two treatises composing his 
elaborate and profound work on the Mind.”301 In December 1859, Mill had written a 
lengthy review of these texts for the Edinburgh Review and provided a strong advocacy 
for the book, which provides good reason to think that its contents might have influenced 
his account of morality as it is given in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism.
 302 
  
 To summarize, then: I have suggested that chapter five might be read differently 
than the rest of the book, given that it was composed separately, and possibly several 
years later, than the other four essays. There is also evidence that Mill was influenced in 
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this chapter by Bain’s writings, which might help explain the chapter’s discontinuity 
from the rest of the text. I have also argued that in the fifth chapter, Mill includes several 
controversial doctrines that are in concert with his other writings but stand apart from his 
practice in the other essays. Overall, this provides at least some evidence for thinking 
that Mill is expressing his own views in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism in a way that 
is different from his practice and objectives in the rest of the chapters.  
  
Implications of the Ecumenical reading and the final chapter  
 If this hypothesis for how to read chapter five apart from the other chapters 
holds, it could have a notable effect on determining how one interprets Mill’s moral 
theory. Here I will briefly look at one possible implication of this reading as it relates to 
larger interpretations of Mill’s criteria for a moral action. In the second chapter of 
Utilitarianism, Mill famously provides his ‘proportionality criterion’ of morality which 
says that, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”303 According to 
Crisp, “This passage is the clearest statement in Utilitarianism of Mill’s moral theory” 
and is an essential component of Mill’s articulation of act utilitarianism.304 As Wendy 
Donner has written, even if one does not read Mill as an act utilitarian all things 
considered, this is at least one passage that is commonly thought to provide important 
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support for that reading as it seems to provide Mill’s criterion for judging the morality of 
an action.
305
 Yet there is another place where Mill seems to give an alternative criterion 
for judging the morality of an action. In chapter five Mill states that:   
  . . . I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions 
 of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some 
 other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person 
 ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say that it would be right to do 
 so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as we 
 would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded 
 and exhorted, to act in that manner.
306
 
As noted in the previous chapter, this passage is standardly referred to as Mill’s 
‘punishability criterion’ of morality since it seems to establish some essential tie 
between an action’s wrongness and punishment for that action. Just as act utilitarian 
interpreters rely heavily on the proportionality criterion, so do those the favoring other 
interpretations, like rule utilitarianism or sanction utilitarianism, put heavy emphasis on 
the punishability criterion.
307
 These scholars standardly use this passage to argue that 
Mill identifies wrongness with an action that violates a moral rule and is thus subject to 
sanctioning, whether that punishment comes in the form of guilt, social criticism, or 
legal punishment.  
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 Those who favor the act utilitarian interpretation and those who do not, then, 
have competing understandings of Mill’s account of what makes an action a moral one. 
As Berger has written, this is a problem since Mill “gave no indication as to how the 
proportionality and punishability criteria are to be reconciled. This part of the theory was 
never sufficiently clarified or developed.”308 Berger is correct to note that Mill does not 
sufficiently clarify his view on these points. As one might recall from the previous 
chapter, Crisp recognizes the difficulty of reconciling these two criteria, but he argues 
that Mill provides the solution by presenting the proportionality criterion first.
309
 This 
allows Mill to avoid “an internal contradiction.”310 Alternatively, and more plausibly in 
my view, one might say that Mill’s statement of the proportionality criterion is vague 
and ecumenical in its own right, and that Mill specifies his own view of morality in the 
fifth chapter in providing the punishability criterion.
311
 However, if Mill had ecumenical 
aims for the second chapter of Utilitarianism, where the proportionality criterion 
appeared, it is not surprising that he failed to reconcile these two criteria. Mill would not 
have thought that he needed to explain how to reconcile these two parts of his moral 
theory since one of the criteria was not properly a part of his theory. If Mill is giving his 
own account of Utilitarianism in chapter five, where the punishability criterion appears, 
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then this provides reason to favor the punishability criterion over the proportionality 
criterion in determining Mill’s theory of morality. If this reading is correct, the act 
utilitarian interpretation loses one of its most commonly cited passages typically given in 
its defense, while the rule and sanction interpretations are bolstered by Mill’s statements 
in chapter five.   
 
 Conclusion  
 To conclude, I have argued that the Orthodox reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism is 
mistaken on two distinct points. First, there are good reasons to think that it is mistaken 
in claiming that Mill was not writing for a popular audience and that the work represents 
Mill’s definitive articulation of his moral theory. Contrary to the Orthodox view, I 
argued for the Ecumenical reading, which says that Mill used the text to defend a 
common creed that could command general utilitarian assent throughout the first four 
essays. Second, I argued that the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism can be read differently 
than the other chapters and, furthermore that such a reading promises to significantly 
change how we interpret Mill’s moral theory. While there is much in the text of 
Utilitarianism itself to support this position (e.g. Mill’s avoidance of sectarian utilitarian 
topics, his special concern to respond to familiar criticisms against the doctrine), my 
primary aim has been to show that the evidence external to the text provided above has 
further illuminated the meaning of one of Mill’s most famous works. As Quentin 
Skinner has famously argued, “A study that focuses exclusively on what a writer said 
about some given doctrine will not only be inadequate, but may be in some cases be 
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positively misleading as a guide to what the writer in question may have intended or 
meant.”312 I take it that Mill’s Utilitarianism is precisely one these cases, and I hope that 
this chapter has proved adequate in providing sufficient reason to see that this is so. 
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CHAPTER V  
DEFENSE OF THE SANCTION THEORY OF MORAL WRONG  
  
 In this chapter my aim is to provide an interpretation of what I call Mill’s 
Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong. As I will discuss shortly, this is a central element in 
describing his theory of moral obligation and his theory of moral obligation more 
generally. After providing an interpretation of Mill’s Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong 
in this chapter, the next chapter will elaborate on Mill’s sanction utilitarian theory. The 
interpretation offered in both chapters obviously builds upon the work I have discussed 
thus far, especially the previous chapter, wherein I examined the historical challenges in 
interpreting Mill’s moral theory, focusing on Utilitarianism. As was evident there, the 
historical questions surrounding Mill’s writings on moral theory are simultaneously 
difficult and unavoidable for anyone attempting to offer a particular interpretation. 
While it is standard procedure to put chapter two of Utilitarianism at the center of one’s 
interpretation, in the last chapter I argued for the Ecumenical reading, which holds that 
there are good reasons to doubt the wisdom of this practice. Instead, this chapter will 
proceed with the interpretive hypothesis that Mill gives the most important elements of 
his moral theory in chapter five of Utilitarianism. This is especially the case in the 
fourteenth paragraph of that chapter where Mill describes the relationship between 
identifying an action as wrong and saying that it should be punished.    
 To say that Mill is best interpreted in this way, though, is not to say that it is the 
only way that he can be plausibly interpreted. In the second and third chapters of this 
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dissertation, I examined both rule and act utilitarian interpretations of Mill’s moral 
theory. Each side claimed some passages as crucial evidence for their view, while 
admitting that other passages stand as apparent confounders. My interpretation has its 
own share of crucial passages and apparent confounders, though the obvious aim is to 
make the most out of the former and to be able to discount the importance of the latter. 
Moreover, my hope is that the historical evidence discussed in the last chapter will go 
some way toward discounting some of these difficult passages.  
 In fact, my arguments about how to discount the confounders and emphasize 
certain crucial passages are what I take to be distinctive about this dissertation. To date, 
no one has gone through the evidence for reading Mill as a sanction utilitarian with the 
Ecumenical historical position in mind as a decisive method of adjudicating questions 
about the priority of Mill’s texts. Jacobson has gone some way toward developing the 
Ecumenical reading while also reinvigorating a version of the sanction utilitarian 
reading, and Miller has waded through many of the difficulties that accompany 
interpreting Mill as a rule or sanction utilitarian. My aim is to outline a new reading of 
Mill’s moral theory that, among other things, combines the insights of both of these 
approaches that build upon the interpretation offered by Lyons almost thirty years ago. 
As such, the next two chapters where I outline and argue for the view should serve both 
as an exposition of the sanction utilitarian theory and, to a lesser extent, a review of the 
most trenchant points highlighted by these scholars. In contrast to chapters two and three 
which focused on the nature of moral rules, this discussion will be more wide ranging 
and will not hew closely to any particular interpreter’s view. The hope is that by 
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incorporating the work done on components of the theory into a more straightforward 
defense of the sanction view, I can best identify precisely where Mill spells out the 
nature of his moral theory and where we might need to speculate on how his view is 
supposed to work.   
 In an attempt to specify just what Mill explains and what he does not, I will 
spend this chapter arguing for what I call Mill’s Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong. In 
presenting the theory, I will contextualize the paragraph where Mill lays out his theory, 
state the theory’s thesis, explicate the passages that motivate the theory’s thesis by 
reviewing Mill’s three formulations of the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, 
contextualize these formulations by showing their connections to Mill’s broader body of 
writings, and explain Mill’s theory of compulsion, rules, and prospective guidance. After 
these elements are in place, I will review the contours of the theory and explain how the 
constituent parts support the initially stated thesis. It is only after providing this 
schematic of the theory and the central passages that motivate each component that I will 
later, in the next chapter, attempt to examine the full nature of Mill’s utilitarianism.  
 Before turning to my interpretation proper, however, I want to explicitly state the 
claims that I will be arguing for in my exposition of Mill’s theory of moral obligation. 
These claims may seem rather startling in light of the Mill scholarship discussed in 
chapters two and three, so I will request the reader’s patience for the moment as I lay out 
my claims in a rather bald manner. Some claims are more controversial than others, but, 
in an attempt to foreshadow where the discussion is heading, I want to clearly specify 
the aims of my exegesis.  
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 On my interpretation, Mill’s comments in the fourteenth paragraph of chapter 
five of Utilitarianism are best read as a metaethical discussion concerning the nature of 
moral obligation. In that passage Mill sketches a theory of moral obligation that is 
compatible with both non-utilitarian and utilitarian theories of morality. That said, while 
Mill’s own theory is still a utilitarian one in that he generally evaluates actions by their 
consequences and identifies the principle of utility as the ultimate source of value, his 
theory of moral obligation ultimately precludes a commitment to certain types of 
utilitarianism—namely types of maximizing act and rule utilitarianism. Both the chapter 
five passage and Mill’s other writings suggest that he wants to allow for the possibility 
of positively and negatively evaluating actions in a way that is beyond the purview of 
morality (which is impossible for maximizing versions of act utilitarianism). He also 
demonstrates a clear commitment to punishing morally wrong actions regardless of how 
that punishment alters utility (which is incompatible with rule utilitarianism).  
 Aside from arguing for the ways in which Mill’s theory is distinct from types of 
act and rule utilitarianism, I will also argue that Mill’s understanding of moral right and 
wrong is bound up with his theory of rules and his theory of the moral conscience. On 
Mill’s view, an agent commits a morally wrong action when she violates a moral rule 
and is punished by the internal sanction of the conscience. An action is morally right 
when an agent can be rightfully be compelled to undertake it. I will argue that, by 
compel, Mill means that the agent should be punished, in some way, if she does not 
undertake the action in question. On this reading, then, sanctions, or punishments, play 
an essential role in both Mill’s theory of wrong and his theory of right.  
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   Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong        
 It is regularly acknowledged in Mill scholarship that Mill’s moral theory 
“conceptually links” morality to punishment. The challenge, however, is to specify the 
precise nature of this conceptual link and to explain how it is consistent with Mill’s 
utilitarian and liberal commitments. The primary motivation for seeing this close 
connection between Mill’s theory of punishment and his theory of moral obligation is 
the result of a careful reading of the fourteenth paragraph of the fifth chapter in 
Utilitarianism.  
 The context for the passage is that Mill has just concluded his discussion of the 
etymological origins of “justice” and its close to relation to the concept of legal 
punishment. Mill writes that that one can identify injustices while admitting that an 
action should not, for prudential reasons, be punished by the force of law. The prudential 
constraint comes from concerns about investing a magistrate with the power to enforce 
the dictates of justice in “even the remotest details” of life.313 Nonetheless, Mill 
supposes, it is evident that legal constraint is closely allied with the concept of justice. 
As Mill’s next paragraph contains so many points that are essential to the discussion in 
this chapter, I will quote it here in full:  
  The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and 
 progressive growth of the idea of justice. But we must observe, that it contains, 
 as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral obligation in general. 
 For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters 
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 not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We 
 do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be 
 punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his 
 fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This 
 seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple 
 expediency. It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a 
 person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may 
 be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be 
 exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest 
 of other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, 
 it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, 
 on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire 
 them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that 
 they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame 
 them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How we 
 come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment, will appear, 
 perhaps, in the sequel; but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the 
 bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or 
 employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we 
 think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say that it 
 would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, 
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 according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or 
 only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.
314
 
 There are two immediately striking elements to this passage.
315
 The first, and 
most obvious, is that Mill, three times, associates moral obligation and the concept of 
‘ought’ with punishment. In what follows, I will discuss and contextualize each of these 
three instances to make Mill’s point stand out. Many writers on Mill’s moral theory 
mention this key paragraph in their exposition of Mill’s views. However, I will try to 
show that a close reading of the paragraph, when combined with a wider reading of 
Mill’s moral theory across several texts, can shed new light on his theory of moral 
obligation and the nature of his utilitarianism.   
 The second striking element is that, though the paragraph is explicitly about the 
nature of moral obligation, there is a complete absence of utilitarian language. Mill 
seems to be giving an account of moral obligation that makes no special appeal to utility. 
As will be discussed shortly, Mill is presenting his reader with a general sketch of a 
sanction understanding of moral obligation that does not itself assume utilitarianism.
316
  
Indeed, it appears that one could accept the central features of a sanction theory of 
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Mill’s Progressive Principles, 100. 
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 This was noted by Lyons in his early influential reading of this passage, and is even 
acknowledged by Brink who is hostile to the sanction utilitarian position. See, Lyons, “Mill’s Theory of 
Morality,” 105; Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 100-101. 
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wrong without being a utilitarian.
317
 To grasp the specifically utilitarian aspect of his 
moral theory, one must situate this passage in light of Mill’s other theoretical 
commitments as they appear in this fifth chapter and elsewhere in his writings. Though I 
will mention certain utilitarian aspects of Mill’s theory here, I will focus more on these 
questions in the next chapter.  
 First, however, it is necessary to give an analysis of Mill’s theory of moral 
wrong. In this analysis I will give the sanction view’s distinctive definition of a moral 
wrong, identify and explicate the passages motivating the formulation, and then 
elaborate on some of the finer points of the theory that are involved in the definition. My 
objective will be to understand the passage in light of the three central formulations of 
Mill’s account of a Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong. My exposition will be, to a 
degree, guided by the work of other sanction utilitarian interpreters, though the labels I 
attach to the formulations and the sequence by which I introduce the relevant concepts 
are my own. In examining some of the implications of the two formulations I will 
connect these two formulations to the rest of the passage in a way that helps make sense 
of the sanction account of moral wrong. Only after this is clear will I examine, more 
specifically, Mill’s moral theory in all of its relevant aspects.     
 As I interpret this passage, Mill is setting forth the following definition for an 
action to be morally wrong:   
 
                                                 
 
317 One modern example of a deontological theory that adopts a similar model is Darwall, 
“Moral Obligation and Accountability,” 91-110.  
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Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong: An act is morally wrong if and only if it is appropriate 
for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience, and possibly be subject to other 
punishments (e.g. social or legal penalties), for performance of the act.  
 
As stated, the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong sounds rather empty, and it will only 
become less so when one looks more carefully at how to best understand the meaning of 
the term ‘appropriate’ and what it means to apply sanctions in the way that Mill advises.     
 
The first formulation  
 The first component of the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong occurs when Mill 
provides his first formulation of the idea that there is an important connection between 
moral wrongness and punishment.
318
   
  The Implication Formulation: We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean 
 to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing 
 it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the 
 reproaches of his own conscience.
319
 
This formulation raises two especially important points. The first point concerns Mill’s 
mention of the logical connection between punishment and moral wrong. The second 
concerns Mill’s analysis of the nature of punishment involved in moral wrongdoing. In 
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 As will be discussed later, Mill had been developing these ideas on the relation between moral 
wrong and punishment in his correspondence and they reoccur in later writings like his Examination of the 
Philosophy of William Hamilton. The discussion in Utilitarianism is the clearest discussion, however, and 
my account the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong will be especially focused on what Mill says there.   
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 Mill, U, 5.14. 
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both cases, Mill has a more subtle point to make than is perhaps immediately 
appreciated, and it is thus worth taking care to notice how he explains his view.  
 Regarding the first of these points, consider Mill’s claim that there is some type 
of inferential relationship between the use of moral condemnation and punishment. Mill 
seems to be saying that the very concept of moral wrongdoing has within it the idea that 
some kind of punishment is appropriate. One might think that this is a rather trivial 
point. After all, it is a common enough thought that it would be justified to mete out at 
least some kind of punishment for moral wrongdoing. To see why Mill’s statement is not 
a trivial point, consider how such a statement might be in tension with, say, a 
maximizing rule utilitarian theory with a basic hedonistic conception of the good. 
Suppose an agent breaks a justified moral rule and aggregate utility is thereby 
decreased.
320
 The action is morally wrong, but since the theory is, by definition, 
supposed to maximize aggregate utility, the theory would, by rule, prescribe punishment 
for the moral wrong only when doing so is in accordance with the promotion of utility. 
This is because punishment involves disutility, and must therefore be justified by appeal 
to utility. In other words, whether punishment is appropriate for wrongdoing is 
something that the rule utilitarian does not assume at the outset but must justify 
depending on how utility is affected.
321
 This means that the appropriateness of 
punishment is a contingent feature of morality for the simple rule utilitarian theory—it 
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 I add the second part of the conjunction to avoid strange cases where justified rules are broken 
and, by way of resultant luck, aggregate utility is raised or stays the same.  
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 As Lyons explains on this point, “it is a utilitarian platitude that sanctions involve disutility; 
even the ‘internal sanction’ of conscience is assumed to be unpleasant.” Lyons, “Mill’s Theory of 
Morality,” 106. 
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recommends punishment in those cases where utility would be maximized by there 
being a relevant rule in place to handle such cases. Mill’s theory does not leave the 
question open to whether there should be a rule—he seems to say, preemptively, that 
agents should be punished by their conscience, regardless of whether there is a rule 
justifying the punishment from the standpoint of utility. Thus, Mill’s statement in the 
Implication Formulation is not a trivial point—it is not even compatible with a simple 
rule utilitarian account of moral wrong.  
 This idea that there is an implication relation between moral wrongdoing and 
punishment is picked up by Mill again in his later work (possibly the sequel mentioned 
in the fourteenth paragraph of chapter five) An Examination of the Philosophy of Sir 
William Hamilton. In a chapter devoted to discussing controversies about free will and 
moral responsibility, Mill includes a rich discussion on the psychology of how humans 
hold each other responsible as moral agents. Mill states that his own account of moral 
wrong does account for the fact people generally expect to be punished for undertaking a 
wrong action, though he is quick to say that this fact does not necessarily justify this 
account (he comments on that matter elsewhere).
322
 In describing the psychological 
foundation for how punishment and wrongdoing are related he writes that:    
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 Mill makes it clear in the text that the feeling that punishment should accompany a moral 
wrong is not itself moral until it becomes allied with a general principle like a concern for the general 
welfare. As he put it in a separate passage the one quoted below, “This natural feeling, whether instinctive 
or acquired, though in itself it has nothing moral in it, yet when moralized by being allied with, and limited 
by, regard for the general welfare, becomes, in my view of the matter, our moral sentiment of justice.” 
Mill, Examination, CW, 9, 460n. As will become evident shortly this follows precisely the account given 
in chapter five of Utilitarianism. See Mill, U, 5.21-23. 
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 From our earliest childhood, the idea of doing wrong (that is, of doing what is 
 forbidden, or what is injurious to others) and the idea of punishment are 
 presented to our mind together, and the intense character of the impressions 
 causes the association between them to attain the highest degree of closeness and 
 intimacy. Is it strange, or unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in 
 these circumstances we should retain the feeling, and forget the reason on which 
 it is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason has 
 never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only ideas 
 presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable 
 association has been created between these directly, without the help of any 
 intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelings of 
 mankind regard punishment and a wrongdoer as naturally fitted to each other—as 
 a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of any consequences.
323
 
This passage, which was written after the publication of chapter five of Utilitarianism 
and is in part a response to unfriendly readings of Mill’s views, goes some way to 
explaining why Mill does not tie his account of moral wrong to utilitarianism.
324
 
Namely, Mill sees the account surrounding the connection between the two concepts as 
extending beyond the moral psychology of those who formally accept utilitarianism and 
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 Mill mentions that his account here is in part a response to Patrick Procter Alexander. In a 
footnote specifically addressing Alexander’s misreading of Mill’s account of justice he says, with some 
sarcasm, “The chapter in which I have discussed this question is quite familiar to Mr. Alexander; who 
shows himself extremely well acquainted with all parts of it, except those which tell against his own side.” 
Ibid., 460n. For a larger view on Mill’s motives for writing the Examination and its relation to both On 
Liberty and Utilitarianism (both of which he revised for publication while writing the Examination), see 
John Robson, “Textual Introduction,” in Mill, Examination, CW, 9, lxix-cii.  
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to human beings more generally. In this passage quoted above, among human beings 
generally, punishment and moral wrong are presented as attaining, “the highest degree of 
closeness and intimacy,” forming a direct and “inseparable association,” that does not 
require any “intervening idea,” and  which leads people to see the two as “naturally 
fitted to one another.” It is striking that he says that the two concepts are regarded as 
appropriately fitting apart from any consequences. In other words, even if someone is 
not a consequentialist (in the general sense of that term), that person already operates 
with the account of moral wrongdoing that is being defended here. When possible, Mill 
makes it a practice in his works to sharply distinguish his moral theory from those that 
suppose that an action can be wrong in itself or that wrong actions can be determined by 
some faculty of moral sense. With regard to the connection between moral wrongdoing 
and punishment, however, “It matters not, for this purpose, whether the right and wrong 
of actions depends on the consequences they tend to produce, or on an inherent quality 
of the actions themselves. It is indifferent whether we are utilitarians or anti-utilitarians; 
whether our ethics rest on intuition or on experience.”325 It seems, then, that Mill is not 
in doubt as to whether his readers will need to suppose a belief in utilitarianism in order 
to understand his connection between wrongdoing and punishment. This, then, goes 
some way in explaining why he does not invoke utilitarianism in the fourteenth 
paragraph of chapter five.   
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 Mill, Examination, CW, 9, 454. Cf. Mill’s discussion of intuitive vs. inductive systems of 
morals in Mill, U, 1.3.  
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 The second notable point of the Implication Formation concerns Mill’s claim 
about the types of punishment that are implied when an action is identified as morally 
wrong. Properly recognizing an action as wrong might legitimate external sanctions, like 
those of legal punishment (e.g. jail time) or merely social punishment (e.g. moral 
criticism from peers). Mill also supposes that wrong actions contain the implication that 
internal sanctions (e.g. the feelings of conscience) follow from wrong action. To be 
clear, in the Implication Formulation, Mill is not merely saying that agents expect that 
sanctions will follow from their action (though they presumably will in light of their 
psychological histories), but he is making a bolder statement that the very idea of saying 
that an agent’s action is morally wrong implies that it would be justified for sanctions of 
some kind to be applied to the agent as a result of undertaking the action.
326
  
 Careful attention to the Implication Formulation also allows one to notice that 
Mill does not suppose that these punishments come in a single, undifferentiated package. 
Instead, he has a kind of cascading terrace of punishment possibilities, not all of which 
might be appropriate for a moral wrong. Mill’s formulation suggests that if legal or 
social punishments are not deemed appropriate, because of “prudence or the interest of 
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 Recall that the Implication Formulation says that, “We do not call anything wrong, unless we 
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of two kinds. It may mean, expectation that if we act in a certain manner, punishment will actually be 
inflicted upon us, by our fellow creatures or by a Supreme Power. Or it may only mean, knowing that we 
shall deserve that infliction.” Mill, Examination, CW, 9, 454. 
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other people,” then, at least, the internal sanction of conscience is appropriate.327 As 
such, Mill takes there to be a special relationship between moral wrong and the internal 
sanction of conscience.
328
 In determining what other punishments might be called for, 
beyond internal sanctions, one could appeal to prudence, utility, or some other principle. 
These punishments would only be added on, so to speak, as deemed fitting by the 
principle in question. In contrast, the internal sanctions are deemed to be fitting at the 
outset of the moral wrong, conceptually speaking. It is for this reason that the Sanction 
Theory of Moral Wrong picks out the internal sanction of conscience as having 
particular relevance for determining moral wrongdoing. Again, the passage does not 
assume that Mill is operating under a utilitarian framework governed by the principle of 
utility, and alternative moral schemes could appropriate Mill’s understanding of the 
relationship between moral wrong and punishment without sharing his commitment to 
the principle of utility.          
 
The second formulation  
 The fourteenth paragraph contains a second formulation of the idea that there is a 
conceptual connection between an action being wrong and it being worthy of 
punishment. I call this formulation the Proper Object Formulation.  
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328Mill refers to internal sanctions as “the essence of Conscience” and conscience, Mill suggests, 
serves as the “Ultimate sanction of the principle of utility.” Ibid., 3.4. Though he identifies the importance 
of the internal sanction for utilitarianism, Mill also stresses that the pangs of conscience are just as 
important to other moral theories besides utilitarianism—though they might differ, ultimately, on the 
appropriateness of various external sanctions. See Ibid., 3.4. For a more general discussion on Mill’s 
theory of sanctions see Dale Miller, “Mill’s Theory of Sanctions,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, 159-173.   
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 The Proper Object Formulation: There are other things, on the contrary, which 
 we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, 
 perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not 
 bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, 
 we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment.
329
 
There are two immediately important points concerning this passage. The first is that 
Mill is explicitly limiting the scope of moral obligation to those things that one can be 
properly punished for failing to do rather than those actions for which agents are 
admired or liked for doing. It is not enough, to qualify as a matter of moral obligation, 
that one can be despised by agents for not doing something. Nor is it enough to say that 
one would wish something to be done or that we would admire someone for doing that 
thing. Agents become proper objects of punishment, Mill is suggesting, when they 
trespass on a moral obligation rather than when they do less than their absolute best—a 
standard that, as we have seen in previous chapters, stands in contrast to the maximizing 
act utilitarian point of view.   
 The second point concerns Mill’s discussion of who can be a “proper object” of 
punishment. This point is important both for establishing a further link between 
wrongness and punishment and for including a normative element into his conception of 
what qualifies an agent for punishment. By saying that some people are properly the 
objects of punishment it is implied that there is some standard that has been violated 
such that the agents can be justifiably punished. As was discussed in the Implication 
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Formulation, just because an agent is, in fact, punished for undertaking an action it does 
not follow that it is right to punish that person. By invoking the language of “proper 
objects” Mill is apparently appealing to the existence of some normative standard. As is 
the case in Mill’s two other formulations, Mill’s examination here of the link between 
moral wrongdoing and punishment is echoed and clarified in his other writings, and I 
will be appealing to such texts in outlining the Proper Object Formulation.  
 The first significant point about the Proper Object Formulation is that Mill has a 
limited sense of moral obligation. This is plain from the language of the formulation, 
which says that there are actions that can be admired, liked, or despised by other agents, 
but which are, nonetheless, not matters of moral obligation. This suggests that there is a 
conceptual space of positive and negative evaluation of actions that is distinct from the 
space containing acts of moral obligation and, ipso facto, distinct from those cases that 
involve moral blame and punishment.  
 This might seem like a trivial claim since it is common enough to think that 
morality has a limited role in human lives such that agents are not obligated to do all that 
it would be good to do. Morality might be an important part of life, perhaps even the 
most important, without being the sole foundational principle for organizing how to live 
one’s life.330 Yet, this idea of being guided by a sole foundational principle is just what 
maximizing utilitarians seem to affirm. On a single-level subjective maximizing act 
utilitarian view, one is morally obligated to undertake the action that is likely to produce 
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the greatest amount of aggregate happiness. This type of utilitarianism does not put any 
restrictions, as such, on which types of action are evaluable from the standpoint of 
utility. Since the standard of utility can be applied to any action where utility can be 
affected, its domain in life of human agents is theoretically limitless. It would make little 
sense, to employ the language in the Proper Object Formulation, for this kind of 
utilitarian to say that she wished an agent would have undertaken one action over 
another or that she despised another agent’s action and not thereby imply that the other 
agent’s action was morally wrong. This is because, for this type of utilitarian, all 
evaluation is, strictly speaking, a matter of judging what increases or decreases probable 
alterations to aggregate utility.
331
 It would be strange, from a strictly maximizing act 
utilitarian point of view, for an agent to say, “I really despise (or admire) your action 
even though it has absolutely no relevance to utility outcomes.” In light of this, Mill’s 
identification of a region whereby positive and negative evaluations do not necessarily 
involve moral evaluations is a significant point.  
 It is important to remember that, in giving the Proper Object Formulation, Mill is 
only sketching his Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong and not his version of 
utilitarianism. The Proper Object Formulation suggests that actions can be positively or 
negatively evaluated without being matters of moral obligation. Yet, it does not say, for 
example, where one should draw the line between actions that are despised but not 
morally wrong and actions that are morally wrong. In other writings, like On Liberty and 
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other passages in chapter five of Utilitarianism, Mill does draw the line in various 
places, but he does not do so here since he is merely giving a general framework for 
moral obligation more generally.     
 Since Mill does not say much in this passage about where this line might be 
drawn, I will consider three passages from Mill’s essays on Auguste Comte where Mill 
discusses the proper use of moral sanctions. Mill wrote two essays on Comte, which 
appeared sequentially in the Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review in 1864 and 
1865 after finishing his work on Hamilton.
332
 Mill had a long association with Comte’s 
work, but undertook these essays in light of Comte’s expanding influence on European 
intellectual culture. Mill writes that Comte, “had taken his place in the estimation both of 
friends and opponents, as one of the conspicuous figures in the thought of the age.”333 
Given Mill’s longstanding familiarity with Comte’s work and, as Mill saw it, his desire 
to distinguish his own views from Comte’s, Mill saw himself as especially well situated 
to “undertake the task of sifting what is good from what is bad in M. Comte’s 
speculations . . .”334     
 The first passage comes towards the beginning of the second essay on Comte. 
Mill refers to Comte as “a morally intoxicated man” in that “every question with him is 
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 Ibid. Mill references Comte in chapter three of Utilitarianism, where he directs readers to 
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an ethical system that does not depend on a deity but which directs agents to live in a vigorously unselfish 
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and morals set forth in that treatise.” Mill, U, 3.10. Mill also references Comte’s work, in a less than 
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unfolded in his Système Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal 
appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political 
ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.” Mill, OL, 1.14. 
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one of morality, and no motive but that of morality is permitted.”335 Continuing this line 
of thought, Mill explains that no one could reasonably claim that Comte’s moral theory 
is undemanding or lax in what it requires from agents adhering to the theory:  
 On the contrary, it prodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical 
 mistake as the theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the 
 glory of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive that 
 between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate space, the 
 region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons should be bound, by 
 other people’s opinion, to do everything that they would deserve praise for doing. 
 There is a standard of altruism to which all should be required to come up, and a 
 degree beyond it which is not obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on 
 every one to restrain the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits 
 consistent with the essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the 
 province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals and 
 aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of punishment and 
 of moral blame.
336
 
While this passage contains a number of interesting elements, I will point to just two for 
sake of economy and relevance. The first is that Mill identifies the conceptual space 
between duty and positively evaluable action. In the Proper Object Formulation, Mill 
suggests that there can be actions that are positively evaluated (e.g. liked or admired) 
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and negatively evaluated (e.g. despised) but not qualify as an act subject to moral 
obligation.
337
 In this passage from Comte, Mill is again saying that moral theories need 
to allow for this conceptual space: “between the region of duty and that of sin there is an 
intermediate space, the region of positive worthiness.”338 Just as Calvinism makes the 
error of thinking that whatever is not a duty is a sin, so does a moral theory make an 
error if it supposes that every action is one of moral obligation.  
 The second point in this passage concerns the limits of moral obligation and the 
role of punishment and moral blame in enforcing those obligations. Proper use of moral 
blame and punishment, Mill says, should be limited to protecting certain essential 
human interests. This is striking since one might have supposed, if one favored a 
maximizing act utilitarian interpretation of Mill’s theory of moral obligation, that Mill 
would say that moral obligation (and therefore moral blame and punishment) should be 
tied to whatever would maximize the greatest amount of good.
339
 Mill seems, however, 
both here and in the Proper Object Formulation, to have a considerably more limited idea 
of which actions should be punished through the use of moral blame and punishment.  
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 Mill builds on this limited conception of moral obligation in the second passage 
from Comte, which focuses on limiting the force that positive encouragements to benefit 
the general good can have. The passage occurs immediately after the previous quote, 
where Mill says that it is the proper role of the “ethical sciences” to determine which 
moral obligations protect the essential interest of other people:  
  If in addition to fulfilling this obligation, persons make the good of others a 
 direct object of disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even 
 innocent personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit 
 objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this conduct 
 by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a necessary 
 condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness for all, procured by 
 the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is really felt to be a sacrifice, is a 
 contradiction. Such spontaneity by no means excludes sympathetic  
 encouragement; but the encouragement should take the form of making self-
 devotion pleasant, not that of making everything else painful. The object should 
 be to stimulate services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the 
 pursuit of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the 
 reproaches of other and of our own conscience.
340
 
In this passage, Mill makes two significant points with respect to doing more than the 
minimally specified requirements of one’s obligation to protect the essential interests of 
society. The first is that when an agent makes the interests of others her direct concern 
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(i.e. does more than she is obligated to do), she is a worthy object of admiration and 
praise. However, and this is the really significant point, it is “necessary” that it be 
“spontaneously” undertaken without a feeling of sacrifice that is generated from 
“external pressure.” In short, if external forces, like the expectations of other agents, 
make you feel as if are making a significant sacrifice in acting for the benefit of others, 
something has gone wrong. The objective, Mill seems to think, is to make the good of 
others something we want to pursue because it makes the agent herself pleased (i.e. 
enjoy the “natural rewards”), not because she feels pressured into it.  
  At the same time, others can encourage you to do this, but only in such a way as 
to preserve the spontaneity of the action. This leads to the second point concerning this 
passage: it is appropriate to praise other agents for their good action, as long as an 
agent’s own good can be pursued without feeling the reproaches of the agent’s own 
conscience or blame from another agent. This point is significant because it further ties 
Mill’s understanding of what we are obligated to do with the sanctions of our own 
conscience and the possibility of blame from other agents. At the same time, it also 
reminds his readers of the sensitivity one must employ in using various means to incite 
other agents to work for the betterment of the general good: it is good, and worthy of 
admiration, to do such acts; but failing to do them, and instead pursuing ends that are 
purely self-interested, should not be punished by our consciences or by the social 
sanctioning of other agents.    
 To better understand why Mill has this idea that agents should not sanction 
themselves (via their conscience) or others (via criticism) for pursuing purely self-
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interested acts, it will help to look at a third passage from his discussion of Comte’s 
moral theory as it contrasts with his own. Here, Mill explicitly says that he does not 
support the idea that purely personal enjoyments, which do not necessarily contribute to 
the happiness of all, should be subject to moral criticism. Instead he proposes the 
following:  
  As a rule of conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more 
 should be attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or 
 omitting to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, 
 society, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the natural 
 activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, will expand itself 
 in useful ones. . . But above this standard there is an unlimited range of moral 
 worth, up to the most exalted heroism, which should be fostered by every 
 positive encouragement, though not converted into an obligation.
341
 
In this passage, Mill, again, makes two relevant points. The first goes some way as to 
explaining why he limits moral sanctioning as he does and the second further strengthens 
the idea that Mill adopts something less than a maximalist understanding of moral 
obligation.  
As in the Proper Object Formulation, Mill is saying that agents may perform 
better actions than merely avoiding harming other people and meeting one’s obligation, 
but it is important that agents not to be in any way obligated to perform all the good that 
they might do. When Mill says that he thinks that “[n]o more should be attempted” than 
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having limits on harmful behavior or requiring people to meet their standing obligations, 
presumably he means that a given scheme of moral obligation could require agents to do 
better actions than those on his chosen theory, but that he is rejecting just such an option. 
As Mill explains in the passage, by limiting the practice of social sanctioning as he 
suggests, “society obtains much more” from its citizens. In other words, Mill seems to 
think that there will be more good produced, presumably in the long run, by not 
punishing (even by the agent’s own conscience) actions that are purely self-interested.342  
 Just as in the first passage, Mill seems to adopt something less than a maximalist 
understanding of the circumstances in which one should be employing moral sanctions. 
That is to say, he does not say that moral sanctions should be applied whenever someone 
does less than the maximal amount of good. Just as in the previous passage where Mill 
stressed the importance of protecting certain “essential interests,” in this passage he 
picks out, for those domains where moral sanctions are appropriate, protection against 
harm and the importance of actually carrying out whatever agents have already 
committed to doing.
343
 Furthermore, here Mill gestures again toward the existence of 
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distinct conceptual spaces for how different actions might be evaluated. In one space are 
actions that one is morally obligated to do and in the other are actions of great or 
unlimited worth, but which are not considered matters of moral obligation. To sum up: 
these three passages from Mill’s essay on Comte support the Proper Object 
Formulation’s emphasis on there being a limit on which types actions are proper cases of 
moral obligation. For his Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, this is important since it 
specifies a limited use of moral sanctions. The Proper Object Formulation does not 
specify where one should draw the line, precisely, between actions that are positively or 
negatively evaluated without being judged to be morally wrong: Mill merely suggests 
that there is such a line.   
 In those passages giving his own view, rather than adopting a maximalist 
understanding whereby one is morally obligated to do all that one might do, Mill 
supposes that there is a conceptual space where actions can be judged to be good and 
worthwhile without being considered morally obligatory. Similarly, actions can be less 
than maximally good (and perhaps despised), without being morally wrong. In the first 
quote from Comte, Mill mentions the importance of avoiding the mistake of Comte and 
the Calvinists who want to make every action that is not a matter of duty a moral wrong. 
In the second quote, he cautions against squelching humankind’s spontaneity by 
converting positive encouragement to altruistic acts into feelings of obligation. In the 
third quote, Mill says that the standard of moral obligation does not rise to the level of 
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requiring all of the good that one might do. In all three passages, as in the Proper Object 
Formulation itself, Mill is suggesting that cases where moral obligation are involved 
need not include every case where an action can be positively or negatively evaluated. 
This goes some way, then, toward explaining where Mill draws the line between actions 
that are merely positively or negatively evaluated (e.g. admired or despised) and those 
that are matters of moral obligation. 
  With these ideas in mind, it is now possible to consider the second important 
point concerning the Proper Object Formulation. By saying that certain actions qualify 
agents as “proper” objects of punishment Mill is appealing to some normative standard 
that sets the qualification. That is to say, some standard specifies who is a proper object 
of punishment and who is not. Rather than specifying what qualifies someone as a 
proper object of punishment (since this will be covered in greater depth in discussion of 
the third formulation), the relevant point here is that Mill is recognizing a certain 
normative standard at all for punishment. Mill does not take it that punishment itself to 
be self-certifying. By saying that is not self-certifying I mean that the fact that something 
is punished does not thereby indicate that wrongdoing occurred. 
 In fact, Mill seems eager to emphasize the importance of appealing to a 
normative standard in explaining issues like the workings of conscience in his reply to 
Whewell’s critique of utilitarianism.344 There, one finds Mill expressly concerned that 
his opponents suppose that their conceptions of morality are more dignified, if that is the 
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right word, than those employed by utilitarians. According to Mill, Whewell, in support 
of the moral intuitionist position, “appropriates to his own side of the question all the 
expressions, such as conscience, duty, rectitude, with which the reverential feelings of 
mankind towards moral ideas are associated, and cries out, I am for these noble things, 
you are for pleasure, or utility.”345 Mill cannot accept this characterization of his and 
similar positions. As he sees it, both the intuitive and utilitarian approaches to morality 
are entitled to these basic concepts. Speaking as a utilitarian, Mill says:  
 We are as much for conscience, duty, rectitude, as Dr. Whewell. The terms, and 
 all the feelings connected with them, are as much a part of the ethics of utility as 
 of that of intuition. The point in dispute is, what acts are the proper objects of 
 those feelings; whether we ought to take the feelings as we find them, as accident 
 or design has made them, or whether the tendency of actions to promote 
 happiness affords a test to which the feelings of morality should conform.
346
 
By making reference in this passage to the “proper objects” of certain feelings, Mill 
shows that, just as in the second formulation itself, he is by no means claiming that just 
because something is punished that it should be punished. In the original chapter five 
passage, Mill does not explain, as he does in this passage from the essay on Whewell, 
that, for him, the standard that will be appealed to will be the standard of utility. This is 
just what one would expect, however, from the fact that in one passage Mill is giving a 
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metaethical point whereas in the other he is making a direct defense of the utilitarian 
morality.     
 This passage in Whewell, and its concern for creating a normative standard for 
the use in identifying actions that are worthy of punishment, is not an obscure comment 
in Mill’s larger oeuvre. Mill thinks that it is important to take stock of current practices, 
like those concerning punishment, but those facts, on their own, by no means necessitate 
a particular form of action. For instance, while the concepts of wrongdoing and 
punishment are tightly related in Mill’s mind (for reasons that were evident in the 
passages from the Examination of Sir William Hamilton), Mill is not necessarily 
claiming that agents, in fact, punish all and only what they should punish. That is to say, 
punishments, including internal sanctions, are not self-certifying. One can learn 
something important from what society punishes, while still holding that it can go wrong 
in many ways. Mill does not develop this point in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism as 
he might have, but it is a regular item for discussion in his other writings. People 
sometimes punish (by way of social criticism) others for things that are not, in fact, 
really worthy of punishment. As he says in his essay on Whewell, “I am not bound to 
abstain from an action because another person dislikes it, however he may dignify his 
dislike with the name of disapprobation.”347 Also, people will sometimes feel the 
reproaches of the conscience even when it is not appropriate for them to do so. Mill was 
aware that people can and do feel internal sanctions even when they have no share in any 
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kind of moral wrongdoing.
348
 Alternatively, Mill was well aware that many men do not 
feel internally sanctioned for their unjust treatment of women, even though they should. 
Such persons might think that the unequal treatment and domination of women is not 
unjust because it is natural. As Mill says in The Subjection of Women, “No less an 
intellect, and one which contributed no less to the progress of human thought, than 
Aristotle, held this opinion without doubt or misgiving.”349 Mill argues in that text, 
however, that the current social relations, including practices of punishment, show that 
such treatment, “is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human 
improvement: and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality admitting 
no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.”350 As Mill stresses 
throughout the Subjection of Women, and in many places in his writings, there is 
something important to be learned by what a society punishes, but the fact that a society 
punishes, or fails to punish, a given action does not suffice to indicate that the 
punishment has been carried out appropriately.   
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The third formulation   
 Apart from what I called the Implication Formation and Proper Object 
Formulations, which go some way to expressing the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, 
Mill also provides a third statement, which I will call the Foundational Formulation:   
 Foundational Formulation: [B]ut I think there is no doubt that this distinction 
 lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct 
 wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, 
 according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; 
 and we say that it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be 
 desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it 
 concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.
351
 
This formulation, when compared with the first two formulations, has three notable 
points that I will explore here. The first concerns the Foundational Formulation’s 
reassertion of the connection between moral wrong and punishment. The second 
concerns Mill’s emphasis on the special nature of moral criticism. The third point 
concerns his statement that morally right and wrong action is action that can be 
compelled.  
 As in the previous section, to help identify what Mill seems to be getting at in 
these points, I will bring in some reference to his other writings. Again, however, it is 
worth stressing that, at this stage, the account still does not presuppose utilitarianism.  
While the precise nature of his utilitarian commitments seems difficult to sort out, Mill 
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expressly identifies himself as a utilitarian even during earlier periods of his life (e.g. the 
1830s) when he was especially frustrated with the movement.
352
 That said, my objective 
here is to clarify how Mill understands the terminology he is employing in the different 
formulations rather than how the substantive content of that terminology is underwritten, 
so to speak, by the standards of utility.        
 With this understanding in place, I will now turn to the first aspect of the 
Foundational Formulation, which concerns Mill’s third iteration of the close conceptual 
relation between moral wrong and punishment. The Implication Formulation said that an 
action’s being morally wrong implied that it ought to be punished, and in the 
Foundational Formulation Mill is saying that punishment “lies at the bottom” (i.e. is 
foundational) for the concepts of moral right and wrong. The Proper Object Formulation 
identifies cases of moral obligation with those cases where agents can be blamed or 
otherwise punished. Mill does not use either the implication or proper object language 
again in this passage, but I read his statement here as a reaffirmation of the tight, and 
non-contingent, relationship between the two concepts. The importance of this 
reaffirmation emerges when one recalls Mill’s status as a rhetorician. Mill made a 
practice of restating principles fundamental to his system in different ways to bring out 
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various philosophical subtleties in his doctrines.
353
 In my view, the fact that he provides 
another restatement of the connection between moral wrongdoing and punishment 
makes it less likely that the Implication Formulation and Proper Object Formulation 
were mere accidental phrasings of which too much has been made by Mill scholars.
354
    
 The second notable point in the Foundational Formulation concerns the special 
nature of moral criticism. This point comes in when Mill writes that it is necessary to 
separate cases of moral criticism from those cases where we “employ, instead, some 
other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, or 
ought not, to be punished for it.”355 Mill’s claim that moral criticism needs to be used 
apart from other types of criticism may seem to be a rather uncontroversial thesis. And it 
is, in a sense, but the important point here is that he situates his point within in a more 
general framework that requires some explanation. Mill classifies morality as a distinct 
part of the more general category of expediency, which is Mill’s more general term for 
the realm in which humans evaluate any kind of action.
356
 Later, when looking at his 
substantive moral view, I will explore this concept in greater detail, since it is related to 
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Mill’s theory of the Art of the Life. For the time being, however, it is enough to say that 
Mill is taking note of the point that there are at least two distinct realms, expediency and 
morality, that involve different uses of critical language.    
 In order to get a better view of what Mill is saying at this point it is helpful to 
look beyond the text of Utilitarianism. In chapter four of On Liberty, Mill states that 
agents, “are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to 
others . . .”357 This is important since, as he emphasizes in that chapter, there are distinct 
kinds of punishment due to someone who has committed an offence against others as 
contrasted with cases where only the agent is principally affected.
358
 Indeed, “It makes a 
vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him whether he 
displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things 
which we know that we have not.”359 If a person merely displeases us, we should not 
aim to “make his life uncomfortable.”360 When an agent ruins her life through 
mismanagement, for instance, she “may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but 
not of anger or resentment . . .”361 These latter feelings, Mill thinks, have a proper 
domain and must be employed so as to not extend the bounds of their proper jurisdiction. 
To mismanage one’s life is inexpedient in Mill’s sense of the term, but it is not 
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necessarily immoral and other agents must save their moral criticism for cases involving 
legitimate moral wrongdoing.     
 The third notable point concerns Mill’s idea of understanding the appropriate 
circumstances in which agents can compel certain behavior of the part of other agents. In 
the Foundational Formulation Mill says that when agents speak of moral obligation, 
“we say that it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or 
laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or 
only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.”362 Just as the Foundational 
Formulation clarifies the kind of punishment that is appropriate for actions that are 
misdeeds in some way (e.g. wrong from the standpoint of morality vs. from the 
standpoint of general expediency), so also does it point to an important difference 
between trying to compel other agents to undertake an action and attempting to persuade 
them to undertake an action. 
 Mill does not say much in this passage about what he means by compulsion and 
how it is related to morality, though he does provide a few comments regarding justice 
and compulsion in chapter five of Utilitarianism. In the paragraph preceding the 
Foundational Formulation, Mill writes that, “When we think a person is bound in justice 
to do a thing, it is an ordinary form of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to 
do it. We should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anyone that has the 
power.”363 In his explanation of what he has in mind by enforcement, Mill mentions 
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legal penalties and, in cases where those may be inexpedient to actually carry out the 
punishment, members of society are entitled to, “make amends for it by bringing a 
strong expression of our own and the public disapprobation to bear upon the 
offender.”364 This account is consistent with the treatment of punishment for moral 
wrongs as it was described in the Implication Formulation, since it describes the 
appropriateness of the application of the penalties in relation to the expediency of their 
application. When Mill says that we would be gratified to see the offender compelled, 
“by anyone who has the power,” it must also be recalled that because (in his view) 
citizens rightfully distrust giving government officials the power to punish every 
incident of injustice, “We forego that gratification on account of incidental 
inconveniences.”365  
 One might think that Mill’s comments about justice are distinct from his claims 
about moral obligation more generally. One might think that, since justice concerns 
those interests that are especially important, they should be treated differently with 
respect to how they should be punished. On one possible reading, violating the rules of 
justice qualifies an agent for punishment, but the same does not necessarily hold true for 
non-justice related moral obligations. On this understanding, Mill sees punishment as 
tied to infringements of the dictates of justice but not to infringements of morality more 
generally.  
                                                 
 
364
 Ibid. 
 
365
 Ibid. 
 186 
 
 On my interpretation, this reading is a mistake. In chapter five of Utilitarianism, 
Mill elaborates on how the concepts of justice and morality more generally share an 
important relation to the concept of punishment. Just before providing the Implication 
Formulation Mill says that, “the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, 
enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into any kind of wrong.”366 The 
distinction between justice and morality more generally, then, will not be found in 
whether punishments are implied in the one and not the other. The precise nature of the 
punishments might differ depending on various circumstances, but the fact that one 
establishes oneself as a candidate for moral punishment can arise from either violations 
of the standards of moral obligation or the standards of justice. Mill clarifies the 
conceptual difference between moral obligation generally and justice by saying that they 
correspond to the familiar distinction between imperfect and perfect duties.
367
 To 
properly see how Mill understands these distinctions, it will be necessary to discuss 
Mill’s theory of moral rights and their importance to perfect and imperfect duties, 
though this will have to wait until the next chapter. At this point, it will suffice to say 
that Mill sees compulsion as related to the threat of punishment for both injustice and 
immorality more generally.  
 Before moving on to discuss further Mill’s concept of compulsion as it relates to 
his other writings, it is necessary to make one further point concerning justice and 
compulsion. Mill says that in those cases where one is bound by justice to do an action, 
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then one can be compelled to do that action. In the next section, I will give reasons to 
suppose that Mill understands compulsion in a distinctly rule-like way. By “rule-like 
way,” I mean that Mill’s understanding of (moral) compulsion is such that when agents 
are compelled to undertake an action it should be understood that this will involve an 
agent being expected to conform to a rule or set of rules. However, this interpretation of 
Mill’s theory of compulsion is a richer concept than what can be built out of what Mill 
provides for the reader in Utilitarianism. What I want to demonstrate here is that while it 
is a more difficult question as to whether Mill understands moral obligation, generally 
speaking, in a rule-like way, there should be considerably less doubt that he understands 
justice to be a matter of rules. 
 Mill makes the connection between justice and rules clear in later sections of 
chapter five of Utilitarianism. After the above mentioned discussion on the distinction 
between perfect and imperfect duties, Mill goes on to describe the sentiment associated 
with justice, especially the sentiment that leads us to lash out at those who have harmed 
us or those close to us, and how that sentiment can come to take on a moral flavor, as it 
were. People have the tendency to resent, Mill says, anything disagreeable that happens 
to them, regardless of whether the person has done anything truly worthy of that 
resentment. The sentiment, in its initial non-moral form, becomes moralized only when 
it “acts in the directions conformable to the general good.”368 Resentment needs to be 
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defending something that is worth protecting in some sense that extends beyond the 
individual in question. One might take the view that resentment essentially appeals to 
some principle or rule.
369
 While this is debatable, Mill brings out a more explicit 
connection between the sentiment involved in justice and punishment when confronting 
a worry about his analysis of the moralization of the sentiment. Mill says that the person 
who has a true moral feeling of resentment might not explicitly acknowledge that he is 
concerned about society in general but, that person “certainly does feel that he is 
asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own.”370 When Mill 
sums up his analysis of the nature of justice he says that, “the idea of justice supposes 
two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule.”371 The 
sentiment that leads individuals to lash out at others is specifically identified as, “a desire 
that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.”372 It seems right, then, 
to conclude that Mill explicitly sees the nature of justice as essentially bound up with 
rules. 
  Thus far, then, it seems clear that justice essentially involves rules and that 
justice is something that can be used to compel action on the part of others. It is also 
clear, based on what is said in the Foundational Formulation, that moral obligations 
more generally involve the compulsion of other agents. The remaining question is 
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whether those obligations—the obligations of morality more generally—essentially 
involve rules.  
 
Compulsion, rules, and prospective guidance  
 In this section I want to provide a larger context for how to understand Mill’s 
theory of moral compulsion and its relations to rules. I acknowledge at the outset that 
Mill does not make explicit reference to rules in the Implication, Proper Object, or 
Foundational Formulations.
373
 That said, I will argue here that a more general 
examination of Mill’s account of compulsion and the nature of the internal sanction of 
conscience, reveals a deep connection between an action being morally wrong and the 
action violating a rule. To be clear, the rules in question establish the conditions for 
punishment but not the nature (social or legal) or extent (mild or severe) of the 
punishment itself. This is, of course, aside from the agent getting punished by way of 
internal sanction as is explained in the Implication Formulation. The external sanctions 
are to be carried out according to the standards of prudence or the interest of others, but 
the ways in which the punishments are given out do not need to essentially follow in a 
rule-like pattern. As has been said above, Mill does not go into detail in chapter five 
about how punishment should be decided. What is clear is that the rules are the standards 
by which agents become proper candidates for punishment. As I will argue here, Mill’s 
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understanding of compulsion also makes reference to rules in that they are the standards 
that agents can use to prospectively guide behavior. When agents deviate from the rules, 
other agents are thereby authorized to use social and legal penalties in order to coerce the 
deviant agents into compliance.   
 As we have seen, Mill goes some way toward describing what he means by 
compulsion in the text of chapter five. A broader view of Mill’s writings, however, 
shows that he has a richer concept of compulsion at work in his larger moral theory. To 
get a better appreciation of his understanding of compulsion it is necessary to examine 
some of his remarks beyond this text and to consider the concept of compulsion more 
generally. Someone can be compelled to leave the room, say, by being literally picked 
up and carried out of the room. In that case, the force directly behind the compulsion is 
an external (to the agent being carried) and physical one. For the most part, this is not the 
type of compulsion Mill is interested in when discussing moral compulsion. In fact, Mill 
sees physical compulsion in direct contrast to moral compulsion. In his Principles of 
Political Economy, in a discussion about government regulation of labor unions, Mill 
says that if a government is going to allow unions it must ensure that participation 
among the workers is genuinely voluntary:  
 No severity, necessary to the purpose, is too great to be employed against 
 attempts to compel workmen to join a union, or take part in a strike by threats or 
 violence. Mere moral compulsion, by the expression of opinion, the law ought 
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 not to interfere with; it belongs to more enlightened opinion to restrain it, by 
 rectifying the moral sentiments of the people.
374
  
In other words, unions may appeal to social but not physical forces to compel action. 
Still, Mill hopes that the “more enlightened” populations of society might reduce the 
efficacy of the psychological force behind the union leaders’ appeals by shifting the 
nature of moral sentiments of the workers that the unions are trying to compel. 
 This quote concerning labor unions is interesting in light of the Foundational 
Formulation in that, in the latter, Mill directly contrasts persuasion and exhortation with 
compulsion. In the passage from the Principles of Political Economy, Mill says that 
expression of opinion can be used as a means of moral compulsion. Since persuasion and 
exhortation often include expressions of opinion as well, there needs to be some 
clarification on when expression of an opinion properly counts as compulsion. Here it is 
helpful to turn to the first chapter of On Liberty, and Mill’s discussion of the tyranny of 
the majority. Mill explains that individuals in society need protection from the threats of 
majority opinion in order to maintain their individual liberty. Protection from the threat 
of legal penalties is not enough since there is also a need for protection:  
  against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency 
 of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
 practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the 
 development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in 
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 harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the 
 model of its own.
375
   
What is important here, and this point can be found throughout On Liberty, is Mill’s 
connection between the imposition of rules of conduct and compulsion.
376
 In passage 
just quoted, Mill is saying that society often goes too far in ascribing the codes of 
conduct in domains in which it is not appropriate for it to do so. In other words, rules of 
conduct that can guide behavior have the power of compulsion, though in this case the 
rules have been extended improperly.
377
  
 Mill makes a similar point later in the chapter when he says that, “The likings 
and dislikings of society, or some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which 
has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the 
penalties of law and opinion.”378 What Mill seems to be getting at here is that the 
penalties of law and opinion—the means by which society punishes moral wrongs—do 
accord with established rules that are generally understood across a given society. Mill 
apparently regards this as a truth about how societies work and how moral punishment 
works. The problem, in Mill’s view, is that societies have been mistaken as to what areas 
they have allowed agents to be controlled by these penalties given that societies have 
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been governed by standards as arbitrary as the “likings or dislikings” of a portion of that 
society. They should, he thinks, choose different standards and pointing this out is part 
of his aim in On Liberty. 
 Mill views it as imperative that society have the proper understanding of how to 
employ these rules and the sanctions that enforce them. Mill believed that Bentham did a 
fine job of identifying the misguided principles behind many of England’s penal 
sanctions, but utilitarians, as Bentham was himself aware, must also pay keen attention 
to the power of social penalties in constraining behavior.
379
 In Mill’s view, in fact, the 
stakes for establishing the areas of conduct in which an agent is subject to social 
penalties might even be more important than the stakes regarding legal penalties since:  
 Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates 
 instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to 
 meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of 
 political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, 
 it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of 
 life, and enslaving the soul itself.
380
  
Many may read Mill’s closing words here as an exaggeration and perhaps it is. But the 
fact that Mill spends so much time in the text stressing the importance of individuality 
and the proper use of social influence leads me to believe that he is quite serious here 
regarding the power of social opinions in compelling an individual’s actions. For anyone 
                                                 
 
379
 See Mill, “Bentham,” CW, 10, 78-79. 
 
380
 Mill, OL, 1.5. 
 194 
 
to attain anything of significant value in life, Mill later says, there must be some balance 
between allowing individuals to pursue their individual goals and a set of standards set 
down by society that can protect each person’s pursuit of those goals. “Some rules of 
conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many 
things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is 
the principle question in human affairs.”381 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not 
so important that one get clear on what Mill says about the nature of the rules 
themselves, as this is a very large question. What is key here, though, is that, whatever 
the rules are, they clearly have a strong connection to Mill’s conception of what it means 
to be compelled, if not enslaved, by social forces.      
 This connection between compulsion and rules of conduct in On Liberty suggests 
a significant difference between simply stating an opinion and stating an opinion in a 
way that makes proper use of moral coercion—in the latter case there is a widely 
recognized rule justifying that opinion and in the former case there is not. It would be a 
mistake, Mill thinks, to compel an agent to undertake an action even if “in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating 
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
him with any evil in case he does otherwise.”382 That someone has an opinion about 
another agent’s conduct and how it can be improved does not suffice to qualify the 
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opinion holder in compelling the other agent. In order for there to be justified 
compulsion—that is, to be able to exact the other person’s duty “as one exacts a debt”—
there must be some standard of rule of conduct that the agent is able to use to guide her 
actions.        
 At this point one might object that too much is being made of Mill’s comments 
regarding the coercive power of social opinion and that coercive power being especially 
tied to rules. After all, since this discussion is attempting to get a broader view of Mill’s 
concept of compulsion and its relation to social punishment, it would be ideal for my 
purposes if my exposition of Mill’s writings could reveal some deeper connection 
between rules, moral obligation, and punishment. Thus far, I have provided passages 
from several texts that suggest that the connection is there, but one might justifiably still 
be in doubt. As it turns out, Mill spells out his understanding of the relationship between 
these concepts in a 1859 letter to William George Ward:  
 Now as to the still more important subject of the meaning of ought. . . . I believe 
 that the word has in some respects a different meaning to different people. We 
 must first distinguish between those who have themselves a moral feeling—a 
 feeling of approving & condemning conscience, & those who have not, or in 
 whom what they may have is dormant. I believe that those who have no feeling 
 of right & wrong cannot possibly intue
383
 the rightness or wrongness of anything. 
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 They may assent to the proposition that a certain rule of conduct is right; but they 
 really mean nothing except that such is the conduct which other people expect & 
 require at their hands . . . This you will probably agree with, & I will therefore 
 pass to the case of those who have a true moral feeling, that is, a feeling of pain 
 in the fact of violating a certain rule, quite independently of any expected 
 consequences to themselves. It appears to me that to them the word ought means, 
 that if they act otherwise, they shall be punished by this internal, & perfectly 
 disinterested feeling.
384
    
This letter is a crucial piece of evidence for my interpretation and others who favor the 
sanction utilitarian reading of Mill. In giving his initial sketch of Mill’s sanction-based 
conception of moral wrong, Lyons did not cite this passage, though, as Miller rightly 
says, the view “is far more plausible in light of it.”385 To show how this is so I will 
examine four points that, taken together, go some way toward explaining how Mill 
understands moral obligation.
386
  
 The first point is that while Mill makes it clear that he is discussing the concept 
of ought, the fact that he goes on to connect ought to what it means to have a true moral 
feeling suggests that his statements can be appropriately applied to the moral ought and 
thereby the concept of moral obligation. The second point is that Mill specifically 
separates agents who have a true moral feeling from those who do not based on what 
they mean when they assent to a rule of conduct being right. It is not enough, on Mill’s 
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view, to have a true moral feeling to be able to discern what conduct others expect of 
you and what might happen to you if you disobey a given rule of conduct. To know the 
rule and the likely consequences for breaking it (i.e. “what will be required at their [i.e. 
other people’s] hands”) do not suffice—one must have the proper sentiment to go along 
with it. Just as in the case of justice, there seems to be a rule and a proper sentiment to 
accompany that rule. In other words, Mill’s comments here reveal a kind of symmetry 
between the account of justice and moral obligation more generally: both must be rule 
based and both depend on a sentiment which, as Mill puts it, “sanctions the rule.”387     
 The third key point of the passage concerns what it means to have a true moral 
feeling or, as Mill suggests at the beginning of the paragraph, what it means to means to 
understand the moral ought: “those who have a true moral feeling, that is, a feeling of 
pain in the fact of violating a certain rule, quite independently of any expected 
consequences to themselves.” Aside from the fact that this passage further establishes 
the relationship between a moral obligation and rules, this passage is crucial for 
furthering the connection between moral obligation and the internal sanction that Mill 
mentions in the Implication Formulation. Moral obligation, it seems, is essentially tied 
up in obeying certain rules and feeling an internal sanction when one violates that rule. 
In the Implication Formulation, Mill suggested that external sanctions, like opinion or 
legal penalties, might be appropriate for the violation of a moral obligation, but Mill 
seemed to imply that at least internal sanctions, like the reproaches of one’s conscience, 
are appropriate. After clarifying this point in this letter to Ward, Mill then goes on (in the 
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last line of the passage quoted above) to make one further connection between moral 
obligation and the internal sanction of conscience by saying that ought means that if one 
does not obey its dictates that one will be punished by way of a disinterested internal 
sanction.
388
 
 To sum up these points, then, Mill supposes that those with a true understanding 
of the moral ought are those who mean something particular when they say that a rule of 
conduct is right. One does not understand the meaning of what is morally right or wrong 
if one merely knows what will likely happen if one violates a rule of conduct. To have a 
true moral feeling—that is, to truly understand what the moral ought means—one must 
also be punished by way of internal sanctions when one violates a rule. In explaining the 
matter in this way, Mill thereby clarifies and strengthens two central points of his 
Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong: wrongness is essentially a matter of violating rules 
and violating rules results, at least, in being internally sanctioned by one’s conscience if 
not also being externally sanctioned by others. 
 The fourth and final point concerning this passage concerns the historical context 
of the letter itself. Lest one think that Mill’s comments should be read completely 
separately from his comments in chapter five, one should take note that Mill is writing 
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the letter in 1859, which is after he has finished writing, and publishing, On Liberty and, 
presumably, been revising the final chapter of utilitarianism (based on evidence 
presented in the previous chapter). In fact, at the very end of the letter, Mill makes the 
following addendum to his discussion: 
 This is the nearest approach I am able to make to a theory of our moral 
 feelings. I have written it out, much more fully, in a little manuscript treatise 
 which I propose to publish when I have kept it by me for the length of time I 
 think desirable & given it such further improvement as I am capable of.
389
  
The editors of Mill’s Collected Works rightly identify Mill’s reference here to 
Utilitarianism, as Mill had just recently mentioned in another letter to his regular 
correspondent Alexander Bain that he had been recently working on essays that he was 
thinking of publishing in Utilitarianism.
390
 In light of these historical circumstances, it 
seems appropriate to tie this discussion to Mill’s analysis of justice and moral obligation 
as it is presented in chapter five.   
 To be clear, then, the Ward letter explains the meaning of the term “appropriate” 
in the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, which says that an action is wrong when it is 
appropriately punished by the internal sanction of conscience. By appropriate, it is meant 
that the action violates a justified moral rule that, in fact, leads the agent to experience 
the internal sanction of conscience. Note that in the Ward letter, just as in the three 
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formulations, Mill nowhere appeals to the standard of utility to explain his theory of 
conscience or his understanding of moral wrongdoing. In the view that I am providing 
here, the standard of utility only comes into play when asking from what source moral 
rules receive their justification. The principle of utility, in other words, does not 
determine or regulate the nature of the conscience and it does not itself determine when 
an action is punished. If an agent violates a rule that the conscience has internalized, it 
should be punished—regardless of how this affects utility. Utility only has a role in 
justifying particular rules, which are then installed, as it were, in the conscience. If one 
had a different theory of value, then presumably different rules could thereby be 
justified.     
 With this understanding of the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong in place, let me 
return to the connection between compulsion and moral rules, which will allow a clearer 
picture of Mill’s more general moral theory. Mill sees social rules of conduct as 
compulsory or coercive in the sense that the rules should inform and guide an agent’s 
behavior prospectively. The only way to avoid punishment and meet the standard of 
moral obligation (i.e. do the morally right action), is for an agent to adjust her plan of 
action and thereby preclude any internal or external sanctions that could have been (i.e. 
if she had acted differently and violated the rule) applied to her behavior. An agent, then, 
who is guided by these rules under the threat of punishment for violation can be thought 
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of as acting according to what Bentham calls coercive social rules.
391
 That is to say, they 
are rules that prohibit or forbid various actions and are enforced through societal 
sanctions like legal, civil, or social penalties.
392
  
 In the next chapter I will say more about the nature of this internalization, but at 
this point it would be best to see how this theory is supposed to work now that the chief 
elements are in place. In the case where an agent commits a moral wrong—that is, the 
agent violates a coercive moral rule—she should feel internal sanctions and she is 
opening herself up to punishment in the sense that, were it to be applied externally, she, 
“would not be entitled to complain.”393 That said, the precise nature of the punishment is 
determined according some other standard, which Mill says can include considerations 
of prudence or the interests of other people. To commit a wrongful act, in other words, is 
to make oneself a candidate for moral punishment—though the extent to which one is 
punished is not decided by the standard of morality itself.   
 
Summary of the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong  
 At this point we can bring the account as a whole together to see how it can 
support the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong that was provided earlier. At the beginning 
of the chapter I said that I would argue for the following claims: that Mill’s metaethical 
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comments on the nature of moral obligation do not presuppose utilitarianism, that Mill’s 
theory of moral obligation precludes a commitment to certain forms of maximizing act 
and rule utilitarianism, that Mill recognizes the possibility of agents positively and 
negatively evaluating actions in a way that is distinct from morality, that wrong actions 
are identified with actions that should be punished by the conscience, and that his theory 
of moral obligation is bound up in his conception of rules and the nature of conscience 
such that right actions are those that should be compelled, and that Mill’s theory of 
moral obligation was essentially rule oriented. 
 At this point I have supplied all of the requisite textual evidence in support of my 
claim that Mill holds to the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, so I will try to reinforce 
what I have written by reviewing the evidence presented thus far. I opened by claiming 
that Mill’s Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong says that an act is morally wrong if and 
only if it is appropriate for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience, and 
possibly be subject to other punishments (e.g. social or legal penalties), for performance 
of the act. I said that one can grasp Mill’s reasons for holding this view, by examining 
his three formulations connecting wrongdoing and punishment. Regarding the first 
formulation, the Implication Formulation, I said that it was significant that Mill 
establishes an inferential relationship between calling an action wrong and punishment 
being rightly applicable to that action. Saying that an action is wrong implies that 
punishment, of some kind, would be justified. While one might think that this is a trivial 
point, I gave reasons for thinking that it is not since Mill’s formulation seems to 
distinguish the view from other moral theories like a simple version of rule 
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utilitarianism. It distinguishes itself by establishing a non-contingent relationship 
between moral wrong and punishment. This close conceptual connection is further 
emphasized when one considers Mill’s comments in the Examination, and Mill’s 
account of the moral psychology of punishment. There Mill makes it clear that though 
the two concepts are, strictly speaking, separable, they appear in our mind without, as he 
puts it, “the help of any intervening idea.”394 I also noted that the Implication 
Formulation introduces the idea of a cascading approach to punishment, whereby 
different punishments are meted out according to some standard. Internal sanctions are 
appropriate for every instance of wrongdoing, and other punishments like public 
disapprobation and legal penalties can be added on as is deemed justifiable according to 
the standards of prudence or the interests of others.    
 Regarding the second formulation, the Proper Object Formulation, I said there 
were two significant points. The first is that Mill acknowledges the fact that agents can 
positively or negatively evaluate (e.g. admire or despise) actions in a non-moralized 
way. This seems incompatible with single-level maximizing conceptions of act 
utilitarianism where all evaluations are subject to the demands of morality. Mill does not 
go into detail, in Utilitarianism, about how this might work, but he explains where he 
might draw the line between moral evaluation and other kinds of evaluation in his essays 
on Comte. By examining three different passages in Mill’s writings on Comte, I 
explained the ways in which Mill, when discussing his own version of utilitarianism, 
adopts a less than maximizing form of utilitarianism. In the first passage, Mill explains 
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that, rather than requiring agents to do all that they can, he advises that they work to 
protect certain essential interests and meet their standing commitments. In the second 
passage, I also presented evidence that Mill was cautious even with using moral praise 
since such actions can leave agents with feelings of obligation—a situation he clearly 
wants to avoid. In the third passage Mill makes it clear that agents should not be 
obligated to all the good that they might do. Agents doing less than their absolute best is 
not morally wrong, a fact that sits awkwardly with maximizing act utilitarian 
interpretations. 
 The Proper Object formulation also invokes a normative standard regarding what 
should be punished. I showed how this idea—that merely because something, in fact, 
gets punished does not show that it should be punished, is a point that Mill makes in 
several different his works. Mill’s employs the “proper object” language itself in his 
response to Whewell’s mischaracterization of utilitarianism, and Mill clearly separates 
his vision of what people should feel and how they do feel in the Subjection of Women. 
As such, the Proper Object Formulation underscores again the close relationship 
between punishment and morality.  
 Mill’s third formulation, the Foundational Formulation, brought up three key 
points. The first was that Mill reiterates his contention that morality is fundamentally 
linked with punishment. He does not use the language of inference, but says that 
punishment “lies the bottom of” moral right and wrong. Mill’s reiteration of the 
connection between morality and punishment is important for interpretive reasons since 
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it makes it more difficult to read previous invocations of the singular statements or all-
too-casual remarks about how humans talk about morally wrong actions.  
  The second point concerning the Foundational Formulation builds on the first. 
For Mill, the language of moral criticism is importantly distinct from other types of 
social criticism, and he uses this passage to draw attention to this fact. This follows his 
practice in other works like On Liberty where Mill explains the different circumstances 
in which various types of criticism are appropriate. On Mill’s view, moral criticism is 
appropriate only if an agent’s action principally concerns other agents. In a case where 
an action concerns only the agent herself, even if the action is especially self-destructive, 
as long as it principally concerns only the agent in question, it can be labeled as foolish 
but not as morally wrong. The Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, however, does not 
necessarily employ this understanding of how to separate the two types of criticism (i.e. 
the division between purely self-regarding and other-regarding action). This particular 
understanding only arises because of Mill’s specific understanding of utilitarianism. The 
important thing, for Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, is that moral criticism can be 
distinct from other kinds of criticism. Where one draws the line between the different 
types of criticism will depend on the type of theory justifying the moral rules and the 
sanctions themselves.      
 The third point concerns Mill’s distinction between compelling someone to 
undertake an action, for moral reasons, and merely exhorting or persuading that person 
to undertake an action. In Utilitarianism, Mill explains that when a person is bound by 
justice to undertake and action it is proper to say that that he is compelled to do that 
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action. If the person does not act in accordance with justice, then, Mill thinks, we should 
be pleased to see the wrongdoer punished by anyone who has the power—though the 
concerns of expediency will limit how much power should be turned over to the 
authorities who would punish. This connection between punishment for infringing on the 
rules of justice and morality more generally, and compulsion goes some way toward 
explaining Mill’s understanding of justice, some key elements remain unclear.  
 After making this point connecting justice to compulsion, I showed how justice is 
essentially rule oriented and is tied to a specific sentiment. Mill makes this point clear in 
chapter five of Utilitarianism, and it is a relatively uncontested point in the literature. 
More contested is that compulsion is tied to moral rules apart from justice. To try to 
make that connection, I examined passages from Mill’s Principles of Political Economy 
and On Liberty where Mill discusses the nature of moral compulsion. I reviewed several 
passages where Mill suggests that agents can be guided prospectively by publically 
recognized rules of conduct, which establish codes of moral right and wrong. 
Furthermore, I noted that it is not enough for someone to have an opinion that an action 
is morally right in order for it to be a compulsory rule—it must be widely dispersed and 
internalized across members of a society.  
 At this point in the argument I admitted that, my evidence from On Liberty 
notwithstanding, one might still be unconvinced that Mill’s theory of moral obligation is 
fundamentally rule-oriented in the way that I have suggested. To make the point 
stronger, I examined an 1859 letter from George Ward, which makes a number of points 
crucial to my case. In the letter Mill makes it clear that he is talking about those people 
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who recognize a moral ‘ought’ are those who have a certain kind of moral feeling. The 
moral feeling in question is a feeling of pain in light of having violated a moral rule. 
This is what is meant in the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong when it speaks about 
actions being “appropriately” punished—actions are appropriately punished when they 
violate a moral rule and are punished by the internal sanction of their conscience. Other 
punishments, like legal or social penalties might be added on later, but they are not at the 
heart of the theory in the way that rules and the internal sanction of conscience are.   
 When read in this way, the Ward letter Mill makes the explicit connection 
between moral obligation, rules, and the internal sanction of conscience that I have 
argued is at the center of his view. Mill further clarifies his point, which echoes the 
claims made in the Foundational Formulation, that actions that are right are those for 
which they can be expected to be punished for not doing (i.e. the agents can be 
compelled). This makes the connection between moral compulsion, wrongdoing, and 
rules that I had been seeking to establish throughout the latter parts of the chapter. 
 At this point, one should have a solid grasp on the nature of Mill’s theory of 
moral obligation. That said, I have said only a little about the nature of Mill’s 
utilitarianism. It is clear that, whatever it is, it will be essentially rule based and be a 
non-maximizing form of utilitarianism. It must allow for evaluations that are distinct 
from the moral commitments of utilitarianism, and must not be especially demanding to 
its adherents. This already sets Mill’s view apart from many of the varieties of 
utilitarianism discussed in earlier chapters, and it is in the next chapter that I will discuss 
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in greater detail how to better understand Mill’s commitment to utilitarianism in light of 
his theory of moral obligation more generally.  
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CHAPTER VI  
MILL’S SANCTION UTILITARIANISM  
  
 This chapter will argue for an interpretation of Mill’s sanction utilitarianism. The 
chapter will have four major sections. The first section will discuss the definition of 
sanction utilitarianism and explain its implications in various domains of Mill’s moral 
theory. This will include four clarifications about the definition. These include 
discussions of how punishments are to be carried out, what it means to violate a rule, 
what it means for codes to be internalized by agents in a way that allows them to discern 
right and wrong, and how sanction utilitarianism stands apart from other types of 
utilitarianism.  The second and third sections will focus on how sanction utilitarianism 
applies to some of the contested aspects of Mill’s utilitarianism that have been discussed 
in previous chapters. The second section focuses on Mill’s Art of Life and his approach 
to utility maximization. The third section examines Mill’s theory of liberty and his 
approach to self-regarding action. In discussing these areas I will address some notable 
objections to the sanction utilitarianism reading of Mill and will provide some replies to 
those objections. The fourth and final section of the chapter will include two notable 
objections to my interpretation of sanction utilitarianism and replies to those objections.   
 At several points in the previous chapter outlining Mill’s Sanction Theory of 
Moral Wrong, I stressed that Mill’s arguments did not presuppose a commitment to 
utilitarianism. Indeed, the conclusion of the discussion does not even present a strictly 
utilitarian account of moral wrong. In the fourteenth paragraph of chapter five, Mill 
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seems to be sketching a view of the nature of moral wrongdoing based on his 
understanding of moral psychology. One need not be a utilitarian or even, to pick a more 
general categorization, a consequentialist of some kind to accept what Mill says in that 
paragraph. When the paragraph is read holistically and in light of Mill’s other related 
commitments, Mill articulates the following claim about moral theories: 
 Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong: An act is morally wrong if and only if it is 
 appropriate for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience, and possibly 
 be subject to other punishments (e.g. social or legal penalties), for performance 
 of the act. 
 One might reasonably wonder what changes follow once one adds Mill’s 
utilitarian commitments to his Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong. Specifying how to 
classify one kind of action as morally wrong and another as admittedly regrettable but 
not wrong requires an appeal to some external standard. As Mill says about 
utilitarianism in his essay on Whewell, “The contest between the morality which appeals 
to an external standard, and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the 
contest of progressive morality against stationary—of reason and argument against mere 
opinion and habit.”395 For Mill, the standard in question is the principle of utility. In On 
Liberty he writes, that, “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions . . 
.”396 Similarly, in chapter five of Utilitarianism, when Mill confronts the objection of 
why certain rights should be protected, he says, “I can give him no other reason than the 
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principle of utility.”397 In his Autobiography, Mill says of John Austin that, “like me, he 
never ceased to be a utilitarian . .  .”398 It is clear, then, that Mill took himself, in some 
sense, to affirm the claims of utilitarianism. It remains less clear, though, precisely what 
particular claims of utilitarianism Mill ultimately affirms as true. As has surely been 
evident from the previous chapters, Mill’s utilitarianism, whatever it is, has a number of 
peculiar features that make it less than obvious just how he understands the theory and 
its fundamental components. In order to try to better understand the nature of his view, I 
will now turn to a discussion of some of the key elements and implications.    
 
Mill’s commitment to utilitarianism and his approach to punishment  
 On my interpretation, Mill held fast to the idea that happiness, in all of its 
complexity, was the sole source of ultimate value. Though it is discussed in more detail 
in the next section (and as I have partly argued earlier in the dissertation), sanction 
utilitarians typically understand the principle of utility as a principle that says what is 
valuable or good. It is not a principle about how to promote that good.
399
 Most 
importantly, it is not a principle that requires agents to act in such a way so as to 
maximize the good. Put differently, it is an axiological principle not an action-guiding 
principle. As such, the principle of utility is Mill’s theory of what is valuable and what 
end is ultimately to be pursued. It is only in his moral theory proper that one finds an 
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expression of the means by which that end is to be promoted and pursued. In a later 
section of this chapter on Mill’s Art of Life I will say more as a point of justification for 
this understanding of Mill’s principle of utility.     
 With this in mind, it is now possible to walk through the basic structure of 
sanction utilitarianism: 
 Sanction Utilitarianism: An act is morally wrong if and only if it is appropriate 
 for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience (and possibly be subject to 
 other punishments such as social or legal penalties) for violating a rule in a 
 moral code that, when internalized by an agent, promotes utility.     
The first point to clarify about this definition is related to the question of how 
punishment for wrongdoing is carried out. As with the Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong, 
sanctions other than those of conscience, such as moralized resentment from other agents 
or legal penalties, may be applied to an agent in light of her violation of a moral rule (i.e. 
that which makes her a proper candidate for punishment). After the sanction is applied 
by the conscience, further punishment is given out according to the demands of 
prudence, not morality. This means that though some punishments (e.g. verbal moral 
blame) may have a particularly moralized flavor to them (e.g. “Hey! What you did to 
that person was as an assault on her dignity!”), the domain of morality is concerned only 
with the question of which agents get punished, not the nature and extent of their 
punishments.
400
 In other words, it is the proper work of the department (as Mill calls it) 
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of morality to determine who is a candidate for punishment and who should receive at 
least the internal sanction of conscience. A different department, the department of 
prudence, governs the way in which the external sanctions are applied. The work of the 
department of prudence is guided by utility (just as the department of morality is), but it 
is worth clarifying the point that there is a distinction in how morality and prudence 
operate on Mill’s scheme: they work together under the auspices of the principle of 
utility, but have decidedly different roles. 
 
Rule violations 
 The second point concerns the question of what it means to violate a rule. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to answer this question that generalizes across all of the 
relevant moral rules that would be contained within a single code. For instance, the 
moral rules concerning imperfect duties like giving money to charity are going to be 
difficulty to specify precisely.
401
 Given that Mill’s conception of imperfect duties does 
not require agents to act in a specific time or manner, it may be difficult to know just 
when one has violated the rule and should feel the internal sanction of guilt for it. If an 
agent fails to give money to a particular charity on particular day, has she violated the 
rule? Probably not, but there presumably should be some point in time that she should 
feel guilty about not following the rule concerning charity. Aside from the timing 
question, there is also the difficulty of specifying rules about just how much one should 
give. Should the amount required be relative to one’s income, and, if so, what sort of 
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share is appropriate? If an agent deliberately chooses to have children and takes on the 
accompanying expenses, does that mean that her obligation to give to strangers should 
be lessened? If an agent is especially generous with her time, should that lessen her 
obligation compared to someone who has a similar income but only contributes money, 
and not time, to charitable causes? These are only some of the questions that Mill does 
not answer concerning the nature of imperfect duties and how to fashion moral rules. 
Indeed, it is admittedly unsatisfying but nonetheless correct to say that there is little one 
can say generally about what it means to violate many or even most particular moral 
rules. As I will try to show below, there are similar difficulties when trying to specify the 
rules concerning perfect duties like those concerned with telling lies.   
 Determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for what it means to violate 
the rules concerning lying is notoriously difficult, as Mill himself would surely agree.
402
 
In fact, in a letter to Henry Brandreth in 1867, Mill expresses a general skepticism about 
devising a utilitarian scheme that can generalize across all circumstances such that it 
specifies precisely when one should depart from the “rule of veracity.”403 Circumstances 
are so varied, Mill seems to think, that it would be wrong to think that utilitarian 
theorists can devise a perfect scheme that can account for all possible circumstances. In 
many places in his work, Mill makes it clear that agents must be wary about being self-
serving, or even just poor calculators of general utility, when they elect to depart from 
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the standard rules of conduct. Mill is quick to add, though, that this holds for virtually 
any moral theory.
404
 For utilitarian agents to be able to use moral rules in daily life they 
must have some discretion in applying them and the rules must be kept relatively simple 
(especially since at least two rules might be in tension in a given case). Still, different 
moral rules may have exceptions built into them (e.g. “Don’t tell a lie, except when it is 
seriously impolite not to or in order to save lives”) and agents will need to use caution 
and discretion in applying a moral rule to a given situation.
405
 Utilitarianism depends 
upon agents using their best judgment in applying such rules to the relevant 
circumstances.
406
  
 Mill is rather hesitant about giving specific directions about what it means to 
violate a moral rule such that one appropriately feels the internal sanction of 
conscience.
407
 To better understand Mill’s hesitancy, it may be helpful to look at specific 
example from Mill’s writings. In his essay on Whewell, Mill confronts the charge, 
levelled by his antagonist, that the morality of utility allows agents too much discretion 
in deviating from truth telling when facing delicate social circumstances (e.g. in cases of 
flattery). Mill responds by asking:  
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 Does no one of Dr. Whewell’s way of thinking, say, or allow to be thought, that 
 he is glad to see a visitor whom he wishes away? Does he never ask 
 acquaintances  or relatives to stay when he would prefer them to go, or would 
 invite them when he hopes they will refuse? Does he never show any interest in 
 persons or things he cares nothing for, or send people away believing in his 
 friendly feeling, to whom his real feeling is indifference, or even dislike?
408
  
Immediately after making this point, Mill says that he will not go into whether such 
actions are really morally wrong. He does say, however, that one can engage in flattery 
only to the extent that one can do so without lying, which, “all persons of sympathizing 
feeling and quick perception can.”409 Just what precisely those lacking these abilities are 
to do is left unsaid. This supports my initial claim that Mill has little generally to say 
about what it means to precisely keep or to violate a rule and seems to depend on agents 
using their own judgment to fit the principle to the case at hand.  
 
Conscience: moral codes across and within societies  
 The third point concerns the question of how one should understand the 
definition’s reference to a moral code that is internalized by an agent’s conscience and 
promotes utility. This is an especially complex issue and I will break it into two halves. 
The first half will concern the fluctuating nature of the moral code that will be 
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internalized by agents and regulate their consciences. The second half, which is 
discussed in the next section, concerns the nature of this internalization process.    
  On Mill’s view, the code of moral rules consistent with the doctrine of utility is a 
code that will continue to evolve—both within particular societies and across societies. 
On Mill’s view, central doctrines of his normative moral and political theory, like his 
doctrine of liberty, do not apply even to adult agents in different societies at a given 
time. As he says in On Liberty, the moral and political doctrines he is expressing in the 
book do not apply to “backward states of society,” that have not reached (as he sees it) a 
certain stage of intellectual and cultural development.
410
 “Liberty, as a principle, has no 
application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become 
capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.”411 Once society develops to a 
point where they can be so improved, Mill’s utilitarianism would advise agents to 
internalize a different moral code than it had previous to that development. As Mill saw 
it, the moral code governing agents in mid-nineteenth century India were decidedly 
different than those governing his fellow English citizens.
412
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 Mill also believes that moral codes should continue to adapt within, and not 
merely across, particular societies. They should adapt their current moral code in 
accordance with the “external standard” of the principle of utility.413 That said, Mill sees 
much of society’s moral codes as already embodying a great deal of the truth that resides 
in the principles of utilitarianism, regardless of whether members of the society in 
question acknowledge as much.
414
 Even so, the present state of morality will stand in 
need of improvement, and it is one of Mill’s chief concerns that the moral code be up for 
revision under the governance of the principle of utility. Some of Mill’s sharpest words 
were directed toward those theorists who argued that the current codes of morality 
embodied the final truth of the matter: “The doctrine that the existing order of things is 
the natural order, and that, being natural, all innovation upon it is criminal, is as vicious 
in morals, as it is now at last admitted to be in physics, and in society and 
government.”415 As such, moral reformers, people like James Mill, Harriet Mill, Jeremy 
Bentham, and other utilitarian intellectuals should work to understand the current state of 
morality, identify what was worth keeping and what should be altered to the degree that 
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agents would be able to internalize it, and then seek to publicize the altered code, which 
could then be internalized by agents in a given society.
416
   
 
Conscience: moral wrong and the counterfactual right  
 The second half of the question about moral codes concerns the nature of moral 
conscience and how it works in light of the moral code that agents have internalized 
through their upbringing and broader cultural socialization. In his chapter on the 
sanctions of utility in Utilitarianism, Mill gives a theory of conscience that, he thinks, 
should hold, “whatever our standard of duty may be.”417 In that chapter, he refers to the 
conscience as the “ultimate sanction” of any theory of morality, not merely 
utilitarianism.
418
 The ultimate sanction, supplies “a feeling in our own mind; a pain, 
more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.”419 Similarly, when a person with a 
“properly cultivated moral nature” considers doing a seriously wrong action, she will, 
“shrink from it as an impossibility.”420 As such, one’s conscience can serve to guide an 
agent’s practical actions as they move through their lives. In those cases where an 
agent’s conscience is properly cultivated, one need only consider an action, consider 
whether it would violate a rule, and, if so, one should expect to “shrink” away from the 
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action in question. Note that this account sits easily with the account of conscience in 
Mill’s letter to Ward mentioned the previous chapter. In the letter Mill identifies those 
“who have themselves a moral feeling” precisely with those who possess a “feeling of 
approving and condemning conscience,” which provides “a feeling of pain in the fact of 
violating a certain rule.”421  
 Thus far I have said quite a bit about what it means for an action to be wrong, but 
much less about what it means for an action to be right. On my interpretation when Mill 
is speaking about the department of morality, actions that are wrong are appropriately 
condemned and punished by the conscience because they violate legitimate/justified 
moral rules, and those that are right are those that would be punished, at least, by the 
conscience were they not performed. In the previous chapter, I explained that this is 
what Mill means when he says that right actions are those that can be compelled.
422
 To 
put the matter formally, on the view I am ascribing to Mill, an action is morally right 
when conditions are such that if the action were not performed, then the action would be 
appropriately punished, at least by the agent’s conscience. We might call this a 
counterfactual analysis of morally right actions. It is a counterfactual analysis in light of 
the fact that what makes the action right is how the action would be morally classified if 
it were not performed.  
 On this interpretation, Mill has a more limited conception of right action than is 
sometimes supposed. Right action is not identified with what does or is likely to produce 
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the maximal amount of good, as is suggested in the first formulation of the greatest 
happiness principle.
423
 Rather, to put it simply, it is merely what one needs to do in order 
to avoid moral wrongdoing. The fact that punishment is what links both morally right 
and morally wrong actions should not surprise us, though, since Mill announces this fact 
in the Foundational Formulation. There Mill explains that distinguishing between cases 
of deserving and undeserving punishment, “lies at the bottom of the notions of right and 
wrong.”424  
 To consider what this looks like in action, it is helpful to recall a famous example 
from On Liberty. There, Mill explains that the solitary and self-reliant drunkard commits 
no moral wrong in overindulging. Mill says that:  
 No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a 
 policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there 
 is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the 
 public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of 
 morality or law.
425
  
Mill makes it clear, then, that the drunkard’s action is in the province of liberty and not 
morality. It is not morally wrong; but it is not morally right either. It is not the case that 
it is morally right because it would not be wrong for the agent not to overindulge. 
Instead, the action is of a self-regarding nature, which is more properly thought of as 
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permissible. In this case, one might regard the action as foolish, from a prudential 
standpoint, but it is not morally wrong. 
 This counterfactual conception of right speaks directly to Mill’s conception of 
supererogatory actions. As was discussed in previous chapters, Mill shows a plain 
commitment to the possibility of actions that go significantly beyond what moral duty 
requires.
426
 As such, supererogatory actions fit neither into the categories of right nor 
wrong action. To see this concept in action in light of the above analysis of right and 
wrong, suppose that an agent has an imperfect duty to give a certain amount of money to 
charity. Given that Mill has adopted a less than maximizing understanding of moral 
obligation, the agent is entitled to give less than all that she could in order to increase the 
general welfare. Suppose however, that, in addition to giving the required amount 
(whatever that is), the agent chooses to give up her daily morning latte and use the 
resulting savings to supplement the amount that she gives to an efficient charity that 
promotes the general good. It would not be wrong, in this instance, for the agent to fail 
to give up her latte. After all, she is already going to give the sufficient amount to 
discharge her imperfect duty, so in this case she is doing a supererogatory action by 
sacrificing a permissible personal luxury for the sake of the general good. Mill seems to 
have just cases in mind when he writes, in his Comte essay, that “If in addition to 
fulfilling this obligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of disinterested 
exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent personal indulgences, they 
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deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit objects of moral praise.”427 As was evident in 
the discussion of the Proper Object Formulation, just as punishments can exert a 
coercive force on agents, so also can moral praise.
428
 When agents decide to undertake 
actions for the “natural rewards” of doing so, they perform supererogatory actions rather 
than morally right actions as such.  
 In this way, then, Mill recognizes four distinct categories of action: morally right 
and wrong actions (strictly in the sphere of morality), permissible actions (typically in 
the prudential sphere), and supererogatory actions (typically in the aesthetic sphere). In 
this way, the categories of action correspond to different departments Art of Life. 
However, single actions can be evaluated from different departments simultaneously. An 
agent who commits an unprovoked violent attack on someone commits a moral wrong 
while simultaneously doing something that is also probably foolish and unattractive as a 
matter of character. The categories, then, are conceptually distinct, even if they can, at 
times, be used in evaluating a single action.   
 
The distinctness of sanction utilitarianism  
 The fourth and final point of clarification concerns the way in which Mill’s 
theory is distinct from maximizing act and rule utilitarianism. After all, it is the general 
thesis of my dissertation that Mill is best read as a sanction utilitarian. Rather than 
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rehearsing the many textual arguments that have already been presented in the previous 
chapters, I will instead explain the conceptual features of the sanction utilitarian view 
that are incompatible with these other types of utilitarianism. At different points in the 
dissertation I have flagged various issues in my exposition of Mill’s view that sit 
uneasily with the act and rule utilitarian interpretations. I will pick the most notable 
cases of features that contrast with the two views.  
 In my view, there are two key features of the sanction utilitarian theory that set it 
apart from the maximizing act utilitarian theory. First, Mill sees moral obligation as rule 
rather than act oriented. The undeniably close conceptual tie between an action being 
wrong and it being a violation of a rule is incompatible with both rules of thumb and the 
strategy conceptions of rules. These views see rules as merely instrumental to securing 
the right action and avoiding the wrong action; but Mill’s view (as expressed in the 
Ward letter, for example) provides for a stronger connection than this. Second, Mill does 
not seem recognize a general moral obligation to maximize utility. Maximizing act 
utilitarianism supposes that every action is ultimately evaluable from a moral standpoint, 
and Mill denies just that in many places in his writings. Contra Crisp, who said that any 
action that fails to maximize utility should be punished at least by the conscience, Mill 
expressly says that agents should not feel the sanctions of conscience for doing less than 
the maximal amount of good. Doing the greatest amount of good may be pursued as a 
matter of supererogation, but it is not a matter of moral obligation as such.      
 As was evident in chapter two, the sanction utilitarian interpretation I have 
argued for shares many important features with the rule utilitarian theories. Both insist 
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on a rather indirect pursuit of utilitarian ends, and both obviously give a privileged place 
to the role of rules in the moral life. The primary reason why it seems correct to call Mill 
a sanction utilitarian rather than a rule utilitarian is the role of Mill’s theory of 
conscience in moral obligation. On Mill’s view, actions that are wrong should receive 
punishment regardless of how utility is affected. As we have seen, this is not because he 
does not care about utility as such, but because of how he understands the way moral 
wrongdoing is conceptually (wrongdoing implies punishment) and psychologically 
connected to punishment (wrongdoing is strongly psychologically associated with 
punishment). On the maximizing rule utilitarian theory (like the one favored by Fuchs), 
punishment, as a rule, should be inflicted only in those cases where it will promote 
utility. As such, it should be an open question whether punishment should be meted out 
for moral wrongdoing. For the maximizing rule utilitarian, there will be rules for action 
(in general) and rules for punishment, and both sets of rules must serve to maximize 
utility. If an agent commits a morally wrong act, but the rules for punishment stipulate 
that punishing an agent who has committed this type of act would not maximize utility, 
then the agent should not be punished. Mill, though, insists that the “penal sanction” 
enters not merely into cases of injustice, but, “any kind of wrong.”429 Mill’s 
utilitarianism is distinctive not so much for its insistence that rules for punishment are 
crucial to morality—though this is important—but for its insistence that the internal 
sanction of conscience is at the heart of both morally wrong and morally right actions.  
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Art of Life and utility maximization 
 Now that I have clarified some of the key questions surrounding Mill’s sanction 
utilitarianism, I will turn to the first of two sections where I examine particular aspects 
of Mill’s utilitarianism. At several points in the dissertation (including the previous 
section) I have referred to Mill’s doctrine of the Art of Life. I first outlined the essentials 
of the Art of Life in chapter two in my discussion of Fuchs and have returned to it a 
number of times since to elaborate on the ways in which Mill separates the domain of 
morality from other spheres of practical activity. In what follows, I briefly revisit and 
explain the central elements of the doctrine so as to situate it within Mill’s utilitarianism. 
To show the relevance of this doctrine to sanction utilitarianism, I examine three recent 
objections from Brink who maintains that sanction utilitarianism is actually incompatible 
with the Art of Life. Brink argues that the Art of Life, as interpreted by the sanction 
utilitarian, actually undermines the claims of the sanction utilitarian theory. Given the 
seriousness of this charge, I provide replies to each of these objections on behalf of the 
sanction utilitarian interpretation I am arguing for in my dissertation.  
  Mill introduces the Art of Life in the System of Logic as a means of marking the 
familiar distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’.430 The sciences serve to elucidate various 
causal relations and the arts apply knowledge of those relations in service of some 
chosen end. To use Mill’s example, medicine, as an art, has bodily health as its aim, and 
it makes no sense, he thinks, to call that aim scientific in that it is not asserting some 
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proposition about the world as a truth. Rather, bodily health serves as an end at which 
practitioners aim in their use of scientific truths. All arts, in Mill’s view, are teleological 
in nature and depend on some ruling or controlling end at which they themselves aim. 
Above such practical arts as medicine or architecture, however, are three superior arts 
that establish whether a particular art’s end is “worthy or desirable” in light of the 
various competing ends.
431
 These superior arts, which Mill also refers to as principles of 
practical reason, are called the “Art of Life, in its three departments, Morality, Prudence 
or Policy, and Aesthetics; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beautiful or Noble, in human 
conduct and works.”432 As noted before, Mill does not go into detail about how these 
various departments are supposed to work together, aside from noting that every other 
subordinate art must function under their direction.  
 Mill does make one central addition to his doctrine, however, which concerns the 
end or principle at which the Art of Life itself aims. While admitting that he has not 
argued for or really justified the claim, Mill declares his conviction:  
  that the general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the 
 test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of 
 mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of 
 happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.
433
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Many commentators take Mill’s statement here about the “ultimate principle of 
Teleology” to refer to the principle of utility, a doctrine at the very center of any 
utilitarian theory.
434
 Despite being at the center, Mill immediately adds to his declaration 
the claim that happiness should not be the direct aim of all actions, but that this standard 
is merely intended to “umpire” between the different departments of life, which might 
suggest different courses of action.
435
 
 Mill first added the doctrine of Art of Life to a revised edition of the System of 
Logic in 1851, and it is referred to in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism as well.
436
 In 
Utilitarianism, the Art of Life is mentioned immediately after the discussion of morality 
and punishment in the fourteenth paragraph of chapter five. At the opening of the next 
paragraph Mill explains that the above discussion separated morality, “from the 
remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness . . .”437 The fact that Mill does not 
really explain in the text of Utilitarianism what he means by invoking these two 
provinces leads Ryan (who first brought the doctrine the attention to Mill scholars) to 
claim that, “the account of the matter given in Utilitarianism presupposes, and indeed 
only makes complete sense in the light of, the account in the System of Logic.”438  
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 Aside from explaining this odd passage from Utilitarianism, one might ask at this 
point why the Art of Life is so important to the sanction utilitarian interpretation. The 
answer is that the Art of Life doctrine shows that Mill does not see morality as 
dominating the whole of human life. Rather, he understands morality as a single sector 
of life, which is especially concerned with rules and the sanctions of one’s conscience. 
Two other whole domains of practical action that stand completely apart from morality.    
 In a recent book, Brink gives three objections concerning the compatibility of the 
doctrine of the Art of Life with sanction utilitarianism.
439
 Brink’s first objection is that 
since the Art of Life is governed by the principle of utility, it is governed by a principle 
that advises the agent to maximize happiness across the different domains. Given that 
sanction utilitarianism supposes that Mill does not say that happiness should be 
maximized in the domain of morality, the Art of Life is therefore inconsistent with 
sanction utilitarianism. In reply, I say that Brink has misunderstood the nature of the Art 
of Life and the principle of utility. As noted previously, Brown, who found as many as 
fifteen different understandings of the principle of utility, has argued that Mill 
understands the principle of utility as an axiological principle that explains what is 
valuable rather than how agents should act in light of that value.
440
 An especially clear 
statement of the principle of utility that fits within this definition can be found in chapter 
five of Utilitarianism. In a footnote towards the end of the chapter, Mill corrects 
Spencer’s mistaken understanding that the principle of utility claims that everyone has a 
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right to happiness. In reply, Mill writes that, “It may be more correctly described as 
supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the 
same or by different persons.  This, however, is not a presupposition; not a premise 
needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself . . ..
441
 Notice that 
Mill’s statement here of “the very principle itself” says nothing about the extent to which 
individuals should seek the end of the general happiness. Mill’s statement merely 
clarifies a point about how happiness should be understood as a value within the 
utilitarian scheme—namely that every individual person’s happiness counts equally. As 
such, there is no explicit or implied commitment to utility maximization.   
 To this Brink might reply that it is not the principle of utility that governs the Art 
of Life, but the “ultimate principle of Teleology,” as he calls it in the text of the System 
of Logic. While Brown and others may have shown that Mill tends to understand the 
principle in this way, it might not apply to the Art of Life since Mill uses a different 
phrasing. Even though it is common to read Mill as regarding the ultimate principle of 
teleology as an equivalent term from the principle of utility, one can grant Brink the 
claim that they are different principles for the sake of the argument. However, it will not 
ultimately support his reading of the Art of Life and his objection to sanction 
utilitarianism. For an examination of the ultimate principle of teleology in the System of 
Logic shows that it does not require one to maximize utility. Recall that Mill states the 
principle in the following way:  
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 [T]he general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and 
 the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness 
 of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of 
 happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.
442
 
Mill only commits himself to saying that happiness should be promoted, which is not 
necessarily to say that it should be maximized. As I argued in chapter two when 
discussing Crisp, I read Mill as a satisficing utilitarian who recognizes that less than 
optimal actions can be regarded as nonetheless morally correct.
443
 The above passage is 
consistent with the satisficing interpretation since Mill seems to be saying actions are 
good when they promote or are conducive to happiness, though he does not say that they 
must to do this to the maximal degree. While the “fundamental principle of Teleology” 
can justifiably be read as telling agents to act so as to produce happiness (and is in this 
case action guiding), it does not follow from this that one must maximize happiness 
across the departments of the Art of Life. To get the reading that Brink would like, Mill 
would have needed to further specify that whatever is conducive to happiness should be 
promoted as much as possible. Given that Mill does not say this, Brink’s objection 
fails.
444
  
 The second objection is that sanction utilitarianism is inconsistent with the 
limited, rather than universal, role of morality described in the Art of Life. “For sanction 
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utilitarianism also has universal scope, implying that any action is morally wrong just in 
case some kind of sanction, whether external or internal, is appropriate on utilitarian 
grounds.”445 On Brink’s view, this creates a problem for the sanction utilitarian since the 
principles of utilitarianism counsel agents to punish imprudence. However, if they are 
punishing imprudence, then it looks like the distinctive nature of the sanction utilitarian 
view—that it punishes all and only morally wrong acts—is mistaken.    
 But, in reply, I say that Brink has misunderstood the nature of sanction 
utilitarianism, as least as I have argued for it here.
446
 According the sanction utilitarian 
view I have argued for, the only relevant sanction for determining an action’s status as 
morally wrong is the internal sanction of conscience. As the Ward letter made clear, one 
should feel the internal sanction of conscience precisely when one has violated a moral 
rule. If one acts in such way as to be imprudent (like the self-reliant drunkard), one’s 
action can qualify as something that one can be socially punished for externally by other 
agents, though not morally condemned or blamed. However, Mill does not say that 
acting, say, as the self-reliant drunkard does goes against a moral rule or that he should 
feel the internal sanction of conscience for such actions. Indeed, Mill seems keen to 
encourage the sparing use of moral sanctions. Recall Mill’s statement on this point from 
his essay on Comte where he says that, “As a rule of conduct, to be enforced by moral 
sanctions, we think no more should be attempted than to prevent people from doing 
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harm to others, or omitting to do such good as they have undertaken.”447 This passage 
contains just the kind of narrow understanding of moral obligation that is consistent with 
the sanction utilitarian interpretation, and, as a result, Brink’s objection is again off 
target.  
 Brink’s third objection is that the distinct domains of the Art of Life, as they are 
understood on the sanction utilitarian interpretation, seem at odds with passages from 
Utilitarianism that appear to endorse act utilitarianism. In particular, Brink thinks that 
Mill’s claim that, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness,” is incompatible with the Art of 
Life doctrine as the sanction utilitarian interpretation understands it.
448
 In other words, 
Brink claims that the reading of the Art of Life that I am advocating cannot be correct 
since it is incompatible with the act utilitarian comments that Mill makes elsewhere. The 
particular aspect of my interpretation of the Art of Life that is incompatible with the act 
utilitarian reading is the sharp distinction I recognize between the departments of 
prudence and morality. On the sanction utilitarian interpretation, both domains recognize 
happiness as the relevant value to be promoted, but moral rightness is only relevant to 
one of the departments. If Mill is instead an act utilitarian, there would be no reason to 
restrict the domain of morality in this way.  
 My reply to this objection speaks, in part, to the entire thrust of this dissertation. 
As was evident in my lengthy section on in chapter three on Crisp’s act utilitarian view, I 
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think that there are many problems with the act utilitarian interpretation, especially in 
relation to how it interprets Mill’s commitment to supererogation, the demandingness of 
morality, and his conception of punishment. These difficulties accompany the act 
utilitarian reading even when one if one makes use of all of Utilitarianism. However, in 
chapter four of the dissertation I argued for the Ecumenical reading of Utilitarianism, 
which directly discounts the passage that Brink cites as a posing the most significant 
problem for the sanction utilitarian view. According to the Ecumenical reading, it is in 
chapter five of Utilitarianism, not chapter two, that Mill gives his definitive statement of 
his moral theory. Chapter five of this dissertation argued for a particular reading of 
Mill’s text that is plainly incompatible with act utilitarianism. It is, however, perfectly 
compatible with the reading of Art of the Life that I have discussed above. Therefore, 
since the evidence taken as a whole suggests that Mill is not an act utilitarian, my 
reading of Mill’s theory of the Art of Life is perfectly compatible with the sanction 
utilitarian position I have argued for in this dissertation and Brink’s third objection fails.  
 To sum up, in this section I presented Mill’s theory of the Art of Life as it 
appears in his System of Logic. I discussed how this doctrine is important in that it 
explains how Mill understands the relationship between morality, prudence, and 
aesthetic evaluation on a utilitarian scheme. I also explained how Mill’s comments in 
chapter five of Utilitarianism are compatible with the Art of Life as it is presented in the 
System of Logic. Finally, I responded to three objections to the sanction utilitarian 
reading of Mill’s Art of Life. The first reply, in drawing on work discussed previously in 
the dissertation, reveals that Mill does not seem to recognize a commitment to 
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maximizing utilitarianism across the categories of prudence and morality. The second 
reply pointed to a distinct separation in the way that prudential and moral wrongs are 
punished on the sanction utilitarian interpretation. My final reply emphasizes my 
criticisms of the act utilitarian reading of Mill and stresses importance of the Ecumenical 
reading for my overall argument in favor of the sanction utilitarian interpretation. 
Passages from Utilitarianism that are typically thought to disagree with the sanction 
utilitarian view can be rightfully set aside, and those favoring it, like the fourteenth 
paragraph of chapter five, can rightly be emphasized. In light these replies, Brink’s 
objections to my reading of the Art of Life should be judged as inadequate to dislodge 
the sanction utilitarian interpretation.  
 
Self-regarding action and sanction utilitarianism  
 In explaining the Art of Life, Mill seems to recognize a sharp distinction between 
the departments of prudence, morality, and aesthetics. On the sanction utilitarian 
interpretation I support, the realm of morality is especially concerned with matters of 
moral obligation and is rather limited in scope. In contrast, the departments of aesthetics 
and prudence seem comparatively spacious. This seems especially so when one recalls 
that the Art of Life is supposed to stand as Mill’s theory of practical action. As such, any 
evaluative stance on an intentional action that is not a matter of moral obligation must be 
made from at least one of the other two perspectives. Given that Mill says comparatively 
little about aesthetics and quite a bit about prudence (or, as he sometimes calls it, general 
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expediency), this section will be concerned with specifying how one should understand 
the prudential domain according to the sanction utilitarian interpretation. 
 This section, while narrowly focused, will be especially reliant on an exposition 
of Jacobson’s reading of On Liberty, with particular attention to Mill’s theory of self-
regarding action.
449
 This is for two reasons. First, I have no substantial disagreement 
with Jacobson’s reading of Mill’s stance on these issues, and his work serves to 
illuminate Mill’s position in a way that is especially important for the sanction utilitarian 
reading. Second, for the most part I wish to stay away from the mountain of contentious 
issues surrounding how best to interpret Mill’s theory of liberty—which, alongside his 
utilitarianism, is arguably his most famous and thoroughly studied doctrine.
450
 
Jacobson’s general reading of Mill on these issues is consistent with the sanction 
utilitarian position and my objective is to review the central passages and key arguments 
that support this reading. In short, what I will provide here is a way to read a few of the 
central doctrines in On Liberty in a manner consistent with the sanction utilitarian 
position. To argue that this is the only or even the best way to read Mill on these points 
would be a far larger task than I can hope accomplish here. 
 The central issue in this discussion is: over what kinds of action society may 
rightfully exercise forms of social control, such as moral blame? The issue stems from 
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difficulties concerning how to interpret Mill’s so called harm principle.451 The portion of 
the text commonly claimed to be identified as the harm principle can be found in the 
opening chapter of On Liberty:  
  The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to 
 govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
 compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of 
 legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.  That principle is, that 
 the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
 in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
 That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
 member of a civilized community, against  his will, is to prevent harm to 
 others.
452
  
When one surveys the staggering amount of literature about what Mill seems to be 
saying in this passage, it is easy to agree with Miller who writes that, “Mill may never be 
so far wrong as when he describes the liberty principle as ‘very simple.’”453  
 On a standard reading of Mill’s harm principle, any action that affects non-
consenting others is or even likely to affect non-consenting others in a way that is 
harmful is both a necessary and sufficient condition for providing a prima facie reason 
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for members of society to exact some form of social control over that action.
454
 It is only 
a prima facie reason because members of society may elect not to enact such social 
control since the costs of doing so may be too high, but it will ultimately be a question of 
a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.
455
 That said, such calculations do not apply to actions 
that concern only the individuals undertaking the action in question since:  
 The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
 that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
 independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
 the individual is sovereign.
456
 
Thus, while individuals can act in ways that prove harmful to their interests, they cannot 
be constrained by society for the sake of their own good. As long as the action does not 
involve others, the agent undertaking the action should not be constrained by society. To 
force the agent to behave in a particular way when she is not harming others is 
paternalistic and unacceptable to Mill.   
 The difficulty generated by this reading of the harm principle is that it appears to 
severely weaken Mill’s expressed aim in On Liberty, which is to carve out a substantial 
sphere of action for an individual to exercise her liberty and to determine the best way to 
live her life. On the one hand, Mill claims to recognize a difference between “the part of 
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a person’s life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others,” but he also 
admits that, “it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful 
to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far 
beyond them.”457 Given that humans are so interpersonally interconnected and given that 
harms so readily reach beyond the individual immediately involved, Mill’s sphere of 
purely self-regarding action seems to shrink considerably. This is somewhat troubling 
for the sanction utilitarian since it seems to cast the net of morality rather wide given that 
so many of one’s actions can prove harmful or potentially harmful to others.       
 However, Jacobson rejects the traditional reading of the harm principle and 
proposes an alternative understanding of Mill’s theory of liberty and self-regarding 
action. He argues that the harm principle is better interpreted as providing a merely 
necessary condition for a prima facie justification for legal or moral sanctions of an 
agent’s action. Again, I say prima facie justification because Mill says that one might 
deem an action as wrong and still hold that it should not be punished (apart from the 
conscience) by legal or social sanctions because punishment would lack utility. Jacobson 
reaches this conclusion, in part, because of Mill’s apparent commitment to what 
Jacobson refers to as the doctrine of liberty, which, broadly speaking, is the principle 
that specifies the domain in which an individual is recognized as free from moral 
sanctions. On the standard understanding, the doctrine of liberty is a corollary of the 
harm principle, in that individual actions that do not directly harm others qualify as 
actions that should not be subject to moral sanctions. On Jacobson’s view, the doctrine 
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of liberty is not a corollary of the harm principle but wholly distinct from it.
458
 The 
doctrine of liberty is properly read as “the claim that there is a substantial sphere of 
liberty rights with which society must not interfere.”459 This emphasis on rights is 
important since it makes clear the point that whether the action is harmful is not what is 
morally relevant. The question is one of rights rather than one of harms. In other words, 
on Jacobson’s view, if agents have a liberty right to perform an action, then even if other 
agents are harmed, the action is not subject to interference.
460
 On the presumption that 
Mill grants some notable liberty rights to individuals, this appears to be a solid strategy 
for expanding the domain of prudence and self-regarding action.     
 At this point one can rightly ask what is meant by saying that agents have 
particular liberty rights. In the twelfth paragraph of the opening chapter of On Liberty, 
Mill expressly identifies the types of behavior he has in mind for domains in which 
individuals should be free from interference. Mill explains the three domains of liberty 
that are to be regarded, in their own ways, as absolute and unqualified, as 1) liberty of 
thought and speech, 2) liberty to frame and carry out one’s life in one’s own way (i.e. 
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pursue self-regarding action proper), and 3) the liberty to unite with other individuals in 
ways that do not harm others.
461
 By saying, “in their own ways,” I mean that each type 
of liberty enjoys a different type of protection (as Mill explains in the different chapters 
of the text). Liberty of thought requires different types of protection than the liberty to 
form social unions, and so on. For instance, Mill says that, “No one pretends that actions 
should be as free as opinions.”462 To be sure, the second and third branches, which 
concern actions, are as equally unqualified and absolute as cases in the first branch, but 
they allow for different sorts of liberties to be expressed: one is entitled to be rather 
carefree in tossing around pointed political opinions among friends, but considerably 
less so in tossing around a set of darts.     
 Now in grouping three branches as I have, I am, admittedly, endorsing 
Jacobson’s controversial claim that speech is to be grouped with liberty of thought.463 
Given my limited objectives at this point, however, I will not examine the textual 
evidence for this claim. Instead, I want to turn to Jacobson’s gloss on the second branch 
of liberty, which concerns self-regarding action. According to Jacobson’s reading of 
Mill, “to say that an action is self-regarding is simply shorthand for claiming it to be 
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within the sphere of liberty.”464 Mill’s purported justification for classifying some 
actions as purely self-regarding is that the action in question either does not principally 
affect others or, in cases where the action causes harm to others, the harm involved is not 
one for which society should give protection.
465
 In other words, if your action directly 
concerns only yourself or if your action is one that could have consequences that are not 
protected as a matter of right, then the action should be regarded as self-regarding. In 
explaining what he means by this, Mill gives the example of competing for some good 
and suffering disappointment. This is so even if an agent fails to achieve the good as the 
result of someone else’s action (even in cases when you do not consent). Mill explicitly 
mentions this latter kind of case, where agents consent to participate in a competition 
and face the risk of potentially serious losses when he says: 
 In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed 
 competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to 
 interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary 
 to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and force.466   
To use Mill’s example as an application of this principle explained in this passage, if an 
agent’s success in securing a job in “overcrowded profession” causes harm to others who 
do not get the job, the agent should not be judged to have done anything wrong since no 
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one has a right to avoid the suffering that arises from failing to succeed in a competitive 
field.
467
   
 On this reading of On Liberty, actions can have harmful effects on other agents 
who do not consent to them, but nonetheless be self-regarding.
468
 A paradigm case of 
this for Mill is freedom of expression. On Jacobson’s reading, “The freedom of 
expression Mill advocates is the freedom to express any factual or normative opinion, 
where opinions are understood to be individuated by their content.”469 For Mill, no 
opinion, no matter how false or potentially pernicious its consequences for non-
consenting others, can be ruled out by the nature of its content. The only justification for 
limiting individual’s freedom of expression is when an opinion is expressed in 
circumstances that constitute a “positive instigation to act.”470 Mill illustrates this point 
with a now famous example: 
  An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
 robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but 
 may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled 
 before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in 
 the form of a placard.
471
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Even if the opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor is disastrously harmful to 
the interests of the corn dealers, this does not provide reason to interfere with the action, 
and it remains in the protected realm of the self-regarding. Mill does not even consider 
how an opinion’s content, as such, might lead to harmful effects when examining 
whether an action is one with which society should interfere. It is important to 
underscore this point about harm to non-consenting others being permissible since it is 
often denied in the literature. Mill notes that society does not punish all wrongful 
actions, but, on the traditional reading of the harm principle, the fact that there is a harm 
involved in an action suffices for there to be a prima facie reason to regulate the action 
and constrain an agent’s liberty. However, on Jacobson’s reading, regardless of how 
negatively utility is affected by non-instigating speech, society is not justified in limiting 
an agent’s liberty or punishing the action in question.  
 Mill gives a very specific explanation of how an action moves from a self-
regarding action (in the realm of prudence) to a wrong action (in the realm of morality) 
by saying that:  
 I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriously 
 affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected 
 with him, and in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a 
 person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person 
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 or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes 
 amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term.
472
 
In this way, Mill explains that doing an action that harms oneself but indirectly affects 
others in a way that harms them is not enough to qualify an action as something that 
society should consider punishing through moral or other penalties. This exactly 
coincides with Jacobson’s reading of the harm principle. On that reading, harm is merely 
a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for using moral sanctions as a means of 
curtailing the action in question. The action must violate some distinct right in order to 
justifiably move from the prudential realm to the moral one. As Jacobson sees it, then, 
even if an action is rightfully judged to harm some other non-consenting agent, if it does 
not violate some distinct and assignable right or obligation, then it is self-regarding (in 
Mill’s sense) and is not morally wrong, but is, at worst, foolish.   
 To sum up, I began this discussion by noting that I wanted to explore just how 
wide of a space Mill recognized for liberty and for self-regarding behavior. On the 
reading I have given here, Mill allows for a fairly wide-berth for what can be understood 
as being within the realm of the self-regarding. Self-regarding actions are those that 
either directly concern only the agent herself or, if others are concerned, does not 
infringe on the rights of others or violate some distinct obligation to them. Just how wide 
of a space this turns out to be will depend on the nature of the rules in a particular moral 
code that specify the nature of rights and obligations.  
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Objections to sanction utilitarianism  
 In this section I will examine two distinct objections to the sanction utilitarian 
interpretation for which I have argued. The two objections come from Brink and Berger, 
and are directed at particular versions of sanction utilitarianism, which are similar 
though not identical to the one defended here. My hope is that discussing these 
objections both addresses some legitimate concerns about the conceptual coherence and 
textual justifications I have offered for the view while also serving to explain how the 
version of sanction utilitarianism I defend here is distinct from previous versions.  
 I will call Brink’s objection the “wrong sort of reason” objection.473 This 
objection speaks more to the conceptual coherence of the view than to the textual 
evidence that sanction utilitarians have offered to support their view. The thrust of the 
objection is that sanction utilitarianism gets the standard understanding of the connection 
between wrongdoing and punishment exactly backwards. This is because the view 
embraces what Brink calls a response-dependent notion of duty where wrong actions 
merit a particular response, namely sanctions of some kind. Thus, the wrongness of an 
act is explained by the response that it deserves. As Brink sees it, this is where the view 
goes wrong as a conceptually coherent moral theory:  
 [T]his inverts what many would regard as the usual dependency between 
 wrongness and sanction. Many think that sanctions are appropriate for wrong 
 acts because they are wrong. This requires grounding wrongness in some 
 independent account; it is not the suitability for sanction that makes an act 
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 wrong. Perhaps one ought to sanction wrong acts, but it doesn’t seem that they 
 are wrong because one ought to sanction them.
474
 
 Before replying to this objection it is necessary to clarify a point about the 
interpreters to whom the objection is directed. Brink’s criticism seems to be targeted at 
Lyons’ and Jacobson’s sanction utilitarian interpretations.475 Brink does not cite 
particular passages of Jacobson’s work to motivate his objection, but presumably he has 
passages like the following in mind: “As I see it, Mill holds the quintessentially 
sentimentalist thesis that an act is wrong whenever guilt over it would be fitting from the 
agent, and resentment fitting from others.”476 Similarly, Lyons claims that, in the 
fourteenth paragraph of Utilitarianism, chapter five, “Mill seems to be claiming that 
wrong acts are those for which guilt feelings are appropriate.”477  
 These quotations serve to identify some important differences between the views 
of Lyons, Jacobson, and myself. Readers by now will have recognized that I have 
refrained from identifying Mill’s internal sanction of conscience with guilt, as these 
other authors have.
478
 I have resisted making this leap as there seems to be little to no 
textual evidence to justify it. Neither Lyons nor Jacobson have provided evidence from 
Mill’s writings that he understood guilt to be identical with what he calls the internal 
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sanction of conscience.
479
 Mill does mention guilt upon occasion in his writings on 
morality, even in chapter five of Utilitarianism, but, to my knowledge, it is always in a 
juridical sense of an agent being, as a matter of fact, in the wrong somehow. It is not, 
contrary to what would be the case on their view, a word that connotes an agent’s feeling 
about having committing a moral wrong.
480
  
 Jacobson especially relies on his understanding of guilt as a moral emotion to say 
that it is the emotion that the agent experiences that specifies which category of action an 
action falls into in the Art of Life. On Jacobson’s interpretation, “the moral sentiments 
distinguish the moral realm from the prudential and aesthetic.”481 If an agent fittingly 
feels guilty then an action is wrong, but if she only fittingly feels regret, then the action 
must have been merely imprudent.
482
 Jacobson connects his notion of “fittingness” to the 
anthropocentric constraints on moral emotions like guilt and regret. On his 
interpretation, it is because I cannot feel guilt about harming only myself that a given 
action may be self-regarding.
483
 In his example, if I hit my hand with a hammer and 
cause no lasting damage but undeniably cause myself intense pain, I have acted foolishly 
but not wrongly.
484
 This is because, as he sees it, the emotion of guilt implies the desire 
to make reparations—a desire that seems completely out of place in the context of the 
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case of the hammer. The nature of emotion itself, in other words, sets the boundaries for 
what kind of response is appropriate for an agent to feel and thus what category in the 
Art of Life the action should be placed in.       
 My response to Brink both replies to the initial objection and illustrates the way 
in which my view is similar to Jacobson’s. To Brink, I say that the response of the 
internal sanction of conscience comes only when one has violated a rule that is in 
accordance with the promotion of utility and is punished by the internal sanction of 
conscience. In other words, both the rule and the sanction of conscience play a role in 
identifying an action as morally wrong. In a case where an agent has internalized the 
rules that promote utility and has a properly functioning conscience, there will be a 
certain response from an agent’s conscience in those cases where there are rule 
violations. As I see it, however, this does not mean that the view is conceptually 
incoherent. Brink’s objection seems to trade on the idea that, conceptually speaking, 
wrongdoing should come prior to punishment. Wrongdoing should arguably come 
before punishment because punishment should be done for some reason. However, on 
the sanction utilitarian view, there is a reason that the action is punished, namely that it 
violates the rules that work in tandem with the agent’s conscience. I will say more in a 
moment about why it is important to think of these two concepts as working in tandem, 
but first it is important to revisit Mill’s understanding of the connection between the 
ideas of punishment and wrongdoing.     
 On Mill’s view, the internal sanction of conscience should always accompany a 
case of moral wrongdoing as a form of punishment. This is true no matter what the 
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consequences of this form of punishment are. Recall that for Mill the concepts of moral 
wrongdoing and punishment are, strictly speaking, conceptually distinct. Wrongdoing 
implies a certain internal punishment on Mill’s view, but that punishment is not 
equivalent to wrongdoing as such.
485
 Nonetheless, human moral psychology, on Mill’s 
view, recognizes a very close connection between the concepts: 
  of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable association has been created 
 between these directly, without the help of any intervening idea. This is quite 
 enough to make the spontaneous feelings of mankind regard punishment and a 
 wrongdoer as naturally fitted to each other—as a conjunction appropriate in 
 itself, independently of any consequences.
486
 
Mill’s last statement here about the connection between punishment and a wrongdoer 
being appropriate independent of the consequences fits my response to Brink precisely. 
If things are going as Mill thinks they should, the punishment always works in concert 
with the reason that the punishment is being applied. While this does admittedly differ 
from how wrongdoing and punishment are often thought of, my analysis of it here does 
respond to what I take to be the heart of the objection, which is that responses to 
wrongdoing must be done for some reason.   
 Earlier I said that Mill’s theory of rules works in tandem with the conscience. 
This understanding seems implied by the Ward letter, which suggests that the conscience 
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operates in conjunction with moral rules in that it brings about a feeling of pain when a 
rule has been violated. This is the aspect of my reading of sanction utilitarianism that is 
similar to Jacobson: the nature of the conscience and its ability to internalize rules puts 
limits on what type of actions can properly be regarded as morally wrong. Thus, if an 
action does not violate a moral rule that the agent should have internalized, then the 
action will not be punished and is not wrong. In this way I agree with Jacobson on his 
point that actions that one cannot feel the internal sanction of conscience about cannot be 
morally wrong.
487
 
 It may help to explain this understanding of the role of the conscience in the 
sanction utilitarian view by contrasting it with that of another famous utilitarian thinker: 
Hare.
488
 On Hare’s maximizing view of utilitarianism, it would maximize utility if 
agents would internalize various rules that are tied to the internal sanction of conscience 
or, as Hare puts it, feelings of remorse.
489
 By tied to, I mean that when an agent breaks 
the rule she will feel remorse and if she does not break a rule she will not feel remorse. 
However, these rules and the remorse that they work with are not linked in a strict way 
to moral wrongdoing on Hare’s view. Even if the rules to be internalized are chosen 
judiciously (as they should be in order to maximize utility), there can be rare cases in 
which agents act in a morally wrong way but, in doing so, act in accordance with the 
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internalized rule and thus do not feel remorse. Conversely, there can be cases where 
agents violate the internalized rule, feel remorse, but, in fact, do nothing morally wrong. 
This is because, on Hare’s view, morally right and morally wrong actions are to be 
evaluated only in light of their relation to utility, not whether they should be punished by 
the conscience. Since Mill, unlike Hare, does link the punishment of conscience to moral 
wrongdoing, Mill can be said to have a similar view of the conscience as Hare (in that it 
operates in light of internalized rules) but a decidedly different conception of right and 
wrong.         
 The second objection I want to consider comes from Berger’s criticism of Lyons. 
Berger’s worry speaks more to questions about the textual justification of my view than 
to worries about the conceptual coherence of my view that Brink questioned. Like 
Brink’s objection, however, I believe that my reply brings out a distinctive aspect of the 
dissertation.    
 I noted in chapter three that Berger was concerned that Mill never clarified his 
views on how one was to reconcile the proportionality criterion and punishability 
criteria. In his article, Lyons made a notable effort to sketch a view of Mill’s 
utilitarianism that could be compatible with the fourteenth paragraph of chapter five and 
much of what Mill says elsewhere in his writings on moral philosophy. Berger’s 
objection is that while Lyons has made an interesting case for the connection between 
wrongdoing and punishment, he has not fully proved his case. Berger rightly says that 
Lyons does not “argue that Mill’s statements require his interpretation at all crucial 
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points.”490 Perhaps because of this fact, Lyons’ interpretation spurred on a number of 
scholars like Gray and Sumner who attempted to reconcile the proportionality criterion 
in chapter two of Utilitarianism with the punishability criterion that Lyons outlines. 
Berger methodically raises some objections to each of these attempts and explains why 
they fail.
491
 The reasons they fail is not so important for my purposes here. What is 
important is Berger’s conclusion that his review of Mill scholarship, and the many 
passages he has examined in trying to determine Mill’s theory of morality, has led him 
to settle on the view that, “Mill did not sufficiently resolve the conflict between the 
‘proportionality’ criterion of right action and the ‘punishability’ criterion.”492 Berger 
insists that Mill altered, but did not ultimately reject the proportionality criterion as a 
significant tool in his moral thinking. There seems to be evidence, he thinks, on both 
sides of the question:   
 It may well be that the punishability criterion came to dominate his thinking. 
 But the part of Utilitarianism in which the punishability criterion was given—the 
 chapter on justice—was written before the part of the book in which the 
 proportionality standard was set out. Moreover, the essay on Hamilton shows 
 both criteria at work, though written well after Utilitarianism, and a similar 
 duality is displayed in ‘Thornton on Labour,’ also written after Utilitarianism.493 
 If Berger were correct in his historical and textual claims, I admit that this would 
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pose a problem for my interpretation. If Mill had employed the proportionality criterion 
as a moral principle in later work outside of Utilitarianism, then the Ecumenical 
interpretation’s rejection of the principle (as something Mill is committed to only in the 
pages of a text that he wrote with ecumenical aims in mind) would presumably be less 
plausible than it is. However, I will argue that Berger is mistaken in his claims here for 
two reasons. First, Berger is mistaken about the time at which Utilitarianism was 
written. In chapter four of this dissertation I argued that chapter five of Utilitarianism 
was written or at least revised and added later than the other chapters of Utilitarianism. 
Like the other chapters in the text, Mill seems to have begun to write the text of chapter 
five at least by 1854, but he seems to have delayed before returning to it later.
494
 
According to Taylor, the essays that comprise Utilitarianism were written sometime 
between 1850-1858, though certain portions were added later on and its contents revised 
in 1860.
495
 We know that Mill reviewed Bain’s book in 1859, which is cited favorably at 
the end of the crucial fourteenth paragraph of chapter five.
496
 We also know that in the 
Ward letter from 1859 we find many of same ideas as appear in the chapter on 
punishability criterion.
497
 Moreover, as was discussed in chapter five of this dissertation, 
much of the discussion about wrongdoing and punishment in the Examination (published 
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in 1865) seems perfectly in line with and even explanatory of Mill’s understanding of 
the connection between punishment and wrongdoing.
498
  
 Even if I were mistaken in the timing of the composition of the essays, however, 
the Ecumenical view could still stand as a reason to discount the proportionality 
criterion. This is because Mill seems to have different authorial aims in the text of 
chapter five than in the other four chapters. He introduces several key controversial and 
partisan doctrines in chapter five that are absent elsewhere in the text. In the first four 
chapters, Mill is primarily either responding to objections or defending commonly held 
utilitarian doctrines. When he does defend novel ideas, like the higher pleasures 
doctrine, he deliberately notes that he is doing so. Mill does not seem to be laying out the 
first principles of his moral philosophy, but rather making the general defense of the 
ethics of utility, just as he had said he might to Gomperz in 1858.
499
  
  The second reason I think Berger is mistaken is that he overstates his claims 
about the proportionality criterion being at work in both the Examination and the essay 
on Thornton. On the page that Berger cites for thinking that the proportionality criterion 
can be found in the Examination, the text that most closely resembles the proportionality 
criterion would be the following claim:   
 It matters not, for this purpose, whether the right and wrong of actions depends 
 on the consequences they tend to produce, or on an inherent quality of the actions 
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 themselves. It is indifferent whether we are utilitarians or anti-utilitarians; 
 whether our ethics rest on intuition or on experience.
500
  
As I read this, Mill is speaking here only as a point of comparison between two general 
approaches to ethical theories (utilitarianism/consequentialism and intuitionism). Mill is 
saying if one has a utilitarian perspective one may evaluate rightness or wrongness based 
on consequences. This is not in tension with the sanction utilitarian perspective since 
those consequences are, in fact, what matter when devising the moral rules that are 
internalized in one’s conscience. If the rules do not tend to produce good consequences 
then they are not the correct rules and could lead to wrong actions. Note, however, that 
the passage does not say, as the proportionality criterion does, that actions are right and 
wrong in proportion to their tendency to produce pleasure and pain. That is a crucial 
element of the criterion (hence the name), and the fact that Mill does not say that here 
leads me to conclude that he is just making a broad claim about the nature of utilitarian 
moral theories, namely that they evaluate right and wrong action with reference to the 
consequences they tend to produce.  
 Berger’s citation of the passages from the essay on Thornton is more puzzling, 
since his cited passages gives credence to the punishability criterion but not the 
proportionality criterion.
501
 The page he cites that is presumably supposed to speak in 
favor of the punishability criterion does lend some support to it. In his essay Mill writes 
that, “there are many acts, and still a great number of forbearances the perpetual practice 
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of which by all is so necessary to the general well-being, that people must be held to 
compulsorily, either by law or social pressure. These acts and forbearances constitute 
duty.”502 Mill welcomes agents to do more than this, however, and to undertake actions 
that go beyond these requirements for the good of their fellow creatures. However, he 
insists that such actions should “be left free; being merely encouraged by praise and 
honour. . .”503 These passages speak to sanction utilitarian claim that actions relevant to 
moral duty are those that can be compelled and those that are good, but extend beyond 
what is required to avoid compulsion, are supererogatory and a properly evaluated only 
from an aesthetic standpoint.  
 Meanwhile, the passage cited in support of the idea that Mill maintained a 
commitment to the proportionality criterion is less than unequivocal. On that page, Mill 
is discussing Thornton’s maxim that whatever is lawfully done by one person should be 
able to be lawfully done by any number of people. Mill disagrees with Thornton on this 
point and gives a rather fanciful counterexample to illustrate its disagreement (the 
example is not relevant to my purposes here). He concludes with an admission that:  
 The cases are not parallel; but if there be so much as one case of this character, 
 it is discussable, and requires to be discussed, whether any given case is such a 
 one; and we have a fresh proof how little even the most plausible of these 
 absolute maxims of right and wrong are to be depended on, and how unsafe it is 
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 to lose sight, even for a moment, of the paramount principle—the good of the 
 human race.
504
 
This passage does speak in favor of the idea that one must recall the foundational 
principles motivating the formation of particular maxims and rules of a moral code. 
However, this is some distance from the specific claims of the proportionality criterion. 
The claim in this passage seems to be that one should not forget the point behind 
maxims or moral rules, but this is different from saying that actions are right and wrong, 
directly, in proportion as they tend to produce happiness. The sanction utilitarian reading 
of this passage would take Mill’s claim to be a reference to the idea that moral rules 
should not be pursued for their own sake, but rather for the sake of the ultimate end that 
they are seeking to promote. This is consistent with the sanction utilitarian reading of the 
Art of Life, which similarly stresses that the rules of moral obligation must be 
constructed with the content of the principle of utility firmly in mind since it is the end 
of all practical actions. In this way, then, Berger’s appeal to this passage as standing in 
support of the proportionality criterion is not plausible.    
 To sum up, Berger claims that Mill did not reconcile his proportionality criterion 
and his punishability criterion. He claims that Mill maintained a commitment to both 
criteria in his later writings just as he did in Utilitarianism. He also claimed that Mill 
seems to have written the punishability criterion earlier than the proportionality criterion. 
In reply, I reviewed the evidence that the chapter on justice was written or revised later 
than Berger claims. Also, by examining the passages that Berger cites as reasons to think 
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that Mill supported the proportionality criterion in his later writings, I find evidence for 
Mill’s support of the proportionality criterion lacking. Instead, Mill’s use of the 
proportionality criterion appears to be limited to the pages of chapter two of 
Utilitarianism. Given the nature of the Ecumenical reading, this puts Mill’s ultimate 
commitment to the criterion in jeopardy, while leaving the punishability criterion intact.   
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION   
  
 This chapter will serve as the closing chapter of the dissertation. The main 
section of this chapter will review the central arguments of the dissertation and try to 
draw specific lessons from each of the previous chapters. I will conclude with some 
remarks on just what this dissertation has accomplished.     
  
Overview of the defense of the sanction utilitarian interpretation  
 In this section I will provide a condensed overview of the arguments that I have 
given in favor of reading Mill as a sanction utilitarian. In order to be maximally helpful, 
I will explain what I take to be the essential contributions from each chapter. Like my 
discussion of act and rule utilitarian readings of Mill, this overview will not aim at 
comprehensiveness, but rather at prominence and relevance. That is to say, rather than 
giving a summary of all the chapters, I will pick out those aspects that speak most boldly 
and relevantly to the plausibility of my interpretation of Mill as a sanction utilitarian.  
 The most important contribution of the first chapter is its emphasis on clarifying 
the essential terminology and methodology that is employed in the dissertation. Perhaps 
the most important terminological point concerns the definition of utilitarianism itself. I 
maintain that non-maximizing versions of utilitarianism, such as satisficing 
utilitarianism, to be properly counted as utilitarian views. Following Shaw’s definition, I 
claim that central to utilitarianism is the idea that it is the results of actions that matter 
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for moral evaluation and that those consequences should be evaluated according to the 
happiness or the effects on well-being that they produce. These definitions are important 
since, in later chapters, I argue that Mill’s moral theory is a satisficing form of 
utilitarianism and Mill recognizes the principle of utility as his ultimate source of value. 
Mill’s sanction utilitarianism is a type of utilitarianism, then, since it aims to produce 
some acceptable level of good consequences while ascribing value to actions only in 
light of their contribution to happiness.  
 It is also important, of course, to introduce the idea of the Ecumenical reading of 
Utilitarianism early on in the dissertation. To date, no Mill scholar has thoroughly used 
the Ecumenical reading as a way of adjudicating disagreements about how to weigh 
competing passages of texts against one another across Mill’s writings on moral 
philosophy, and this reading has obviously proved helpful to my interpretation at several 
points in my argument.  
   There are three important lessons from chapter two of this dissertation. First, the 
chapter introduces Urmson’s important role in initiating a new set of interpretations of 
Mill’s moral philosophy, even if the textual arguments for his view are not decisive. 
Urmson correctly recognizes that Mill’s discussion of moral obligation in chapter five is 
a problem for maximizing act utilitarian readings of Mill’s views, and in a sense my 
interpretation builds upon what he argues for in his brief essay. Second, I show how 
Fuchs’ essay provides a solid review of the problematic texts for act utilitarian readers to 
explain and properly emphasizes the central role that rules have in Mill’s moral theory. 
He also does a service to those emphasizing a rule-oriented interpretation of Mill’s view 
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by responding to Sumner and West’s arguments that Mill’s theory sometimes resembles 
both act and rule utilitarianism. In my view, Fuchs provided good reasons to resist that 
kind of interpretation. However, third, Fuchs falters in his rule utilitarian interpretation 
by citing a number of texts from Mill’s works that were abandoned at the time he came 
write his major works of moral philosophy. Thus, while Fuchs provides some good 
reasons to favor the rule utilitarian reading, his interpretation is incomplete and open to 
question on methodological grounds.   
 The third chapter analyzes act utilitarian readings of Mill. First, my discussion of 
Crisp’s multilevel maximizing utilitarian reading illustrates the sharp contrast between 
that view and the sanction utilitarian reading that I defend. In particular, I show how we 
differ about which passages provide Mill’s criterion for right and wrong, and on whether 
Mill is a maximizing utilitarian. I show how Crisp bases his interpretation on a particular 
reading of the greatest happiness principle from chapter two of Utilitarianism, which, in 
Crisp’s view, provides the clearest understanding of Mill’s views on moral philosophy. 
While I do not argue with this claim directly by elucidating the ways in which Mill’s 
statement is vague, I do think that its importance should be discounted in light of the 
Ecumenical reading of Utilitarianism. On my argument, Mill gives his criterion of right 
and wrong in chapter five rather than in chapter two of Utilitarianism.  
 Crisp also argues for interpreting Mill as a maximizing utilitarian, whereas I read 
him as a satisficing utilitarian. In a passage where Mill seems to claim that agents do not 
have to maximize utility, Crisp is forced to say that Mill must be dissembling to some 
extent—even though the passage comes from Utilitarianism, where Mill is supposed to 
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be laying out the first principles of his moral theory. I also argue that Crisp fails to come 
up with a plausible account of Mill’s theory of supererogation, the Art of Life, and 
approach to punishing moral wrongdoing. On Crisp’s reading of chapter five of 
Utilitarianism, Mill holds that agents should punish themselves for any action that fails 
to maximize utility. As I discuss at several points in chapter five of this dissertation, 
many of Mill’s explicit statements are in tension with this reading.     
 Chapter three also includes my discussion of Berger’s strategy conception of 
rules provides the second lesson from chapter three. My review of Berger shows that 
moral rules can play a central role even in a view that ultimately reads Mill as a kind of 
act utilitarian. The strategy conception of rules argues that Mill’s reliance of rules is not 
a part of the meaning of Mill’s utilitarianism (as would be the case if Mill were a rule 
utilitarian), but is instead the result of various epistemological limitations of moral 
agents. Since humans often make mistakes of various kinds in calculating utility, they 
need to rely on rules in almost any kind of moral situation. However, when agents can be 
sure that they are not making a mistake, they can legitimately override the rules even in 
cases where that means violating moral rights. This reading of moral rights creates a 
problem, I suggest, following an objection from Brink, since Mill appears to regard 
moral rights as counterfactually stable. In many places in his writings, Mill seems to 
accord rights an unqualified level of protection that seems at odds with the strategy 
conception of rules.          
 The fourth chapter provides an indispensable component in my larger argument 
for sanction utilitarianism. This chapter provides two important lessons. First, scholars 
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should regard Mill’s claims in the first four chapters of Utilitarianism as statements 
about what many utilitarians believe rather than what Mill himself believes. This is 
essential to my case against many scholars like Crisp who draw heavily from the first 
four chapters of Utilitarianism in their interpretation of Mill’s moral philosophy. 
Second, my arguments in this chapter legitimize my emphasis on chapter five of 
Utilitarianism, wherein Mill provides his criterion of right and wrong. Both Crisp and 
Berger find difficulties reconciling Mill’s commitment to both the proportionality 
criterion from chapter two and the punishability criterion from chapter five of 
Utilitarianism. On my view, the scholarly focus on reconciling these two criteria is 
misplaced since Mill does not have conflicting criteria of right and wrong. 
 The fifth chapter of this dissertation provides two lessons. The first concerns 
Mill’s theory of moral obligation and its implications for his moral theory and the 
second concerns his account of rules and moral compulsion. The first lesson is that 
Mill’s theory of moral obligation, which he articulates in the fourteenth paragraph of 
chapter five in Utilitarianism, has significant implications for his moral theory. In 
particular, I argue that Mill’s view of moral obligation precludes Mill from being a 
maximizing act or rule utilitarian. Furthermore, his theory of moral obligation is 
compatible with non-utilitarian moral theories. I argue this point by connecting Mill’s 
three formulations of the connection between wrongdoing and punishment to his larger 
body of writings in moral theory. When these three formulations are analyzed together, I 
argue that they support the following definition:    
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 Sanction Theory of Moral Wrong: An act is morally wrong if and only if it is 
 appropriate for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience, and possibly 
 be subject to other punishments (e.g. social or legal penalties), for performance 
 of the act.  
 This definition obviously recognizes a very close relationship between an action 
being wrong and it being subject to punishment by the conscience. By examining Mill’s 
Implication Formulation I show that Mill is gesturing toward both an inferential and 
psychological connection between wrongdoing and this form of punishment. The 
inferential relationship is important since it is incompatible with maximizing rule 
utilitarianism. On the maximizing rule utilitarian view, wrong actions would only be 
punished when doing so, as a rule, maximizes utility. But Mill thinks that the conscience 
should punish every wrong action regardless of its effect on utility, which thereby 
makes his view incompatible with a maximizing rule utilitarian view. I also show how, 
in Mill’s Examination, he elaborates on both the close psychological relationship 
between wrongdoing and punishment in a way that coincides with his comments in 
chapter five of Utilitarianism. Mill also makes it clear in the Examination that he is 
sketching a theory of the conscience that is compatible with non-utilitarian moral 
theories, just as he seems to be doing in his discussion of moral obligation in 
Utilitarianism.   
 The most important implication of Mill’s Proper Object Formulation is that Mill 
seems to be allowing for actions that are positively and negatively evaluable in a non-
moralized sense. That is to say, agents using Mill’s Sanction Theory of Wrong can 
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evaluate actions from a perspective distinct from the realm of morality. This stands in 
contrast with maximizing act utilitarianism, which claims that all actions, strictly 
speaking, are included within the moral domain. The Proper Object Formulation seems 
to allow for actions that are admirable or unlikable, but not morally wrong, which seems 
in tension with the maximizing act utilitarian perspective. In my discussion of this 
passage I make it clear that, in the Proper Object Formulation itself, Mill does not say 
where one should draw the line between morality and actions that are positively or 
negatively evaluable but not morally right or wrong. However, drawing on key passages 
from Mill’s essay on Comte, I argue that in these passages Mill explicitly allows for 
agents to do actions that are admirable but not morally obligatory as well as actions that 
fail to maximize utility but are not morally wrong. These passages are clearly in conflict 
with the maximizing act utilitarian reading.    
 The Foundational Formulation, Mill’s third formulation of the connection 
between wrongdoing and punishment, serves to provide the beginnings of an account of 
moral right to supplement his account of moral wrong. While Mill has been clear up to 
this point in saying that wrongdoing is connected to punishment, he has said less about 
what it means to do a morally right action. In the Foundational Formulation, Mill 
explains that right actions are those that can be compelled. In my analysis of this 
Formulation, I argued that Mill’s theory of compulsion revolved around a particular 
understanding of the nature of moral rules. This comes out both in the text of On Liberty 
and in the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism where Mill explains his theory of justice, which 
very explicitly involves an appeal to rules in order to justify compulsion. 
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 The discussion of compulsion leads to the second lesson from chapter five, which 
concerns this connection between compulsion and rules. Mill’s discussion of justice 
makes it very clear that justice necessarily involves rules, but the case is less clear for 
matters of moral obligation more generally. The key piece of evidence I presented in 
favor of the idea that moral rules are an essential part of moral obligation is the letter 
from Mill to Ward in 1859. In the letter, Mill says that the moral ought means that those 
who violate moral rules shall be punished by the internal sanction of conscience. This 
letter is crucial for my case, since it ensures a connection between moral obligation and 
rules and it emphasizes the centrality of the internal sanction of conscience for Mill’s 
theory of morality.  
 There are three lessons concerning the sixth and final substantive chapter of the 
dissertation that argues directly for the sanction utilitarian interpretation of Mill. The 
first is that when one adds a satisficing understanding of utilitarianism to the theory of 
moral obligation that Mill sketched in the previous chapter, one derives the following 
understanding of Mill’s utilitarianism:  
 Sanction Utilitarianism: An act is morally wrong if and only if it is appropriate 
 for an agent to feel the internal sanction of conscience (and possibly be subject to 
 other punishments such as social or legal penalties) for violating a rule in a 
 moral code that, when internalized by an agent, promotes utility.     
In my discussion and defense of this definition, I answer several questions concerning 
this definition of sanction utilitarianism. These include questions about what it means for 
an action to violate a rule, how the conscience operates in unison with a code of moral 
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rules, and how this definition carves out a type of utilitarianism that is distinct from act 
and rule utilitarianism.  
 The second lesson from this chapter is that sanction utilitarianism is compatible 
with two prominent aspects of Mill’s moral and political theory: his Art of Life and his 
theory of liberty. In my discussion of the Art of Life, I confront various objections from 
Brink, who claims that a proper understanding of the Art of Life is incompatible with 
sanction utilitarianism. In my replies, I suggest that Brink seems to have a mistaken 
conception of both the Art of Life and the commitments of sanction utilitarianism. For 
instance, I argue that the Art of Life does not commit Mill to maximizing utility across 
the different departments nor does it commit Mill to saying that prudential errors are to 
be sanctioned in the same way as moral errors. In my discussion of Mill’s theory of 
liberty, I deploy Jacobson’s reading of On Liberty to show that the realm of self-
regarding action that is free from moral sanctioning is a much larger domain than had 
been recognized on the previous interpretations of Mill’s harm principle and theory of 
liberty. 
 The third lesson is that Mill’s sanction utilitarianism can respond to objections 
challenging both its conceptual coherence and its textual foundations. Brink challenged 
the conceptual coherence of the view by saying that sanction utilitarianism provides the 
wrong kind of reason for explaining why an action is wrong—namely that it warrants a 
particular kind of response. On the standard view, it is because actions are wrong that 
they receive a particular kind of response, not the other way around. In my reply I 
suggest that the concern that seems to be at the heart of this objection—that responses to 
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wrongdoing should come about as the result of reasons—can be accommodated on the 
sanction utilitarian view. This is because, on that view, wrongdoing is identified in virtue 
of both a justified moral rule being violated and a punishment that accompanies the rule 
violation. In this way, sanction utilitarianism punishes actions for reasons. However, 
because of how Mill understands the nature of the conscience, rules, and punishment, the 
punishment itself retains a very close conceptual relationship with those reasons such 
that it should always be present in a case of wrongdoing by an agent who has 
internalized the justified moral rules and has a properly functioning conscience.  
 I also reply to an objection from Berger who claims that Mill does not 
sufficiently reconcile his proportionality criterion and punishability criterion for morally 
right and wrong actions. He finds both criteria at work in Mill’s later writings, which 
provides reasons to believe that, despite their obvious importance to his theory, Mill 
never figured out how to make the two compatible. In my reply to Berger, I review the 
evidence for the Ecumenical reading that says that one can properly discard the 
proportionality criteria as a part of Mill’s moral theory. I then review the passages that 
Berger cites where Mill supposedly uses the proportionality criteria in later writings. 
Upon examination I find that these passages lack a clear expression of the central ideas 
in the proportionality criterion. Thus, Berger’s contention that Mill is operating with 
both criteria in his later writings is false.   
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Concluding remarks  
 In closing, I want to once more clarify what I take myself to have done in this 
dissertation. I hold that I have given good reasons to doubt that Mill embraced either act 
or rule utilitarianism in the form proffered by prominent interpreters. I also hold that the 
interpretation I offer in favor of Mill’s theory of moral obligation and his theory of 
utilitarianism provide sufficient reason to think that sanction utilitarianism is the moral 
theory that Mill ultimately endorses. I also take it that my defense of the Ecumenical 
reading of Utilitarianism makes the sanction utilitarianism reading of Mill more 
plausible than it was previously. Mill may not have answered all of the questions that 
one might have about this theory, but he has given interpreters enough evidence to 
justifiably conclude that it is the best reading of his theory, which is what I said I would 
be arguing for at the outset of this dissertation.       
 271 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bain, Alexander. John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Reflections. London: Longman’s, 
 1882. 
 
Balfour, Arthur. Theism and Humanism. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915. 
 
Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce. Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals. Chicago:  
 Chicago University Press, 2009. 
 
Berger, Fred. Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy  
 of John Stuart  Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
 
Bradley, Ben. “Against Satisficing Consequentialism.” Utilitas 18 (2006): 97-108. 
 
Brandt, Richard. “Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism.” University of 
 Colorado Studies 3 (1967): 39-65. 
 
Brink, David. “Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 21  
 (1992): 67–103. 
 
———. “Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of  
 Philosophy. Stanford University, 1997-. Article published Fall 2008. 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mill- 
 moral-political/. 
 
———. Mill’s Progressive Principles. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2013. 
 
Brown, D.G. “Mill on Liberty and Morality.” The Philosophical Review 81 (1972): 133-
 158. 
 
———. “Mill’s Act-Utilitarianism.” Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974): 67-68. 
 
———. “Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionism.” Philosophy, Politics, and 
 Economics 9 (2010): 5-45.    
 
———. “What is Mill’s Principle of Utility?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3  
 (1973): 1-12. 
 
Buss, Sarah. “Personal Autonomy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1997-,  
 Article published 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/. 
 272 
 
 
Capaldi, Nicholas. John Stuart Mill: A Biography. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2004. 
 
Collini, Stefan. Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 
 1850-1930. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991.  
 
Coope, Christophere Miles. “Was Mill a Utilitarian?” Utilitas 10 (1998): 33-67. 
 
Copp, David. “The Iterated-Utilitarianism of J.S. Mill.” Supplementary Canadian  
 Journal of Philosophy 5 (1979): 75-98. 
 
Cosgrove, Richard. The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist. Chapel Hill:  
 University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
 
Crisp, Roger, ed. J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism. Oxford Philosophical Texts. Oxford, UK: 
 Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
——. Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge, 1997.   
 
Darwall, Stephen. “Moral Obligation and Accountability.” In The Second-Person  
 Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability, 91-110. Cambridge, Mass.: 
 Harvard University Press, 2009. 
 
Donner, Wendy, and Richard Fumerton. Mill. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
 
——. “Mill’s Utilitarianism.” In The Cambridge Companion to John Stuart  
 Mill. Edited by John Skorupski, 255-292. New York: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1998.  . 
 
Driver, Julia. “The History of Utilitarianism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of  
 Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997-. Article published Summer 2009. 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history/. 
 
Dyer, D.P. “Mill’s Utilitarianism.” In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 10, 
 Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society. Edited by John Robson, lxiii-cxiii. 
 Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985. 
 
Edwards, Rem. “The Principle of Utility and Mill’s Minimizing Utilitarianism.” The  
 Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (1986): 125-136. 
 
Eggleston, Ben. “Rules and their Reasons: Mill on Morality and Instrumental  
 Rationality.” In John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. Edited by Ben Eggleston, 
 273 
 
 Dale Miller, and David Weinstein, 71-93. New York: Oxford University Press, 
 2010. 
 
——, Dale Miller, and David Weinstein. Introduction to John Stuart Mill  
 and the Art of Life. Edited by Ben Eggleston, Dale Miller, and David Weinstein,  
 3-18. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Eggleston, Ben, Dale Miller, and David Weinstein, eds. John Stuart Mill and the Art of 
 Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
 
Fuchs, Alan. “Mill’s Theory of a Morally Correct Action.” In The Blackwell Guide to  
 Mill’s Utilitarianism. Edited by Henry West, 139-158. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
 2006. 
 
Gray, John. Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. 
 
——, G.W. Smith, eds. J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. London: Routledge, 1991.   
 
Hare, R.M. Moral Thinking: Its Method, Level, and Point. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
 1981. 
 
Hurka, Thomas. “Two Kinds of Satisficing.” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 107-111. 
 
Irwin, Terence. The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Vol. 3, 
 From Kant to Rawls. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Jacobson, Daniel. “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.” Oxford Studies in  
 Metaethics 1 (2006): 99-126. 
 
——. “J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism.” Philosophers Imprint 3  
 (2003): 1-18. 
 
——. “Review of Henry R. West, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
 Utilitarianism.” In Notre Dame Philosophical Review. Published July, 2007.   
 http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25072-the-blackwell-guide-to-mill-s-utilitarianism/. 
 
——. “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill.” 
 Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 159-191. 
 
Kagan, Shelly.  The Limits of Morality.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
——. Normative Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998. 
 274 
 
 
Kahn, Leonard. “The Objection from Justice and the Conceptual/Substantive  
 Distinction.” In Mill on Justice. Edited by Leonard Kahn, 198-220. New York:  
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Lewis, David. “Mill and Milquetoast.” In Mill on Liberty. Edited by Gerald Dworkin, 1- 
 29. New York: Routledge, 1988. 
 
Lyons, David. “Human Rights and General Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 
  (1977): 113-129. 
 
——. In the Interest of the Governed. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1973. 
 
——. “Mill’s Theory of Morality.” Nous 10 (1976): 101-120. 
 
——. Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory. New York: Oxford University Press,  
 1994. 
 
——. “Utility and Rights.” In Ethics, Economics, and the Law. Edited by J.R.  
 Pennock and J.W. Chapman, 107-138. New York: New York University Press, 
 1982. 
 
Martin, Rex. “Mill’s Rule Utilitarianism in Context.” In John Stuart Mill and the Art of 
 Life. Edited by Ben Eggleston, Dale Miller, and David Weinstein, 21-43. New 
 York: Oxford University Press, 2010.   
 
Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 1, Autobiography and 
 Literary Essays. Edited by John Robson. Toronto University Press, 1981. 
 
 ——.The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 2, The Principles of Political  
 Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. Edited by John 
 Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1965. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 3, Principles of Political Economy 
 with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Books 3-5 and 
 Appendices. Edited by John Robson. Toronto University Press, 1965. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 4, Essays on Economics and 
 Society. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1967.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 5, Essays on Economics and 
 Society. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1967.  
 275 
 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 8, A System of Logic Ratiocinative 
 and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the 
 Methods of Scientific Investigation. Edited by John Robson. Toronto University 
 Press, 1974.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 9, An Examination of William 
 Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed 
 in his Writings. Edited by John Robson. Toronto University Press, 1979. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion, 
 and Society. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 11, Essays on  Philosophy and the 
 Classics. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1978. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 12, The Earlier Letters of John 
 Stuart Mill 1812-1848. Edited by Francis Mineka. Toronto: Toronto University 
 Press, 1963.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 13, The Earlier Letters of John 
 Stuart Mill 1812-1848. Edited by Francis Mineka. Toronto: Toronto 
 University Press, 1963.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 14, The Later Letters of John Stuart 
 Mill 1849-1873. Edited by Francis Mineka and Dwight Lindley. Toronto: 
 Toronto University Press, 1972.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 15, The Later Letters of John Stuart 
 Mill 1849-1873. Edited by Francis Mineka and Dwight Lindley. Toronto: 
 Toronto University Press, 1972.  
 
——.  The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 16, The Later Letters of John 
 Stuart Mill 1849-1873. Edited by Francis Mineka and Dwight Lindley. Toronto: 
 Toronto University Press, 1972.  
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 17, The Later Letters of John  
 Stuart Mill 1849-1873. Edited by Francis Mineka and Dwight Lindley.  
 Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 18, Essays on Politics and 
 Society. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977. 
 
 276 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 19, Essays on Politics and 
 Society. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 21, Essays on Equality, Law, and 
 Education. Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1984. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 26, Journals and Debating 
 Speeches.  Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 27, Journals and Debating 
 Speeches.  Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988. 
 
——. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 32, Journals and Debating 
 Speeches.  Edited by John Robson. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1991. 
 
Miller, Dale. J.S. Mill: Moral, Social, and Political Thought. Malden, MA: Polity, 2010. 
 
——. “Mill, Rule Utilitarianism, and the Incoherence Objection.” In John Stuart Mill 
 and the Art of Life. Edited by Ben Eggleston, Dale Miller, and David 
 Weinstein, 94-116. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
——. “Mill’s Theory of Sanctions.” In The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism.  
 Edited by Henry West, 159-173. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 
 
Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
 1979. 
 
North, John S., ed. The Waterloo Directory of English Newspapers and Periodicals 
 1800-1900. 20 vols. Waterloo, Ont.: North Waterloo Academic Press, 2003. 
 
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
 
Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. 
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
 
Railton, Peter. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” 
 Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134–71. 
 
Rawls, Jon. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
 University Press, 2007. 
 
 277 
 
Rees, J.C. “A Re-Reading of Mill’s On Liberty.” In J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. 
 Edited by John Gray and G.W. Smith, 169-189. London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Reeves, Richard. John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand. London: Atlantic, 2007. 
 
Ridge, Michael. “Mill’s Intentions and Motives.” Utilitas 14 (2002): 54-70. 
 
Riley, Jonathan. Mill on Liberty. New York: Routledge, 1998 
 
——. “Racism, Blasphemy, and Free Speech.” In Mill’s On Liberty: A Critical Guide. 
 Edited by C.L. Ten, 62-82. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Roberts, William, ed. Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Mrs. Hannah More. 
 Volume 1. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1834. 
 
Robson, John. The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of J.S.  
 Mill. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968. 
 
——. “Textual Introduction.” In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 2, The 
 Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social 
 Philosophy. Edited by John Robson, lxv-lxxxviii. Toronto: Toronto University 
 Press, 1965.  
 
——. “Textual Introduction.” In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 9,  An 
 Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal 
 Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings. Edited by John Robson, lxix-
 cii. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979.  
 
——. “Textual Introduction.” In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 10, 
 Essays  on Ethics, Religion, and Society. Edited by John Robson, cxv- cxxxix. 
 Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985.  
 
Rosen, Frederick. Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. New York:  Routledge, 
 2003. 
 
——. Mill. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
Rowlands, Mark. Can Animals Be Moral? New York: Oxford University Press, 2012 
 
Ryan, Alan. Introduction to Utilitarianism and Other Essays. By John Stuart Mill and  
 Jeremy Bentham, 7-64. New York: Penguin, 1987. 
 
——. John Stuart Mill. New York: Random House, 1970. 
 
 278 
 
——. The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. London: Macmillan, 1970. 
 
——. “John Stuart Mill’s Art of Living.” In J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. Edited by 
 John Gray and G.W. Smith, 162-168. London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Schneewind, J.B. Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford, UK: 
 Clarendon Press, 1978. 
 
Shaw, William. Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism. Malden, MA: 
 Blackwell, 1999. 
 
Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics, 7
th
 ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981. 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Consequentialism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
  Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997-. Article published Fall 2011, 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. 
 
Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” In The Vision 
 of Politics. Vol. 1, Regarding Method, 57-89. New York: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2002. 
 
Skorupski, John.  John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge, 1989. 
 
——. “Utilitarianism in Mill’s Philosophy.” In The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
 Utilitarianism. Edited by Henry West, 45-59. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006). 
 
Smart, J.J.C., “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics.” In J.J.C. Smart and Bernard 
 Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, 3-74. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1973. 
 
—— and Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge, UK: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
 
Snyder, Laura. Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society.
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
Stack, David. “The Death of John Stuart Mill.” The Historical Journal 54 (2011): 167-
 190. 
 
Stafford, William. John Stuart Mill. New York: St. Martins, 1998. 
 
Sumner, L.W. “The Good and the Right.” Supplementary Canadian Journal of  
 Philosophy 5 (1979): 99-114. 
 
 279 
 
Taylor, Helen. “Introductory Notice to Three Essays on Religion.” In The Collected 
 Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society. 
 Edited by John Robson, 371-372. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985. 
 
Ten, C.L., Mill on Liberty. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1980. 
 
——. “Mill’s Defense of Liberty.” In J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. Edited by John 
 Gray and G.W. Smith, 212-238. London: Routledge, 1991.   
 
Tunick, Mark. “Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill’s Defense of British India.”  
 Review of Politics 68 (2006): 586-611. 
 
 Urmson, J.O. “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill.” Philosophical 
 Quarterly 3 (1953): 33-39. 
 
West, Henry, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
 2006. 
 
——. An Introduction to Mill’s Utilitarian Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2004. 
 
Williams, Bernard. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In J.J.C Smart and Bernard Williams, 
 Utilitarianism: For and Against, 77-150. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1973. 
 
Wolf, Susan. “Moral Saints.” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-439. 
 
Wolff, Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1968. 
 
 
 
